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# ***JPRS Report***

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## **Near East & South Asia**

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# Near East & South Asia

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## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

### Author Says Independent State Should Precede Islamic State

44040086 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 1 Nov 88 p 11

[Article by Fahmi Huwaydi: "Tuesday's Discussion: A Liberated Palestine before an Islamic Palestine"]

[Text] We truly wish for an Islamic Palestine, but more importantly, we wish for a liberated Palestine. My greatest fear is that, despite the utmost sincerity and good will with which the Islamic character of Palestine is being pursued, insisting on that now could turn out to be a new land mine that will hold back progress toward liberation by bringing up an issue that has no place on the list of priorities at this stage.

To put it more clearly, we say this: We support any Islamic action to liberate Palestine. In fact, it is our contention that if such action were to become a struggle for the cause of God or lead to martyrdom, it could help us achieve that which we have been hoping for. But we oppose fragmenting the resistance or dividing its ranks in the name of any Islamic action. Such division in the ranks would breed discord which must be avoided. We also oppose distracting the masses with postliberation formulas and with the question of whether the state should be secular or Islamic.

I say this because of the renewed clamor over these matters on the Palestinian scene since last summer. This clamor surrounded the uprising with some confusion, which the Israelis must have hoped for, if they did not in fact try to encourage it by various methods and stratagems.

The clamor has existed for years, and conflicts between Palestinian tendencies have persisted, particularly between the Islamic and secular tendencies. These conflicts assumed various forms in Gaza, Nablus, and Bi'r Zayt, developing into hand-to-hand fights and involving the use of knives. In fact, a few factions went so far as to tell the Israelis indirectly the names of their "opponents" Islamic leaders when a list of those names came out in a publication that was circulated in Gaza in 1985. Some Muslims became so perplexed that some of them were compelled to say that fighting in Afghanistan was a religious duty to which everyone was bound but that fighting in Palestine was a duty to be met by only a sufficient number of Muslims. This is because the former is a fight against godlessness and atheism, while the latter is only a fight against the settlement of territory by others.

Such sorrowful and shameful conflicts were fought primarily in the universities, and we used to console ourselves by saying that those involved in the conflicts were young men who were led by their passions and who were, perhaps, shortsighted. But these conflicts were almost brought to an end early last December with the birth of

the uprising, which reminded everyone of the other side of the conflict. It reminded them that the enemy of both Muslims and secularists was the Israeli occupation.

The most important result of the uprising was the changing of the course of the conflict. The uprising, which resulted in a prominent role for the Islamic Jihad, required some kind of coordination between factions of the resistance, and that was done under a united leadership. These were among the most significant accomplishments of the uprising which thereby shifted to a new stage in which the Palestinian party was markedly predominant.

But the new development which occurred in the summer was the birth of the Islamic Resistance Movement. That new Islamic organization, whose acronym is HAMAS, announced its Charter last August 18. [The following] are among the first of several matters worth noting in the Charter:

- Article Two states, "The Islamic Resistance Movement is a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood Organization in Palestine. The Muslim Brotherhood Organization, which is a worldwide organization, is one of the largest Islamic movements of the modern age."
- Article 11 states that the Islamic Resistance Movement believes that "Palestinian land is a Muslim endowment deeded to generations of Muslims until the Day of Resurrection. No one may dispose of this land, and no one may relinquish it or any part of it to anyone. No Arab country or countries and no Palestinian or Arab organization or organizations may dispose of this land or relinquish it to anyone."
- Article 13 states that initiatives or so-called peaceful solutions and international initiatives to resolve the Palestinian question contradict the ideology of the Islamic Resistance Movement, which believes that giving away any part of Palestine is tantamount to a partial renunciation of religion. The Resistance Movement does not think that the proposed international conference to solve the question can achieve demands or restore rights. "These conferences are nothing more than forums where godless people become arbitrators and make decisions about the land of Muslims."
- Article 15 states that "when enemies usurp some of the land which belongs to Muslims, each Muslim is bound by his religious duty to take up arms and fight. To confront the Jews' usurpation of Palestine, holy war must be declared, and that requires spreading Islamic consciousness among the masses."
- Article 27 states that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the closest organization to the Islamic Resistance Movement. Influenced by circumstances surrounding its birth and the intellectual confusion which prevailed in the Arab world as a result of the intellectual conquest which affected that world, the PLO adopted the idea of a secular state. This idea of a secular state totally contradicts that of a religious

state. And that is why we cannot, despite our appreciation for the PLO and for its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, replace the current and future Islamic character of Palestine with its opposite, a secular state. An Islamic Palestine is part of our religion, and anyone who renounces his religion loses. When the PLO adopts Islam as a way of life, we will become its soldiers. Until then, our attitude toward the PLO shall be that of a son to his father and a brother to his brother.

- Article 31 states that the Islamic Resistance Movement is bound by Islam's tolerant spirit in its view of the followers of other religions. Under Islam, people who subscribe to the three religions can coexist in peace and security. "Followers of other religions are to stop fighting with Islam over sovereignty in this area."

### Political Mistakes

Announcement of HAMAS's Charter prompted diverse reactions. The timing of the announcement was the subject of a major question, especially since it came approximately 8 months after the start of the uprising. Although Muslims did have a role to play in the outbreak of the uprising, they did do their part under a unified command. Yet, when it became evident to everyone in Palestine and abroad that the uprising was having positive effects on Palestinian reality and destiny, it appeared as though one particular party wanted to establish its own presence and to set itself apart from the others. Some people associated HAMAS's announcement with the vacuum left by the death of Abu Jihad, who had been schooled in the principles of the Islamic Brotherhood. He was the man who had planned and worked out the cooperation between Muslims and others in the uprising. His departure had stirred the ambitions of those who wanted to claim the position of leadership for themselves.

That possibility led the movement to strive for the statement, made in the beginning of its Charter, that it was a faction of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement and a part of the group's worldwide organization. That statement was to a large extent a fortunate one. In the climate of the uprising it appeared that the authors of the charter were more interested in the movement than they were in the cause. Furthermore, it was not understood how the group, which considered the struggle in the occupied land a binding duty for everyone in all factions, would designate just one of its factions for the struggle.

The fact that the Charter was formulated to divide and not to unify is related to this point. Article Two of the Charter states that the movement was founded on the cadres of a political organization which has links to secularism, but which, in contradiction, bars nonmembers of the organization from joining the movement, even though a subsequent stipulation welcomes every Muslim into the movement. The movement thus made

an additional mistake: because it ruled out non-Muslims from the struggle, it reinforced the notion that it represented an organization, not a nation.

The Charter dealt with another point in an enviably unfortunate manner. It referred to Palestine as an Islamic endowment, and it called upon followers of other religions to stop fighting with Muslims over sovereignty in the area. These are signals that a balanced political mind would find incomprehensible or inexplicable because they convey many negative implications for no reason whatsoever. Basically, such signals distort the Islamic position which, I don't think has singled out any land or people for an endowment. I also don't think that Islam spread its power by warning or scaring others.

If everyone is suffering under the burden and pressure of occupation, is it wise to muddy the waters and create civil unrest? Why raise questions like that of an endowment or a dispute over sovereignty? It is pointless to talk about such matters at present, not to mention the fact that we find this business about an endowment extraordinary. We think there is no basis of authenticity for it in the reported tradition or in logic.

No one disputes the history of the struggle put up by the Muslim Brotherhood Movement in Palestine. And yet, no one noticed any continuity in this role, especially after the 1967 occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. But HAMAS's Charter emphasizes this business about an Islamic endowment and then rejects any political solutions. The Charter declares that fighting for the liberation of Palestine is a duty that everyone is bound to fulfill. Because HAMAS is a faction of the Muslim Brotherhood, it may be legitimate to ask where were these convictions during the past 20 years! It may be legitimate to ask why is it that the brotherhood's cadres did not rise to defend "the endowment" and perform the duty which they were bound to fulfill? Why did they not take up the armed struggle all this time? Why is it that these cadres remembered these grandiose notions 8 months after the uprising?

Despite expressions of appreciation and the complimentary tone used in the Charter to describe the relationship with the PLO, HAMAS's position appeared to clash with the PLO's. HAMAS appeared to be condemning the PLO's appeal to establish a secular state as well as its attitude toward the idea of an international conference. It even seemed that the fledgling movement was proceeding on a course which contradicted the PLO's. Although there is nothing wrong with having differences and different points of view in political activity, evoking these differences at the peak of the uprising and then arguing about the postliberation formula showed no good judgment at all. It rather contributed to the confusion and fragmentation, and it cannot be justified by good intentions or sound objectives.

### When the Cause Was Missing

It is noteworthy that the movement's media appeared to be aware of some of the dangers created by the announcement of the Charter, especially with regard to the unity of Palestinian action. Last August 18, when ties were broken between Jordan and the West Bank, HAMAS issued a statement entitled, "Palestine Is Islamic from the Sea to the River." The statement, which came out as Bulletin Number 28, stated that "The dispute over who is to take over Palestine and manage its affairs becomes logical if aggression is removed and the cloud of sorrow hanging over the country is lifted. Talking about who will take over the country will be proper after the country is liberated, but bringing up that subject while the enemy continues to oppress us does nothing more than put us in a tight spot. Whoever is embarrassing us in this way has an ulterior motive. Anyway, since when has divisiveness and discord been patriotic in any way?"

In a nonperiodical publication that is published in Cyprus by the same tendency and entitled, *Islam And Palestine*, the editorial in the sixth issue of that publication, which came out on August 1, stated: "It may be wrong to start distributing the inheritance now," as though this were a case of a bequest and spoils! "It would also be wrong to issue testimonials that one group or another deserves more credit or that one group fought more and struggled harder than others. That would be wrong and out of place because it would shift the battle to the uprising itself, and it would not help unify efforts against the enemy."

An article entitled, "The Islamic Plan in Palestine," which appeared in the same publication, displayed the movement's attempt to criticize itself. The article stated, "The question of a Western-Zionist attack on Palestine has been missing from the Islamic scene for many years. In Palestine, Islamic diversity and pluralism continued to yield nothing but negative consequences. Nothing of major, positive significance was achieved because Islamic diversity is a phenomenon associated with other Arab and Islamic conditions and lacks the opportunity to contribute to an Islamic awakening in Arab and Islamic countries. This phenomenon, whose existence is based on the Palestinian national concern, does not attempt to initiate conflict with the Zionist enemy, the main opposition to the Muslim people of Palestine. It was a major tragedy that the National Palestinian Plan was set forth while Muslims looked on with enviable neutrality."

After that the article established that significant changes had taken place in recent years on the Islamic scene in Palestine. "Once again Palestine became the main concern of most Islamic, Palestinian forces and many Islamic forces in the world. A formula for the unity of Islamic, Palestinian forces must now be found as a condition to the establishment of the Islamic plan in Palestine."

### The Pitfalls of Dispute

True intentions or the nature of declared appeals notwithstanding, the fact of the matter is that, in practice, possibilities were created for disputes between HAMAS and leaders of the uprising and between HAMAS and the PLO. There was nothing extraordinary about that because the new movement's proposals had tried to present the movement as a party that did not complement the other parties on the scene and that was to be distinguished from them. Therefore, the possibility that people with ulterior motives, chief among whom are the Israelis, would try to drive a wedge between HAMAS and leaders of the uprising should not be ruled out.

On numerous occasions when leaders of the uprising called a general strike on certain days, HAMAS would call a strike on other days. At general conferences, HAMAS members would accuse the PLO of being secular, while young PLO members responded by charging that Muslim Brothers were reactionaries. Signs and leaflets were other tools that were used in exchanging accusations and competing with other parties. While one party was accused of serving the enemy and splitting the ranks, the other was accused of relinquishing the cause and squandering the sacrifices made by martyrs, and so on and so forth.

Such disputes created confusion on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, and that confusion was echoed by the foreign press. In its 11 September issue the British newspaper, *THE GUARDIAN*, said that "HAMAS was conjuring up the specter of old divisions within Palestinian ranks." In its 27 September issue, the newspaper, *INDEPENDENT*, stated that divisions would weaken the uprising, and that would serve Israel's interests. *REUTERS* carried a report from Gaza indicating that Mr Yasir 'Arafat, president of the PLO, was making a major effort to mend the rift within the Palestinian Resistance. The report stated that a meeting had been held in Kuwait in September to look into containing the disputes and bringing about some kind of integration and coordination between HAMAS and leaders of the uprising. That meeting was attended by representatives of the various parties.

It was understood that Mr Yasir 'Arafat was to discuss the matter last 11 October with Mr Muhammad Hamid Abu-al-Nasr, grand master of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. It was also understood that Abu 'Ammar's talks in this regard were quite successful. That success was reflected in a statement which Mr Abu-al-Nasr issued after his meeting with 'Arafat in which he appealed to all Palestinian tendencies to unite under the leadership of the PLO, affirming that the PLO was the sole spokesman for the Palestinian people. Mr Abu-al-Nasr also said that the PLO had the power to make decisions on everything having to do with the affairs of Palestinians.

Mr Abu-al-Nasr's appeal was thought to have contained the dispute. At the same time it was considered an attempt to rectify the relationship between HAMAS, PLO leaders, and leaders of the uprising. In the same measure it was considered a step toward achieving unity of Islamic, Palestinian action. This is because there are many factions in the Islamic Resistance, although HAMAS is the largest one, especially in the Gaza Strip. HAMAS is the largest faction in the Islamic Resistance because of its association with the highly popular Muslim Brotherhood Organization. And yet the most prominent faction on the scene is Islamic Jihad, which coordinates its activities with leaders of the uprising. Al-Jihad gained this prominence after the numerous daring operations which were carried out by its young members who died in action and became the explosive ingredient which set off the popular uprising. There is a third faction which is influenced by the ideas of the Iranian Revolution. Although that faction subscribes to the idea of armed struggle, it too coordinates its activities with leaders of the uprising. Because the presence of other Islamic factions, such as members of the Islamic Liberation Party and the Salafiya movement, has no concrete impact on the confrontation, these factions do not represent an obstacle to the unity of the ranks.

Because Israel misses no tricks in scheming and sowing discord, it took advantage of HAMAS' mistake in formulating its relationship with non-Muslims, and it tried to provoke the Christians. Unidentified individuals started fires in a few bars in Nablus that are owned by Christians. Naturally, the fingers were pointed at "radical Muslims."

Although grass-roots Christians stand solidly with and within the uprising and although young Christians are members of various resistance factions, Israel's untiring and malicious efforts prodded a small number of Christians to look into the idea of establishing an exclusively Christian resistance faction. It was said that the likely name for that faction would be HAMAM, an acronym for the Christian Resistance Movement. That name was an indirect response to the establishment of HAMAS. Although that new organization has not yet been founded, news leaks from Amman indicate that preparations for it are still underway in Bethlehem, the Christians' stronghold. The news indicates that leaders of the uprising and the PLO are making intense efforts to contain the attempt and mend this new rift among Palestinians.

Such sad impending breakdowns are closely associated with the main mistake committed by HAMAS when it wanted to set itself apart from others and was unwilling to complement them. HAMAS made a mistake when it formulated its Charter in this unfortunate manner.

It is ironic that the early efforts of the Palestinian Resistance 70 years ago noticed what the Muslim Brothers' Movement overlooked in Gaza. During the days of the British mandate when they faced the activities of

Zionist organizations in Palestine, Palestinian scientists, noblemen, and merchants decided to establish societies for Muslims and Christians to resist the Zionists' penetration of the country and use all means to fight the purchase of land by Jews. The logo adopted by these societies showed a cross inside a crescent. Palestinian references indicate that in 1918 the British mandate government approved the establishment of these societies, [one of] whose bylaws stated "The objective of the society is to strive and emphasize the effort to upgrade the country's agricultural, industrial, economic, and commercial affairs. It is the objective of the society to revive knowledge, to educate young patriots, and to preserve the material and moral rights of citizens."

The activities of Islamic-Christian societies changed subsequently so as to conform to the formula of the Palestinian Arab Congress which was convened for the first time in 1919. Everyone participated in that congress which was tantamount to a Palestinian parliament. An executive committee was born out of that congress, and that committee became the leader of the national movement and the spokesman for the Arabs of Palestine.

In 1918 the clarity and maturity of vision were greater than they are in 1988!

#### In the School of Islam

An independent legal opinion is not required here. The damage and the loss are there. It would be extremely easy to make a choice between malicious acts and advantageous ones. However, we will mention only two matters: The significance of the story in the Koran which reported what transpired between the Prophet Moses, may the peace of God be with him; his brother Aaron; and the people of Israel. This is the story whose significant implications I referred to more than once.

When Moses left his people for some time, he charged his brother Aaron with their care. When he returned, Moses found that his people had stopped worshiping God and had returned to the practice of idolatry: They were worshiping a cow that one of them had made. Moses rebuked his brother and fought with him because he had not prevented this regression. According to the narrative in the chapter entitled, "Taha," verse 94, Aaron informed Moses that he did not want to prevent the regression so he would not divide the ranks of his people and stir up disputes in their midst.

And that means that he temporarily overlooked the fact that some of the people had strayed, lost their faith, and returned to idolatry. Aaron overlooked the regression temporarily to maintain unity in the community. The Koranic narrative suggests that the Prophet Moses approved and did not denounce this logic.

The second matter involves a formal legal opinion from Ibn 'Abidi, a Hanafi scholar, who said that if two people were locked in a dispute over a child, and if one of the

two was a Muslim who claimed the child was his slave, while the other, who was not a Muslim, claimed the child was his son, he would judge in favor of the non-Muslim because bringing up a child in freedom, even without Islam, is preferable to bringing up a child in slavery, even if the child were to be brought up as a Muslim. We cite these two examples to draw attention to what unity and freedom represent in the Islamic viewpoint. We cite these examples to show that any action which affects the unity of ranks would be condemned by Islam before it is condemned politically. The liberation of Palestine under any banner, even a non-Islamic banner, is 1,000 times better than keeping Palestine under Israeli occupation. As we said, debating this subject now is an intellectual luxury that wastes time, dissipates effort, and wreaks havoc with priorities for thinking and taking action.

Some people will say that this is the result of injecting Islam into the question. They will say we could have avoided such pitfalls and such dissension had we started out by keeping religion and politics separate. They will say this could have been avoided had the Palestinian struggle remained "secular," and they will continue harping on that well-known tune which we now hear whenever Islam becomes involved in anything temporal.

To those people we would say that Islam is required in this case in particular because it is the only religion that can supply the Palestinian struggle with many fighters vying with each other to give up their lives, to die in action, and claim their place in history among the wise. This is not a question of involving or not involving Islam, but it is a question which has to do with how Islam is to be placed in its proper context so it can play an effective role in serving the nation's supreme interests.

This being the case, the proper approach for dealing with this matter could be to correct the Islamic course, not to abort or kill it.

What we have set forth is indeed an attempt to correct the course, but it is also an attempt to take a critical look at ourselves.

## ALGERIA

### Merbah Appointment Portends Continuation of Reforms

45190015 Paris LE MONDE in French 8 Nov 88 p 29

[Article by Frederic Fritscher: "Mr Kasdi Merbah Has Been Named Prime Minister"]

[Text] Naming a prime minister fitting the new job description defined in the Constitution as amended on 3 November was a bit like placing a wager. Nevertheless, President Chadli did not wait. Only 48 hours after "pocketing" a 92.27 percent "yes" vote at the time of the referendum on the separation of powers between the head of state and the head of government, he named Mr Kasdi Merbah to this delicate post.

With the nomination of Mr Kasdi Merbah, the question became superfluous as to whether the Algerian president would name a pro tem prime minister to hold office until the FLN congress of 27 and 28 November, and from then until the dissolution of the National Peoples' Assembly, or rather a head of government who would take the bull by the horns and begin to apply the economic reforms. For the very personality of the new prime minister leaves room only for the second hypothesis.

The man is well known. "Honest, hard-working, effective" are the adjectives most often mentioned in conversations about him. He is a colonel, which does not hurt his case, for that means he will be able to take advantage of the support of the Army. He is of Kabyle origin and will of necessity reunite all the votes from a region that is considered to be particularly rebellious. He has labored faithfully at the side of President Boumediene. In the name of this past, the leftist currents, which are being more and more outwardly manifested, can from now on draw the conclusion that the economic opening-up advocated by President Chadli for 3 years will not be accomplished to the detriment of the economic and social bases on which the Algerian system is grounded—or at least that the formalities will be respected. In a word, with Mr Merbah there is no question of moving from socialism to unbridled capitalism, even if this were fundamental to his concept of what Algeria is. There will perhaps be an "infatigable" (opening-up), but it will be controlled: No question, either, of deteriorating into the Egyptian model, of which Algerian economists are justifiably afraid.

With the help of the natural passing of generations, the number of Algerians has been greatly reduced who can remember the Boumediene era, when military security—directed by Mr Merbah—was an effective tool for repression. The arrests were numerous and frequent and the disappearances, too. It was the era when the government did not back away from political assassinations, nor did it even seek to deny them.

### A New Balance

The new prime minister appears all at once as a man of consensus. He made a clear and unequivocal statement—moreover, as he was leaving the president's office—that he was going to "conduct broad consultations" in order to form his government. This concern for widening the political spectrum moves in the direction of certain proposals made by President Chadli who in recent times wanted to restore the FLN to the status it enjoyed in its hour of glory, between 1954 and 1962: a political front open to all currents. The sixth congress, which will be held in 3 weeks, should experience the initial application of the presidential directives. About 1,000 people independent of the party will be invited to



take part in the operations of the assembly, working in close collaboration with elected officials and members by right of office (Political Bureau, Central Committee, delegates, etc.).

President Chadli therefore chose an uncontroversial prime minister whose reputation for effectiveness guarantees his capacity for implementing reforms and facing up to a catastrophic economic situation. What is more, the head of state defined the policy of the future government by assigning as its goal "the coherent and organized pursuit of economic reforms and chiefly the passage to autonomy of public corporations, the smooth working of the private sector, and the reorganization of the system of supply and distribution." He also insisted on "the urgency of educational and vocational training reform programs of all kinds," as well as on "the struggle against bureaucracy and the development of social infrastructures."

The appointment of Mr Merbah also marks a new equilibrium which is apparently in the process of establishing itself within the very bosom of the reformist "club." After being an ardent "Boumedienist," the new head of state shaped for himself a reputation of effectiveness as minister of heavy industry, then of agriculture, notably by dismantling the distinctive properties of Boumedienne's system.

His move to agriculture is significant. He parceled out and redistributed to "workers of the sector" land that had been formerly nationalized, and he transformed one of the bastions of Boumedienist ideology into self-managing socialist domains at the time of the "agrarian revolution," in terms of "the self-industrializing industrialization." Along with other politicians currently in the public eye, such as Mr El Hadi Khediri, the minister of the interior in the former government, he incarnates a tendency that is at once reformist and modernist.

#### Buffer and Safety Valve

In his new job, Mr Merbah will also illustrate the progressive popularization of institutions. He is at once the buffer and the safety valve. He must absorb the upsets and shocks of political life so that the operations of the Presidency will in no case be subjected to chance occurrences. He will bear his share of popular discontentment. The president will then be able to count on him as a safety valve of security, to protect himself. But this strengthening of the presidential function has as its corollary a step towards "more democracy."

The prime minister is now responsible for his policy to the assembly, which will judge his program and his actions. Of course, as long as this body reflects the allmighty role of the party, constitutional reform is meaningless. If in due time, however, the delegates are elected

on the basis of criteria independent of their membership in the party, the parliament will become a driving element in Algerian political life, in other words a springboard to democracy.

#### BAHRAIN

**WAKH, CNA Sign News Cooperation Agreement**  
*JN04D123988 Manama WAKH in Arabic*  
1130 GMT 4 Dec 88

[Text] Manama, 4 Dec (WAKH)—A news cooperation agreement was signed here today by WAKH and CNA.

The agreement was signed for WAKH by its director general, Nabil Ya'qub al-Hamar, while it was signed on the CNA side by Francis Jang [name as received], the Taiwanese commercial representative in Bahrain.

The agreement seeks to bring about an exchange of news, information, press reports and enquiries, and photographs between the two news agencies. Moreover, the agreement aims to bring about an exchange of visits and expertise between the officials and editors of both news agencies.

**Fund Established To Develop National Industry**  
*44000190 Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ in Arabic*  
7 Nov 88 p 1

[Text] An official in the Ministry of Development and Industry stated that at the initiative of a number of commercial banks in the country, an attempt is being made to establish a fund to support national industry.

Within the framework of offering incentives and support to national industry in Bahrain, the director of the Industrial Development Center, Khalid 'Ashur, disclosed that intense negotiations took place between the Ministry of Development and Industry and the banks in Bahrain dealing with providing long and medium term loans with easy terms and interest rates.

Mr 'Ashur pointed out that studies are ongoing to reduce the rental fees of industrial land and to expand existing industries, especially the aluminum industry.

In response to a question on the possibility of limiting foreign imports into Bahrain, Mr Rashid al-Dubayb, the director of the patent office in the Ministry of Development and Industry, said that the ministry presently is content with imposing a protection tax on imports. However, he stressed that the next step could limit foreign imports according to the national industry protection law.

## EGYPT

### Government Embarrassment in Trying Extremist Group Described

45040100a Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in  
Arabic 26 Nov 88 pp 20, 21

[Article by Yusuf al-Qa'id: "The 'Egypt's Revolution' Trial—The Authorities' Judiciary and the People's Judiciary"]

[Text] At the moment the Egypt's Revolution trial began, an ordinary Egyptian citizen came into the courtroom. He seemed to be close to one of the accused, because he approached the dock. However, the surprise was that this citizen was carrying the birth certificate of his son, who was born last year. He had given his son the name of Mahmud Nur-al-Din, the main person accused in the case. Thus, this ordinary Egyptian summarized the position of Egypt's people regarding the trial. It was natural that a minor act should reveal where the people's spirit lies. The whole crime of those standing in the locked cages is pursuing the Israeli enemy on Egypt's territory.

The trial of the age began after the start of the judiciary season. It was decided that the higher state security court would review the case; this is a court of a political character and it has been the custom that it should review cases which threaten the security of the citizenry and the nation in its national dimensions and that the case should be reviewed in one of the exhibition halls of the land of exhibitions in Madinat Nasr. The jihad organization which assassinated al-Sadat was tried in this same palace. It is the same as the one which witnessed a number of Egyptian demonstrations in protest against the Zionist enemy's participation in the Cairo international book fair.

The trial took place while Israel was procrastinating in carrying out the ruling on the return of Taba to Egypt and after the replacement of the Israeli ambassador in Cairo with a new one, Shim'on Shamir, whom Egypt had previously dismissed when he was director of the academic center in Cairo because he carried out activities which Egypt considered violations of the framework of the job for which he had come to Egypt.

On the final day of the trial, a fight occurred between Israeli police and a Palestinian citizen in an Egyptian bus coming from Tel Aviv and ended with the killing of the Israeli policeman committing the aggression.

The trial began as Egypt was suffering from everything it has been suffering from: a severe economic crisis, a regime suffering from basic problems, an opposition beset by crisis and political forces among the Egyptian men in the street who are prevented from legitimate activity, indeed prevented from having any basic role.

In spite of the lawyers' opposition to the review of the case before the state security court and their request that the case be reviewed before the ordinary judiciary, the formation of the court board produced a state of Egyptian well-being. This board has had no precedent in enmity to national action, but no sooner did counsellor Raja' al-'Arabi come forward to take charge of representing the indictment in the case than ordinary people realized that the Egyptian game of the status quo was working in accordance with its system and role, which no one could see, though it actually existed. Then came the security measures which prevented Arab lawyers from entering the chambers of the court at all—indeed prevented the chairman of the Federation of Arab Lawyers, Faruq Abu 'Isa, from attending the trial. A number of Arab lawyers expressed their desire to take part in the defense of Egypt's Revolution, on grounds that the revolution is not a purely Egyptian affair and that the position on the Israeli enemy is basically and essentially a comprehensive, Arab, national one.

Ahmad al-Khawajah, the head of the defense board in the case, and the members of the board remained outside the court, indeed outside the main gateway of the exhibition wing building, for more than 2 hours while people engaged in court security for Egyptian television and Israeli television were allowed to enter and film the proceedings of the trial. Who could guarantee that a person entering the trial was not a member of the Israeli Mossad agency?

The trial board decided to withdraw from the case, and Ahmad al-Khawajah held a press conference on the street near the court building in which he said, "We have already protested against this location where the trial is taking place, because it is an isolated one and involves harm to the conditions of openness." He stressed that the people had the right to attend this trial and declared that the withdrawal had come about as the result of the disruption of the rights of the lawyers and the defense board.

The accused had come from prison to the court in armored cars under increased guard, while the guard surrounding the building was without precedent. Each accused person individually rode in a police vehicle in the company of a number of policemen, and motorcycles, antiterror vehicles, and first aid and fire trucks surrounded the cars.

However, none of these measures prevented the accused from uttering cries on behalf of Egypt's Revolution and cries of "Long live Egypt!" upon reaching the court building.

In the court chamber, the accused were distributed among the cages in groups, but all of the accused, without exception, refused to stay with Ahmad 'Isam, the third accused in the case and the brother of the first accused person. It was he who went to the American Embassy in Cairo, and America relied on his confessions

in presenting the case to the Egyptian authorities. Thus, Ahmad 'Isam remained alone in a cage reserved just for him, while the others gathered together in common cages.

Mahmud Nur-al-Din decided before the start of the trial to attend in a red suit as a sign that he did not fear execution or view it with trepidation as long as it was "for the sake of the venerable Egyptian nation." However, the lawyers convinced him that that was a mistake, because it would infringe on the justice and integrity of the Egyptian judiciary before it made its statement in this important case.

Husayn al-Shafi'i, one of the figures of the July revolution, attended the trial, because his son was one of the persons accused in the case. Indeed, he was accused person No 19.

Husayn al-Shafi'i said, "This case touches upon national and domestic honor." He felt pity for any official in whose tenure this case was being reviewed, especially in the context of the current Arab circumstances.

However, Husayn al-Shafi'i did not appear concerned over his son's fate, because he had confidence in the integrity and equity of the Egyptian judiciary and because he considered that what his son had done consisted of honor and heroism. If there were any concern, that bore on all the persons accused in the case.

When the cries for Egypt's revolution and the cries of "Long live Egypt," "Death to Zionism," and "Shame on America" echoed in the hall, a man who was affected greatly said, "These cries themselves give the feeling of national pride and Egyptian and Arab national honor."

Mahmud Nur-al-Din talked from the dock and his conversation turned into something akin to a press conference when he said, "Egypt's Revolution is a shot fired on the road to the liberation of Palestine and the uprising of stones and the possibilities that it may be transformed in the future underlines the correctness of the road Egypt's Revolution has traveled, and others have traveled."

Mahmud Nur-al-Din greeted "all the people fighting against Zionism and American imperialism" and said "We have been feeling warmth within the prison dungeons since the heroic uprising has shaken the Israeli enemy from within."

Mahmud Nur-al-Din said, "Israel does not want peace. Rather, it wants capitulation, and it is working to isolate Egypt from the Arab stage." He asserted his pride at what had been attributed to him in the way of resistance to espionage activity by Israel and America on Egypt's territory and said, "Egypt's Revolution has been a holiday for all Egyptian nationalists and the spark it has set off has revived hope in the hearts of all Egyptians." He declared that he supported the defense board's decision

to withdraw from the trial and that his morale and that of his comrades was unusually high in spite of the solitary confinement they were subjected to.

In the official papers concerning the case, it is stated, with regard to Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir, that he is a "fugitive." Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir is in Yugoslavia now. Prior to the review of the case, lawyer Ahmad al-Khawajah flew to Belgrade where he met with Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir, and it was decided that Jamal Shawqi 'Abd-al-Nasir, one of the accused in the case and the nephew of Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, would return to Egypt to attend the trial as soon as he recuperated from his illness.

The decision on Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir's return to Egypt is now in the hands of the defense board, which will decide whether or not the return should take place. If there is a return, the board will also decide its date.

The defense board considers that it is premature for Khalid to return to Egypt, since the objective part of the trial has not yet started and the first sessions in the trial will be devoted to procedural matters. Thus the possibility that Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir will attend the trial exists and has not changed; all that has changed is the board which makes the decisions and determines the timing.

As for Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir, he has asserted from his place of exile his full confidence in the integrity and equity of the Egyptian judiciary, although the issue that basically preoccupies him is the extent of solidarity among the accused and the rigidity of their position throughout the trial, and whether the appraisal is that such solidarity and firmness exist and are likely to endure because of the people's strong support for the revolution, and also the strong support and defense in the legal and political contexts. Therefore Khalid's mission now, abroad and until his return to Egypt, is to mobilize popular Arab and international groundwork and support for Egypt's Revolution and the men in it.

In telephone contacts with Cairo from Belgrade, Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir has denied that he met with President Husni Mubarak during the Egyptian president's recent visit to Yugoslavia. He has also denied that President Mubarak discussed him with officials in Yugoslavia.

Since he chose exile, Khalid has traveled more than once to London. He has travelled to Algeria at the invitation of Algerian president Chedli Bendjedid, then travelled to the Libyan Jamahiriyah to attend the commemorations of the anniversary of his father's death on 28 September. The visit was restricted to attendance at the commemoration only.

Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir also traveled to a third Arab capital, Baghdad, which he visited at the invitation of the Iraqi president, Saddam Husayn. The main reason for these visits was to attempt to break down the barrier of isolation in his exile.

In the family context, Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir has placed his three children in a college which teaches in Arabic in Belgrade.

The defense board has decided that offense is the best defense. Therefore the board intends to request that the court include the file on the assassination of Egyptian nuclear scholar Dr Yaya al-Misk which the Egyptian Foreign Ministry prepared with regard to the incident which took place in Paris, on grounds that it was the Israeli enemy which carried out the assassination.

In addition to the legal defense, such a state of popular support exists for the case in all Egyptian circles that this case will later become a sort of referendum on the Egyptian-Israeli peace and its validity.

At the same time, the Egyptian Committee for the Defense of Egypt's Revolution has been founded and signatures for it are being collected from all Egyptian national forces. The process of gathering the signatures reminds the Egyptians of the gathering of signatures on the deputization of the Egyptian delegation at the time of the 1919 revolution. This committee has two goals:

First, to guarantee the broadest exercise of the popular political, media and legal defense of the accused.

Second, to sustain the nationalist role in a peaceful people's resistance to normalization and all forms of the Zionist presence in Egypt.

However, one can say that no case has caused such a state of acute embarrassment to the Egyptian leadership as this one. It is difficult for Egyptian public opinion to accept the notion of demanding that Egyptians be executed because they pursued people spying for Israel and America in Egypt at a time when what is happening to the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories has been happening.

In addition, the official government media have so far hewed to the consideration of reporting what goes on in the court chamber only, while totally ignoring the heroic aspects of the case. This position is preferable to that of defamation which these media adopted when the case was announced. The sole objective in that was to block a repetition of the myth of Sulayman Khatir in Egypt.

When the confrontation between the lawyers and security came to a head, the review of the case was postponed about 2 months, perhaps so the papers could be studied and perhaps so that an opportunity could be provided for catching one's breath and opening the door to political negotiations which are aimed at softening the atmosphere in this case, which is inflammatory by its nature and militates against any attempt to soften the atmosphere whatever the good intentions regarding it might be.

### Creditor Nations Advised on Leniency Toward Third World

45040056a Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic  
28 Sep 88 p 12

[Editorial by Mustafa Amin: "An Idea!"]

[Text] We hope that President Husni Mubarak's overseas trip will be successful. It is not only Husni Mubarak who is traveling, but all of Egypt. The problems he will be raising are not his alone, but are the problems of Egypt and the entire Arab world. We live in an age when problems cannot be solved through insults and abuse, but require political wisdom and mutual understanding, argument and persuasion.

For example, the debt problem is not just Egypt's problem, but the Third World's, and this is what makes it so difficult. For example, France cannot reduce just Egypt's debts, but must reduce the debts of all the Third World countries. Many banks in Western countries are facing a severe crisis because the Third World countries are unable to repay their debts. For this reason, the banks are insisting that Egypt repay its debts, because they are also insisting that Mexico repay its debts, which are many times greater than Egypt's.

By asking these countries and banks to postpone their demands or reduce the exorbitant interest they are asking, we are calling on them to sacrifice an insignificant sum in order to guarantee vast riches. Putting pressure on the debtor countries will ultimately lead to an explosion, the price of which will not be paid by the debtor nations alone, but also by the lending nations. It will be like an atomic bomb. The victims will not be just those close to where the bomb falls; people will be wiped out near and far. The creditor nations will be forced to spend many times the amounts they are demanding from the debtor nations in order to rebuild the world, which will have been destroyed.

The Third World nations may have made mistakes, but the greatest mistake is that of the superpowers, which colonized the smaller countries for scores of years, sucked the blood of their inhabitants, resisted educating them, and plundered their wealth before withdrawing their armies and leaving them devastated, destroyed, and ruined. These ravished peoples are entitled to demand compensation for years of violation and occupation.

It is in the interest of the rich countries to not bankrupt the Third World countries. We are the clients who buy the products of these countries, and we are the ones who sell them the petroleum which runs their factories. We are the ones who sell them the products of our land and mines for reprocessing and resale to us at many times their original cost. The destruction which will befall us if the creditor nations adhere to their stand will ruin them before us.

Destruction and wealth cannot coexist in the world, neither can surfeit and famine.

All we can hope is that usurers like the Merchant of Venice, Shylock, who demanded a pound of flesh from the debtor to repay his debt, do not belong to the World Bank!

**Official Reassures Investors, Outlines Government Action**

45040090A Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM in Arabic  
12 Nov 88 p 3

[Interview with Mr Faruq Fu'ad by Amimah Kamal; in Cairo, date not specified]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The Money Market Authority building, where no stranger has set foot in years, turned into a beehive with everyone moving around and working till the late hours of the night, especially when all corners of the rooms became filled with tens of thousands of forms. Tales and tragedies of depositors contained in these forms became the overriding concern of everyone working in that building.

But what will happen when the time limit, and opportunity too, runs out?

Will this be the question echoed by every person in Egypt?

And how will these companies be dealt with? How can the money be paid back? How and who gets it first?

And what will be the fate of the "boon" lists, lists of lucky people who received preferred interest of up to 100 percent in some cases, according to company owners themselves?

These questions are uppermost on the minds of those who deal with these companies as well as those who do not. Therefore, I put these questions to Mr Faruq Fu'ad, first undersecretary of the Ministry of Economy and chairman of the central board of the Money Market Authority, who himself had been looking for answers to these questions for the last two weeks.

[AKHBAR AL-YAWM] Twenty-three companies have actually expressed their unwillingness to adjust their positions to conform to the investment law. Does this necessarily mean that they will have to liquidate their operations? Will the Money Market Authority intervene in the program these companies have laid down to repay depositors' money? Will small depositors get preference?

[Fu'ad] It is not a condition that those who do not wish to adjust their positions in accordance with the law will have to liquidate their companies. They can stay in operation under their pre-law statutes, but will not be allowed to receive money and will be required to pay back depositors' money.

The investment law gave companies that did not adjust their positions a 2-year time limit to pay back the money. This does not mean that the Money Market Authority will leave them alone for two years. It will intervene against them through the adoption of legal measures if it ascertains that during this period they were tampering with depositors' money or were not serious about paying it back.

Furthermore, the authority will naturally intervene in the money pay-back program the companies lay down. It is considering giving preference to small depositors and, consequently, is in the process of making arrangements for frequent distribution to depositors, which means determining how many depositors have 1,000 to 5,000 Egyptian pound deposits and how many have 5,000 and over.

[AKHBAR AL-YAWM] Some depositors have brought legal action against a number of companies for impounding their money or declaring bankruptcy. Where do these depositors stand, and what has become of these cases following the enforcement of the investment law?

[Fu'ad] Naturally, the authority will intervene to stop such lawsuits because depositors are filing them on their own behalf and their deposits may be small. When the authority steps in, it does so on behalf of all depositors, not just one, to recover their money.

Moreover, adjudication of bankruptcy sometimes does not work in favor of depositors, something that becomes clear only when financial positions of these companies are determined. On the other hand, some lawsuits are filed in agreement with company owners for the purpose of obtaining an order to place these companies' assets in receivership, in which case the owners would free themselves of the responsibility to pay back depositors' money!

[AKHBAR AL-YAWM] Is there a tendency to sequester certain companies that have failed to adjust their positions?

[Fu'ad] Sequestration orders are not issued by the authority, but rather by higher authorities. The prime minister has already declared that the government will take all measures necessary to safeguard depositors' rights.

[AKHBAR AL-YAWM] Has the authority prepared, at the request of a watchdog body, lists of high officials and lucky people who have received preferred interest payments?

[Fu'ad] The authority has not asked the companies to furnish the names of those who received preferred interest payments, because it is not its job to eavesdrop on anyone. On the contrary, the investment law and bylaws require companies, when they submit their financial positions, only to specify the size of deposits and the

number of depositors, but does not provide that even their names be mentioned. Accordingly, these kinds of statements are confidential in nature and are only used for the purpose for which they are prepared—namely to identify the size of deposits and the number of depositors to turn over this information to the accounting office's accountants and legal experts to match them to information these companies put out—not for any other reason.

The authority is not aware that any other side has asked these companies to furnish it with information or the names of those preferred clients.

[AKHBAR AL-YAWM] Will the military orders stay in effect beyond the position adjustment period?

[Fu'ad] The military order will stay in effect and expire only if another military order is issued to rescind it. As for violations, we have not received any reports in this regard.

[AKHBAR AL-YAWM] Rumor has it that the military order requires big depositors who have recovered their money from the al-Rayyan Company to report it to the Money Market Authority. How true is this?

[Fu'ad] Absolutely not true, because those who recovered their money did so as depositors rather than buyers and sellers.

[AKHBAR AL-YAWM] Some companies that have failed to submit legal notifications, even though the 3-month time limit has expired, blame their failure on accountants and legal experts who have not completed their work. Will they be turned over to the prosecution?

[Fu'ad] The law set the time limit at 3 months, and neither the Money Market Authority nor anyone else has the right to extend it because the provision is contained in the law, not the bylaws. All that can be said in this regard, however, is that we will apprise the prosecutor's office of any information pertaining to companies that have willfully hampered the accountants' work to prevent them from acting on their financial positions. We will also turn over to the prosecution all information on companies that did not engage in this practice. The prosecution of course will take this into consideration.

[AKHBAR AL-YAWM] There are problems pertaining to certain al-Rayyan Company clients, like those involved in the company's housing projects. How will these people be dealt with, and will they come under the same regulations as depositors?

[Fu'ad] Such matters will be taken up after the financial positions are submitted. Those people will come under the same regulations as depositors.

[AKHBAR AL-YAWM] Finally, the authority has played a watchdog role regarding ads which companies have been running since this law was passed. Will this role continue?

[Fu'ad] The authority will continue to approve ads for publication until the company obtains approval from the authority's board and is registered in the authority's business practice register. Until that time, oversight is necessary to prevent the spread of such lies and false statements on these companies' activities as have entrapped many depositors.

#### **Bread Problem Analyzed, Solutions Proposed** 45040043 Cairo AL-WATANI in Arabic 9 Oct 88 p 4

[Article by Salwa Rif'at and Nadiyah Barsum]

[Text] The bread issue is not a new problem but a longstanding one, and we are just now opening the dossier on this issue in light of the experiment of producing flat loaves. Egypt, which is an agricultural country, has been importing more than 80 percent of its wheat needs, and thus has become the largest importer of wheat in the world. It consumes 10 percent of all the wheat consumed around the world, even though its population accounts for only 1 percent of the world's population.

It is a well-known fact that our yearly local production of wheat is just about enough to cover 2 months' consumption, as facilitated by the manual bakeries which make up about 80 percent of Egypt's bakeries. If they were automated, we could import half the amount of wheat.

Insufficient production, poor quality, the difficulty people have to endure standing in crowded lines around the bakeries, and other problems are forcing buyers to purchase bread right off the sidewalks from young boys selling it outside the bakeries at prices ranging from 5 to 15 Egyptian piasters.

But wherein lies the problem with bread? In the production and importing of wheat? The labor shortage? The controls placed on bread production? The specifications, quality and food value of the loaf? The owners of the bakeries? The citizens' purchasing power? We will try to reach an answer to this question.

#### **The Economic Aspect Of the Loaf**

First of all, we met with Dr Ahmad 'Abd-al-Ghaffar, head of the State Organization for Flour Mills and Silos.

[AL-WATANI] In your opinion, what is the problem with bread in Egypt?

['Abd-al-Ghaffar] The bread problem is related to the problem of its quality and its subsequent misuse, and to the huge subsidies paid by the state treasury; wheat subsidies amount to 450 million Egyptian pounds a year.

There is a relationship between consumption and income, for whenever income rises so does consumption. However, if we look at bread consumption and production in Egypt, we find that increased consumption is primarily due to the declining quality which increases the rate of loss and spoilage. For this reason, we were not surprised when studies revealed that the average per capita consumption of wheat in Egypt amounts to 100 kg a year, while the world average is only 80 kg per person per year. We must also keep in mind that a large percentage of wheat does not go for human consumption, but is wasted or used as feed for livestock.

This is the problem. We are constantly trying to develop semi-automated bakeries which could produce good quality loaves with a minimum of spoilage and loss. We are also trying to draw up a clearcut plan for a study into the flour allotments which are dispensed to village bakeries and which usually are not used to make bread.

[AL-WATANI] What about the subsidy problem? How can it be solved?

[Abd-al-Ghaffar] For any commodity, the amount of subsidies and their increase is linked to the volume of consumption and its increase, as well as to yearly increases in imports, not to mention changes in world prices, exchange rates, and the prices at which the commodity is sold to the consumer. The consequence of increased consumption and stable local wheat production is increased imports. Our wheat imports have increased 8 percent each year since 1970, and now account for 80 percent of our wheat needs. Wheat subsidies amount to 450 million pounds a year.

We all know that this sort of increase in subsidies is harmful to the balance of payments and increases our deficits.

When we study the facts pertaining to the wheat and flour subsidies borne by the state and the huge increase in them, we find that these subsidies are one of the main reasons for increased consumption. Those who can pay and those who can't benefit alike from them. Each loaf of bread costs 9 piasters to make and is sold at only 2 piasters. This means that the state pays a subsidy of 7 piasters on each loaf.

#### Whither the Flat Loaf?

Moving from the bread problem in general to the experiment with the flat loaf, we talked with Mahmud al-Khattab, head of the State Bakeries Company, who said, "The loaves produced by the bakeries have become nondescript. Studies conducted on various samples of flat bread have shown that there are no fixed specifications for this type of loaf. It is enough to say that we have noticed that the weight varies from 110 to 185 grams. For this reason, the ministry has begun to step in to set fixed specifications for flat loaves to which these bakeries must adhere. The weight of the loaf has been set at

135 grams, the diameter must be no less than 22 cm, and the moisture content must not exceed 26 percent. The State Bakeries Company, and 60 other bakeries, have begun producing flat loaves according to these specifications."

[AL-WATANI] But wouldn't it be better for the state to concern itself with making the regular bread better, instead of producing flat loaves?

[Al-Khattab] The state did not turn to producing flat loaves until it had observed a keen acceptance on the part of the consumer. Furthermore, the fact that we have turned to producing this kind of bread does not mean that we are ignoring ordinary bread, which sells for 2 piasters. Production of flat loaves accounts for only 10 percent of the company's production capacity; there remains the other 90 percent of production, which is geared towards the regular loaves. There are 51 production units for regular bread, not to mention the automated and semi-automated units, all of which produce regular bread. These units will never be affected by the trend towards producing flat loaves, and the quality of the loaves we produce will never decline. The reason is that we, as producer, must concern ourselves with the regular loaf, which makes up 90 percent of our production. This product must never become a burden which is hard to dispose of and which thus involves significant losses. In order to avoid such losses, I must always improve the quality of the loaf I offer. Therefore, I can stress that the company's engagement in producing flat loaves will never affect the quality of the regular loaves we produce.

[AL-WATANI] Are the flat loaves priced appropriately in view of limited income?

[Al-Khattab] The specifications for the flat loaf differ from those for the ordinary loaf. The flat loaf must weigh 135 grams, must be 82 percent free of impurities, and must have a moisture content of 26 percent, while the regular loaf must weigh 160 grams, be 72 percent free of impurities, and have a moisture content of 39 percent. These differences are also connected with the difference in price. In order to produce a flat loaf, we need two "sources of energy" instead of one, and thus we need more manpower. In the amount of time it takes only two bakers to process 12 sacks of flour into regular bread, the flat loaf bakery can process only nine sacks. Furthermore, producing flat bread needs a third baker to operate the bakery's other "source of energy." This ultimately means that flat bread costs more than regular bread, especially when we consider that a sack of flour is sold to flat bread bakeries for about 22 pounds, for a net production of 870 loaves, whereas a sack of flour is sold to a regular bakery for only 11 pounds, and the net product per sack is 920 loaves.

[AL-WATANI] Does this mean that the margin of profit for the flat bread bakery is less than that of a regular bakery?

[Al-Khattab] On the contrary. Whereas the profit margin per sack of flour used to make ordinary bread is 7 pounds, it jumps to 20 pounds per sack for flat bread. The reason for this is that there is no wastage in producing flat bread, and it can be kept for some time without spoiling because the moisture content is less. On the other hand, ordinary bread is no good to eat except right after it comes out of the oven. For this reason, regular bread is quite often used for animal fodder, which ultimately leads to a reduced margin of profit.

#### **What Is the Role of the Supply Investigators?**

In our search for the facts, we wanted to find out what role the supply investigators play in apprehending violators at the bakeries. Could the reasons for the problem lie in the bakeries? We interviewed Major General Ibrahim Muhsin Sirhan, deputy director of the General Department for Supply Investigations, who said, "In order to make sure that bread is available in time for all three of the consumers' meals, we run three inspections—at dawn, in the morning, and in the evening, thus covering the entire day. The General Department for Supply Investigations and its branches throughout the governorates are required to make sure that all of the three kinds of bakeries—local, European and Syrian—are being operated to provide the citizens with bread, and after that to overcome all sorts of obstacles, such as shortages of fuel, manpower, yeast and flour, so that the citizens will be able to have a loaf of bread at breakfast or at any time. If we find any stoppage, we try to solve the problem on the spot.

"These campaigns also make sure that the owners of the three kinds of bakeries adhere to the legal specifications for bread—completely round, fully cooked, with the two sides not sticking together. In addition, they must be of the legally-determined weight.

"Our campaigns have proven their effectiveness. For example, on 26 September 1988, 279 cases were apprehended, 52 of which were in the bakery sector. Of these, 19 were for disregarding the specifications, 10 for falling short of the required weight, 7 for work stoppages, and 15 for selling at higher than the set price."

[AL-WATANI] Practically speaking, we find that the loaves do not meet specifications, and the citizens are all complaining about the long lines in front of the bakeries and the misshapen loaves. How does this readily-observed situation relate to the control you have mentioned?

[Sirhan] To date, 80 percent of the bakeries we rely on are manual and only 20 percent are automated. Given all the upheavals and bread crises which the republic has undergone for so many years, there ought to have been a complete change-over to automated bakeries in the bread industry. Bakeries are not costly, nor are they heavy industries. A single room can be taken and turned into an automated bakery very easily. Similarly, wheat

imports could be cut in half if our bakeries were automated. A solution to this procedural problem would put an end to the problem of inferior production.

[AL-WATANI] In light of the changing prices for the ingredients required to make bread, could the problem lie in insufficient studies?

[Sirhan] Actually, no. Over the past few years many studies on pricing loaves have been conducted.

We need to standardize the price of the loaf, achieve some fairness in the way this industry is run, and realize a fair margin of profit. Once we do that, we will have reached the best possible solution.

#### **The Role of the Bakery Workers**

A major part of the responsibility for improving the quality of bread rests on the shoulders of the bakery worker. In this connection, we met with Zakariya 'Abd-al-Hamid, director of the financial department of the State Company for Cairo Bakeries, who said, "The bakery workers can improve the quality of the bread and thus reduce loss, but this will necessitate a raise in their wages to make them more receptive to this profession, for this is not a profession which attracts people. Society's attitude towards it needs to be changed. Everyone knows that these workers are migrating to other Arab countries where the wages are higher. The ideal solution to the manpower problem would be for us to automate the bakeries, thereby saving 80 percent of our labor needs."

[AL-WATANI] Since we are still dependent on such workers, what is being done to train them?

[Abd-al-Hamid] The State Company for Cairo Bakeries has an administrative and technical training center for bakery workers. The training period lasts from 10 to 15 days, during which the worker is trained in all stages of production, as well as in how to display the product and deal with the public.

#### **What About the Bakery Owners?**

One important aspect of the issue remains to be looked into, and that is the bakery owners. We met with Mahmud Mitwalli, owner of a manual bakery, who said, "We are the most oppressed group. On the one hand, we don't realize a reasonable margin of profit, and on the other hand we are subject to strict control by the supply investigators. At the same time we face fierce competition from the flat bread bakeries, which have been able to attract scarce manpower because of the higher wages they pay. In addition, we buy a sack of flour for 11 pounds, but achieve only an insignificant profit from processing it, and most of the time we lose money. This is why some bakery owners sell the subsidized flour to other parties which then sell the loaves for higher prices.



Sometimes we have work stoppages because the employees don't show up. For this reason, as far as I am concerned, the best thing would be for my bakery to be automated."

Will automated bakeries solve the bread production problem?

To answer this question, we met with 'Azab Salim, who owns an automated bakery. He said, "Automated bakeries will solve the problem of crowds and long lines. Even though my bakery serves a densely populated area, there are never any long lines for bread. The automated bakery helps me adhere to specifications, which cannot be done by a worker who is paid only 7 pounds a day. Also, making bread in an automated bakery turns a good profit."

#### Summary

Studies and experience have proven that there are several solutions to the bread problem, which can be summarized as follows:

- First, an effort should be made in the near future to increase local production of first-rate flour, so that we won't have to import it in the future, and types of wheat suitable for all kinds of flour should be imported. This will be reflected in the quality of the bread being produced.
- Second, production units at mills throughout the governorates should increase their capacity to produce flour which will conform to the specifications and thus produce bread acceptable to the consumer.
- Third, the state should subsidize the development of appropriate types of semi-automated bread production lines, to make it easier for the private sector to acquire them at suitable prices and reasonable credit terms.
- Fourth, a solution to the manpower problem should be sought and an effort should be made to improve the workers' quality and training, especially since at present we depend on untrained labor.
- Fifth, the pricing policy must be reviewed, especially with respect to wheat, flour and bread. The subsidy system should be re-examined, and a plan should be drawn up for gradually phasing out these subsidies, in such a way that bread can be produced and sold at economical prices and those on limited incomes can be compensated, in particular by raising the corn subsidy so that wheat and flour will not be diverted for fodder purposes.
- Sixth, families in Egyptian villages should be encouraged to produce the bread they need without relying on private or public sector bakeries; this village production will be a step towards self-sufficiency.
- Seventh, all aspects of bread production should be studied, in order to increase the amount of wheat being produced per feddan, the effect of which will be to reduce the amount of wheat being imported.

#### Ship Launched From Alexandria Shipyards 45000066b Cairo EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 18 Nov 88 p 3

[Text] A ceremony was held in Alexandria yesterday to mark the launching of the new ship al-Qusayr.

During the ceremony, the Minister of Transport and Communications, Dr Sulayman Mutawalli, read out a statement on behalf of the Prime Minister, Dr 'Atif Sidqi in which he lauded the building of "al-Qusayr" in Egypt, describing it as a reflection of the large expertise of the Egyptian personnel working in the ship building industry.

Dr Sidqi added that increasing production poses the main challenge to be faced in this crucial period and that industrial progress is the only viable way to solve our economic problems.

During the launching ceremony, the Minister of Industry, Dr Muhammad 'Abd al-Wahhab, stated that the ship will help promote the Egyptian commercial fleet's capacity. He described the building of the ship in Egypt as a good industrial achievement which was preceded and will be followed by similar ones.

Dr 'Abd al-Wahhab asserted that the Egyptian shipyards are able to absorb the most advanced technology in the field of shipbuilding, pointing to the diversification of the Alexandria shipyard which, in addition to shipbuilding, produces tools, furniture and cranes.

The Chairman of the Alexandria Shipyard, Mr Tawakkul al-Maghribi pointed out that shipbuilding is a well-established industry in Egypt adding that the Egyptian shipyards promote the commercial fleet. Speaking about the Alexandria Shipyard, Mr Tawakkul said that it was established in 1964 and it can build ships with tonnages ranging from ten thousand tonnes and up to 85,000 tonnes. Moreover, Mr Tawakkul went on to say, Alexandria shipyard has its own training center to provide the technical training for its staff and can carry out the overhauling of the different types of ships.

Attending the launching ceremony, were the Governor of Alexandria, Mr Isma'il al-Jawsaqi, and chairman of the Egyptian shipyards.

#### Work Begins on Aswan Airport, 2 Others Planned 45000066a Cairo EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 17 Nov 88 p 2

[Text] The Civil Aviation Authority decided to build three new airports in Aswan, al-Ghardaqah and Sharm al-Shaykh at a total cost of LE 90 million in order to receive giant aircraft said the Minister of Tourism, Mr Fu'ad Sultan, during his field tour of Abu Simbel and Aswan.

Work has actually started in Aswan airport where runways are currently being expanded. A sum of LE 300,000 has been endorsed for improvement operations in Abu Simbel airport, said Mr Sultan. He added that the Ministry of Tourism is currently studying a project for staging "Sound and Light" shows and establishing a tourist cafeteria near the temple.

### Doctoral Study Deems Ground Water Adequate for Needs

45040056b Cairo AL-AKBHAR in Arabic 19 Oct 88 p 4

[Article by Mahmud 'Arif]

[Text] The conclusions reached by 'Ayn Shams University's first scientific study on ground water, which took 4 years to prepare, show that Egypt has enough potable ground water not requiring any chemical treatment to meet consumption needs in the Upper Egyptian governorates for many years. Furthermore, this ground water can be extracted at a very low cost—10 millimes per cubic meter at the most.

The results show that Egypt has 960 billion cubic meters in ground water reserves, enough to meet any drought which might befall the country should rainfall at the sources of the Nile fall short in any given year. There are 100 billion cubic meters in the Upper Egypt aquifer, 280 billion cubic meters in the Lower Egypt aquifer, 500 billion cubic meters in the Western Desert, and 80 billion cubic meters in Wadi al-'Arish.

The conclusions also show that this volume of ground water exceeds the maximum storage capacity of the High Dam at Lake Nasir at the height of the flooding. This ground water could make it possible to add 2 million feddans to the existing farm land, which would provide the opportunity to establish new communities in the desert regions, thereby reducing the population density along the Nile Valley and widening the narrow strip of inhabitable land around it.

The results indicate that in addition to providing drinking water for the population of Upper Egypt, these ground water reserves could be used to irrigate 10 percent of the existing farm lands.

These important conclusions were outlined in a doctoral dissertation prepared by Researcher 'Abd-al-Warith Muhammad 'Abd-al-Warith, of al-Azhar University. It was presented to 'Ayn Shams University and discussed by a specialized scientific committee composed of Former Dean of the Liberal Arts College and Professor of Natural Geography Dr Yusuf Abu-al-Hajjaj, Professor of Economic Geography Dr Muhammad Mahmud al-Dib, and Dean of the Ministry of Works and Water Resources' Ground Water Studies Institute Dr Hanafi Husayn.

### Sources of the Ground Water Reserves

The study indicates that the basic source of the ground water reserves is water seeping from the Nile River and from irrigation, which has increased since the High Dam was built, thus leading to a rise in the ground water table. A harmful side effect of this rise has been the deterioration of agricultural soil, known as "soil waterlogging," in some areas, which is threatening the archeological remains at Luxor, Aswan, and al-Jizah.

The study says that even though water is abundant because of the High Dam, some regions are still not served by canals and waterways, especially in higher areas near the east-west ridge in Sawhaj and Asyut Governorates. This has led peasants in these provinces to drill ground water wells so they can use their irrigation machinery to water their crops. Use of such wells has grown over the 8 years which have elapsed since the drought which hit the country in 1979 due to insufficient rainfall at the sources of the Nile.

The study's conclusions stress that these ground water reserves must be protected from bacterial or chemical pollution, by not drilling wells near sewage treatment sites or garbage dumps.

### The Reserves: A Source of Salvation

In his doctoral dissertation, Researcher 'Abd-al-Warith Muhammad 'Abd-al-Warith says that these ground water reserves could be a major source of salvation in times of drought, provided the water is used properly in homes and factories and in irrigating farmland in such a way as to keep Egypt's land alive. The officials must look after the ground water reserves and conserve this renewable resource, especially since it takes hundreds of billions of cubic meters of rain to fill up the natural reservoir at the High Dam lake, which holds more than 100 billion cubic meters of flood water. It often happens that rainfall at the sources of the Nile is scarce and no floods occur, which in turn imperils the country with drought, as has happened in past years.

The study says that the Upper Egypt ground water aquifer, which extends from Aswan to al-Jizah, with its furthest reaches extending to Bani Suwayf Governorate, is virtually landlocked, because it is so far from the Mediterranean. Its waters do not seep deeper into the earth or into surrounding areas, and thus it is more likely to increase instead of diminishing or becoming dispersed. The situation is different with the Delta ground water aquifer; that region would be endangered if the reserves dropped, since there is the chance that these waters might be permeated by water from the Mediterranean, especially north of Tanta. This permeation would also destroy the quality of the water and make it unfit for irrigation or drinking because of increased salinity.

The results indicate that the link between the Upper Egypt and Delta ground water reserves is very weak, because in the Abu-Sir-al-Manawat-Tarah region, which could be called a bottleneck, there is a barrier consisting of poor-permeability clay strata lying between the two aquifers. The result has been a rise in the ground water table in al-Jizah and Bani Suwayf Governorates, which has had the effect of increasing ground water salinity in those two governorates. The thickness of the sweet ground water-bearing strata in Upper Egypt has been estimated at 200 meters, especially north of Asyut.

### The Best Kind of Water

Ground water is considered the best kind of water. It is suited to modern irrigation techniques because it is free of water moss, and is also good for fish farms because its temperature is constant and it is free of disease. It is also good for sandy and salty areas which need more water. For this reason, the trend towards increasing the use of ground water for irrigation, and pumping water from percolable, poorly drained soil and sending it to reclaimed lands along the Nile Valley, might be the ideal solution for conserving the waters of the Nile. An estimated 5.5 billion cubic meters of ground water is available in Upper Egypt each year.

The adoption of the permanent irrigation system, and the increase in Egypt's share of Nile water following the construction of the High Dam, resulted in 55.5 billion cubic meters instead of 48 billion cubic meters. Furthermore, in Upper Egypt the total length of irrigation canals was increased by 15 percent, i.e. more than 1,760 km, after the High Dam was built. This led to an increase in the amount of water being drawn from the Nile for the governorates of Upper Egypt, and consequently to an increase in the amount of water seeping into the ground water aquifers.

This scholar agrees with the conclusions of other researchers that a critical point will be reached whenever the discharge at Aswan reaches 200 million cubic meters a day. This means that before this critical point, the ground water aquifers work to increase the water flowing into the Nile, whereas after that critical point it is the Nile that feeds the aquifer. For this reason, the High Dam authorities are trying to maintain this level of discharge, which will keep the ground water reserves at the right level so as to not affect the soil, agricultural regions, and even buildings and archeological sites.

The study says that in Upper Egypt, Sawhaj Governorate consumes the most ground water, followed by Qina, al-Minya, and Asyut, and then al-Jizah, Bani Suwayf, and Aswan.

Some 83 percent of the population of Sawhaj depends on ground water for drinking, and in the mid-seventies per capita consumption amounted to about 10 liters per day.

In 1980, about 120,000 cubic meters of ground water were withdrawn daily from artesian wells for drinking purposes, and this figure increased to 161,000 cubic meters a day by 1985.

As for agriculture, in Upper Egypt farmlands get more than 1 billion cubic meters of ground water each year, which is equivalent to 5 percent of Upper Egypt's agricultural water needs.

In addition, many factories, such as the Kima plant in Aswan and the various food-processing plants, are totally dependent on ground water for their needs. In the residential quarters of those factories, ground water is used for drinking and growing vegetables, as is the case with the aluminum plants at Naj' Hammadi and the fertilizer plants at Asyut.

Studies and conclusions obtained by this researcher show that 80 percent of the European countries use ground water to meet their drinking, irrigation, and industrial water needs, even though they have plenty of rainfall and rivers. America depends on ground water for 20 percent of its needs, as is the case in Australia and India.

### Government Reportedly Wastes Groundwater Supply

45040070 Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 8 Nov 88 p 5

[Report by 'Ali Khamis]

[Text] At a time when studies and research conducted by scientific missions confirm the existence of one of the world's largest groundwater supplies in the Western Desert, enough to reclaim and cultivate at least 2 million feddans at an economical price, the Egyptian Government has reclaimed only 3,400 feddans in the last 30 years, leaving the waters of this river to gush out into a barren desert that comprises 50 percent of Egypt's total area, wasted in pools, swamps, and ditches, unutilized. This is with the knowledge that east of Jabal 'Uwaynat and the oases regions, there are millions of feddans in critical need of a drop of water for reclamation.

Al-Wadi al-Jadid Governorate officials have tried to control the amount of water flowing out of this huge reservoir or to reduce the amount of water lost to pools and swamps. Due to its meager resources, however, the governorate has stood helpless before this torrential stream, and the river has continued to lap against the desert sand for over 20,000 years.

We have been hearing in recent years the adage that says, "He who does not have power does not have freedom." This adage was transformed into an Egyptian tragedy when we started importing everything from abroad, even our bread. Studies and research have substantiated the fact that arable land in Egypt amounts to no more than 3.4 percent of its total area and that our production is enough to feed the people for only 3 days a week.

Consequently, voices everywhere have begun calling for self-reliance and for utilizing every inch of Egypt's vast desert. This dream, however, always is dashed by a hard rock, which is represented by a claim we have grown tired of hearing, that there is not enough water to reclaim this desert. However, today we are faced with a unique experience that has turned things upside down, namely the many satellite pictures of a river rippling under the Western Desert, a river moving under the deserts and sands that cover over 50 percent of Egypt's area. International and Egyptian oil companies believed that this river, which cuts across the interior of the Egyptian desert into Libya and Chad, was a sea of oil. These companies moved their experts and equipment to the Western Desert to extract the black gold. The big surprise came when each time these companies drove a pipe into the sand, water gushed out in tremendous force. The companies moved their exploration efforts to another area and, instead of oil, water fountains again gushed out. Therefore, a team of researchers and specialists went out to the desert and discovered one of the largest groundwater supplies in the world. Ever since that date, 1958, these areas have been known as al-Wadi al-Jadid [the New Valley]. Meanwhile, studies have confirmed the existence of 6 million feddans, equal to all the areas currently cultivated in Egypt, located East of al-'Uwaynat and sitting atop this water-rich reservoir. This huge area of land is waiting to be reclaimed if resources are available. Add to that thousands of feddans of clay soil ready to be farmed immediately if we are able to utilize this huge water supply, which is enough, according to studies, for the cultivation of at least 2 million feddans using the flooding method; i.e., the irrigation method used in the Nile Valley and the Delta.

Scientific missions redefined the size of this reservoir, the thickness of its water layer, the water's salinity, and the area that can be safely reclaimed and cultivated for many long years to come. But what did these various scientific missions say? Was this water supply enough to cultivate at least 2 million feddans? If so, what is the secret behind this deep sleep the Egyptian Government has been enjoying since 1958?

Hydrological studies confirmed that this reservoir, called the Nubian Provisional Reservoir, comprised a 2 million square kilometer area east of the African Desert consisting of two main groundwater reservoirs: first, the al-Kufrah Reservoir, which includes eastern Libya, north-eastern Chad and the northwestern part of Sudan, and second, the al-Dakhilah Reservoir, which is the part located in Egypt. The thickness of this Nubian rock in both formations goes down to 3,500 meters at some locations. Over 100 pumping tests have been conducted in the al-Dakhilah groundwater reservoir located under the Egyptian desert. The volume of water stored in this reservoir is estimated to be 50,000 cubic kilometers! Using air and ground magnetic scanning and electric pulses, the amount of water stored under the al-Kharjah, al-Dakhilah, and al-Farafirah depressions has been estimated at 20 trillion cubic meters and the thickness of

the water-bearing strata increases as we go north; i.e., toward the al-Farafirah Oasis. It measures 900 meters at the al-Kharjah Oasis and increases to 2,400 meters in the al-Farafirah area.

Furthermore, all studies of this water supply point to the existence of huge amounts of stored water and, therefore, any supply over and above this stored water can be disregarded. Moreover, this stored supply may be safely used for development—agricultural and otherwise—in all of the al-Wadi al-Jadid depressions. However, while studies say with certainty that water can be drawn out through the year 2010 at an annual rate of 10 million cubic meters, enough to cultivate 142,000 feddans, the government has so far reclaimed only 35,000 feddans in this vast desert, which means that another 100,000 feddans could have been reclaimed safely and economically.

These studies also confirm that the water, as calculated by the radioisotope method, is 20,000 to 30,000 years old, that the water temperature in the upper strata is between 25 and 30 degrees Celsius in the upper strata and 35 degrees and 45 degrees Celsius in the lower strata, and that it is good for drinking and irrigation.

Then came 1958 to bring the role of most scientific missions to an end. For 10 years, these missions had placed studies on this water supply before the Egyptian Government, which flexed its muscles and hailed the discovery of a new valley that matched the Nile Valley in its resources. The political leadership dispatched all resources at its disposal to the area to develop it and reclaim close to 2 million feddans at an economical price, according to what all the studies confirmed. It also created a regional agency it called the Desert Redevelopment Agency which had no sooner been formed than the 1967 disaster came along to sweep away everything in its path. Redevelopment projects in the area came to a halt and Egypt lost billions of cubic meters of water from this free-flowing and gushing supply.

As we were going from the al-Kharjah Oasis to the al-Dakhilah Oasis, along the entire 200-km long road, we were surprised to see new wells being drilled next to dry or sealed ones; also, at a time when a number of feddans were covered with green patches, they were interlaced by fallow land and barren desert, even though they have the same soil, mostly clay, in almost the same spot.

When we tried to unravel the mystery of this mixture, we got some astonishing answers. Farmers stressed the fact that these vast areas of land that used to be cultivated had been rendered fallow because most of the available wells are shallow and old, about 50 to 300 meters deep. Consequently, they dry up quickly, forcing the farmers to desert the area after reclaiming it to go to another close-by location to start drilling new wells, which can take 5 to 10 full years to complete, given their meager

resources and the absence of a strong bond between the farmer and this land. For the entire desert is owned by a development agency and none of them can own a single inch of it.

On the other hand, Eng 'Ali 'Abd-al-Ghani, director of al-Dakhilah area development, stressed that the great amounts of water gushing out of this groundwater reservoir causes them very serious problems. In the winter, when the rate of evaporation drops, huge amounts of surplus water gush out without stopping every day and flow into ditches to form useless swamps! Moreover, wells whose life-expectancy has run out cannot be brought under control because shutting them down creates an imbalance within them, causing water to flow out of them 24 hours a day and this water goes unutilized as well, even though an agreement has been concluded with the Germans to implement an active solution to deal with such wells.

The third problem is the danger inherent in drilling wells for reclamation in the al-Farafirah area. This area has the largest accumulation of groundwater and therefore a single well can put out tremendous amounts of water, but there is not a strong demand for this water. Furthermore, because proper regulation of the flow is nonexistent among the population, the squandering of this scarce resource affects the lifting stations, because we pump the squandered drainage water into large pools which, unfortunately, cannot be utilized.

What is surprising is that at a time when the government is panting for a drop of water, people in al-Wadi al-Jadid spend sleepless nights worrying about the increased flow and tragic waste of water, in winter in particular. The slow, almost nonexistent, land reclamation movement cannot keep up with such a flow and no one can control it.

Eng Sa'd Hasan, assistant secretary general of the governorate, affirmed that the German GTZ organization is conducting a study on how to direct well water to cut waste during the summer period when 30 percent of the water supply is wasted. Furthermore, the governorate has set up 5 pilot farms where the drip irrigation system is applied. The Ministry of Irrigation has declared its readiness to give loans to local residents if they develop this irrigation system. The drip irrigation experiment in the Abu Minqar area has failed, however, because the water there contains high levels of iron oxide that clog up the drippers, necessitating water purification. The residents have been forced to take off the drippers, leaving hoses to pump at full force into the sand. Consequently, the governorate is conducting an applied test to identify the best and most modern irrigation systems for it.

Whereas economists believe that a drop of water in the heart of the desert is a hundred times more precious than oil, how long are we going to let this resource be squandered in pools and swamps while millions of surrounding feddans are in critical need of a drop of water?

### **Specifications of New Military City Detailed During Official Opening**

*45040041 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 10 Oct 88 p 3*

[Excerpts] President Husni Mubarak yesterday opened the first phase of the military city at Hike Stop. The largest military city in the Middle East, it was built by the Armed Forces Engineering Corps and is considered one of the largest projects ever undertaken by the armed forces.

The project was built in the area bounded by the Cairo-Isma'iliyah Road to the north and the Cairo-Suez Road to the south, on an area of approximately 12,000 feddans to the east of the Hike Stop camps, from kilometers 32 to 36 of the Isma'iliyah road, and from kilometers 28 to 34 of the Suez road. The cost of the project is 310 million Egyptian pounds. [passage omitted]

### **Planning and Design**

Major General Faruq al-Zarqa said, "In planning the project and designing its installations, attention was given to realizing the preceding benefits and to absorbing most of the units currently concentrated in the areas of al-'Abbasiyah, Manshiyat al-Bakri, al-Hilmiyah, and al-Mazah."

He added that implementation of the project had begun on 23 February 1984. Implementation had taken 5 years and was expected to end—God willing—in July 1989. The project is expected to cost 310 million pounds.

The head of the Army Engineering Corps went on to say, "The project consists of 27 housing sections for military units, including a mechanized infantry division and five artillery brigades. It also includes a driver training center, two vehicle workshops, two vehicle depots, an armored vehicle depot, two evacuation and rescue battalions, and a group of special antiterrorism units."

### **Service Section in the City**

The city includes a service section that contains a semiautomatic bakery capable of producing 500,000 loaves a day, a mosque for 200 worshippers, 12 other mosques located in various parts of the city, a laundry capable of cleaning 30 tons in 8 hours, a complete medical clinic, and a branch of the Armed Forces Economic Organization. In addition, there are 8 commercial stores, a fire department, a 20,000-line telephone exchange, a 500-seat theatre, and two post office, savings, and distribution centers.

Each housing section includes housing buildings for individuals, command buildings, soldier's restaurants, classrooms, training buildings, sheds for weapons, equipment, and vehicles, administrative depots, fuel depots, a mosque, a recreation room, and a parade ground. There

are 1,628 concrete structures in these sections and 990 metal ones. The city is enclosed on the outside by a wall of buildings, guard towers, and gates.

### 5,000 Housing Units

The housing section includes 5,000 two- and three-room housing units, 2 nurseries, 2 primary schools, a high school, 4 mosques capable of holding 3,000 worshippers, 2 social clubs, a game room accommodating 5,000 individuals, 2 supermarkets, shops, 1 first-class and 1 second-class cinema, 4 first- and second-class post offices, and savings offices.

### Separate Utilities

The head of the Armed Forces Engineering Corps said that the city's utility networks had been designed so as not to depend on City of Cairo utilities, but rather to be a source of utilities for the housing developments expected for the area.

The water and utilities network includes a water purification plant at Siryaqus with a capacity of 60,000 cubic meters a day, 8 pumping stations along the line from Siryaqus to the city, 4 raised water tanks (each with a capacity of 1,000 cubic meters), 8 ground water tanks (total storage capacity 20,000 cubic meters), 236 km of pipes (ranging from 80 to 600 mm in diameter), 183 fire storage tanks (each with a capacity of 25 cubic meters), 282 fire hydrants, and 250 garden watering taps.

The sewage system includes:

- A treatment plant with a capacity of 35 cubic meters. Water from it will be used for agriculture on 1,800 feddans and for planting trees inside the city.
- 13 sewage pumping stations.
- 11.875 km of sloping pipes, and 35 km of cast-iron pipes.
- 3,395 underground concrete chambers.

### Road and Electricity Network

The city contains a road network that includes:

- A network of external roads totaling 87 km in length (from 12 to 18 meters wide, for a surface of 1,157,000 cubic [as in source] meters).
- A network of internal roads totalling 137 km in length (from 6 to 12 meters wide, for a surface of 146 [as published] square meters).

The electricity network of the city includes:

- Two input sources: (1) the Saqr Quraysh plant, and (2) the al-Qutamayah plant.
- A 66/11 kilovolt-ampere transformer station with a capacity of 4 x 25 megavolt-amperes. It will be tied to the two input sources.

- 302 km of medium voltage cables, and 462 km of low voltage cables.
- Main distributors to feed the city, 67 internal transformer boxes (250.5 kilovolt-amperes), and 28 enclosed transformers.
- A lighting network with 7,300 light poles.

The head of the Armed Forces Engineering Corps said that the city contains five restaurants (a total of 4,000 people per restaurant), 41 additional restaurants (each mess serving 600 individuals), an automatic bakery with a capacity of 500,000 loaves a day, a central laundry with a capacity of 30 tons a day, 325 water heaters for buildings, machinery for swimming pools (3 large pools and 2 children's pools), 72 reserve generators of various capacities, and 4 fuel and service stations. [passage omitted]

### American University of Cairo Charged With Spying

45040123 Cairo AL-MUKHTAR AL-ISLAMI in Arabic  
September 1988 pp 45-51

[Article by Dr Layla Bayyumi: "Concerns of Muslims Under University's Dome; American University and Legitimate Spying; Keeping Track of Islamic Movement and Instigating Regime; Why Are Egyptian Youth in American University Addicted; Islamic Current's Offerings in Egyptian Universities"]

[Text] The American University is the bastion of Westernization and secularization. It is the eyes the CIA has focused on this nation's heart. Through it, poisons are injected into the mind and heart of a large sector of the youth of the rich, upper class who are trained to hold this country's leadership positions. Egypt is only one of three countries in the world—Lebanon and Tunisia being the other two—where a foreign university exists. Advanced countries, even the so-called Third World countries, reject the presence of such institutions by virtue of the serious role they play in creating a dual education and of the social, cultural, economic, and political research activity they conduct to expose these countries' conditions and to create inlets for foreign presence and control in countries where religious activity is evident.

Keeping track of the Islamic current in Egypt and analyzing its rising progress graph have been and continue to be a main point of the studies and research conducted by this university's sociologists and researchers. These studies are sent as reports to the CIA, and they are strongly connected with the direction domestic policy takes in the so-called Third World countries.

### Sociology Professors and the Islamic Current

Disregarding the secret war, whose focal points we may not be able to uncover, we will cite several events which occurred in 1987 and 1988. Dr Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim, the general director of the so-called Intellectual Club and a sociology professor at the American University, has

conducted several studies on the Islamic current in Egypt and the Arab world as a phenomenon and not as a basis and a natural extension of our Islamic roots. In a lecture on the future of the Islamic current in Egypt, given at the Economics and Political Science College, Dr Ibrahim warned that the future will belong to the Muslim Brotherhood and to the Islamic current unless the other forces, embodied in the ruling NDP, the communist Grouping, the secular al-Wafd, and the Nasirists, pay attention and develop new practices that attract the masses to them and unless they crystallize a new formula to deal with Egyptian and Arab society's problems. Dr Ibrahim said that the Islamic current is the challenge facing all the other forces, be they the ruling party or the other forces. He expressed surprise that the Egyptian scientific research centers include studies of the Islamic awakening phenomenon under the crime and deviation unit and consider this phenomenon a criminal phenomenon whereas it should have been examined and analyzed politically. Dr Ibrahim is alarmed that the phenomenon, serious as it is, has been tackled very superficially and demagogically, especially by the media. Even Egyptian scientific research centers have not tackled it as they should. Dr Ibrahim noted that this phenomenon is not always confined to Egypt and that it is an Arab phenomenon. Dr Ibrahim's first study was confined to the religious violence groups. He deplored the fact that nobody has conducted an objective scientific study on the political rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and on the money investment companies, saying: We are facing a [word indistinct] Islamic phenomenon that employs various means, beginning with violence and ending with various economic and social activities.

Dr Ibrahim has divided religious activities into three categories:

1. An institutionalized Islam, embodied in al-Azhar and the Ministry of Awqaf, which is tantamount to a governmental Islam that serves the state.
2. A sufist Islam.
3. A political Islam whose heart is the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jihad Group, a splinter brotherhood organization. A change has occurred in recent years in the Muslim Brotherhood's practices with the brotherhood's entry into the arena of partisan politics and with its creation of economic, service, and information establishments. This activity is growing at an enormous pace, setting up major publishing houses, and creating political and information harmony and foundations that are spreading rapidly among ordinary Egyptians. The government stands perplexed. How should it view this current? Should it fight it or should it take precautions against it? The Egyptian intellectuals themselves are perplexed insofar as this issue is concerned. They should develop new practices and devise new ways to challenge and confront the Islamic current generally and the brotherhood in particular.

#### 'Ashmawi and Islamic Government

A permanent lecturer on Islamic government at the American University is Counselor Sa'id al-'Ashmawi, a Rotarian, the official spokesman in the name of Islamic Shari'ah and the university mufti. This man is well known for his strong security connections, and he constantly delivers anti-Islamic movement lectures at radicalism and terrorism conferences. In his lectures to the American University students, he says that there is no law in Islam for establishing a state and that such a law exists in Judaism. He adds that whoever demands the establishment of an Islamic government bases his justifications on a narrow and rigid understanding of the religion and that this poses grave danger to the religion and the people.

Explaining the causes of the call for an Islamic government, al-'Ashmawi alleges that they are:

1. Personal conflicts and the struggle for liberation;
2. The belief that an Islamic government is the means to protect the nation from the West's assaults;
3. The creation of the State of Israel on a religious basis; and
4. Corruption, technological frustration, fear of disintegration, the West's sexual behavior, and other such myths.

He also alleges that there is no evidence defining the form, or even broad lines, of such a government and advises Muslims not to demand an Islamic government but to call for the creation of another form of government (that serves the Jews, secularism, and world Zionism).

#### University's Solidarity With Ministry of Interior

In 1988, the American University organized a major conference to which it invited the symbols of secularism and Masonry, including writers, journalists and artists, to launch a campaign against the Islamic current under the guise of what they call defending art, music, and the theater.

They began to sound the alarm under the leadership of the heroic figure 'Adil Imam who then moved, in coordination with the Ministry of Interior, to invade Upper Egypt with his art and with their central security forces. 'Ali Salim spoke at the university conference, warning of the ugly consequences that could be brought about by the Muslim radicals' attacks on music and the theater, saying that the nation's unity is in danger and that the art issue is the problem of the hour, rather the tragedy of Egypt in its entirety. He demanded that the state intervene strongly to (strike at the Islamic current).

As for 'Adil Imam, the brilliant knight, he defined his position by stressing the need to support the government's confrontation of the terrorist Islamic movement. He addressed a historic appeal to the poor and silent masses to move, not for the sake of sustenance but to confront the vigilant Islamic awakening. He also stressed the need for art advocates to join student and labor organizations. 'Adil Imam further said that he fears the future and feels pessimistic about it unless the state, along with people like him, courageously and firmly confront the Islamic movement which will make people's minds black and their lives even blacker.

'Ali al-Ra'i then reassured the conferees that this phenomenon will not last because it is similar to the British, French, and Zionist colonialism that has failed to destroy the Egyptian people's values. Al-Ra'i also expressed the view that the Islamic awakening is a phenomenon that is separate from the Muslim Egyptian people.

#### **Baker and Enlightened Espionage**

The American University's research activity surpasses its instructional activity. This activity is legal and, therefore, it spreads carefully and normally. The political studies section has working teams led by Baker, an American professor of political science. A group of educationally and practically superior students who are devoid of any political or cultural awareness are assigned to attend and record public Islamic conferences and meetings, to gather newspaper and magazine clippings on specific issues in special archives, and to devote special attention to observing domestic conditions and the Egyptian public interests. The university allocates a special budget for this specific activity. The working team carries out the research and data-collection assignment in return for generous pay and rewards while Baker is in the United States.

#### **Nudist and Drug Films**

We mentioned previously some immoral acts that are practiced at the university normally. To teach anthropology, films of nude tribes of Australia, the Amazon and other places have to be shown. Eliminating modesty under the pretext of education is an approach that leads to some sort of anarchy and libertinism.

A sign indicating that moral values have collapsed and that corruption and addiction have spread among a large number of American University students as a result of previously noted causes is that the Egyptian police arrested in March 1988 a number of the university students walking around aimlessly while under the influence of marijuana. Marijuana cigarettes were found in the students' cars.

#### **Rotary and University**

The Rotary and Masonic movements are closely connected with the university because their means and objectives are the same. Through the regular social activities of missionary groups, such as Caritas, and of the Rotary Clubs in Cairo and the governorates, regular meetings are held between the students, their families, the professors, and the members of these clubs during musical and singing parties held under the guise of family day, university day, women's international day, care for the lepers day, and charitable performances.

#### **Why Does Islamic Current Excel in Egyptian Universities?**

The Islamic movement in Asyut University is independent and confrontational in nature. It is trying to control its own affairs despite the considerable hardship it is experiencing and despite the blockade placed around it. From my observation of the various activities in the universities, I have noticed that the Islamic group in Asyut University and in other universities provides the broadest social, cultural, and educational services. These activities include:

- Organizing scientific schools to teach jurisprudence, the principles of religion, the Hadith, interpretation, and the creed, and schools to train in preaching work and sermon-making and to teach a course on preaching.
- Devoting attention to and devising solutions for student problems, such as the university textbook problem and the free meals problem, either through negotiation or through pressure exerted by way of conferences and protests.
- The Islamic group prints costly scientific books at low prices affordable to all. It also prints examination mimeograph sheets and important summaries at the end of the year.
- The group organizes the low-cost Islamic uniform project which sells a uniform costing 20 pounds for 5 pounds.
- It organizes the yearly pilgrimage during the mid-year holiday for more than 150 students from each university.
- It organizes noncoeducational trips to sites close to or remote from the universities for either recreational or educational purposes. The group also organizes monthly contests on religious, scientific, intellectual, or political topics, as well as monthly retreats, called complete Islamic day.
- It develops political awareness among students by way of religious and political symposiums, and it expresses its opinion on political and intellectual issues through statements, comments or conferences.
- It issues monthly magazines and regular weekly pamphlets to comment on news and public events. It also delivers speeches at university auditoriums to call for Islam and to familiarize audiences with important events.



- It organizes Islamic book fairs and fairs for student paintings, photographs, and products and for medical instruments.
- It conducts student polls on public and student issues, organizes peaceful demonstrations to denounce Israeli actions, to express support for the Palestinian cause, or to denounce the dismissal of students from college towns.
- It supervises efforts to prevent lewd parties and co-ed trips. The Islamic group also engages in numerous social activities to aid needy students, to organize recovery week, to visit and assist patients, to launch blood-donation campaigns, and to organize medical lectures on first aid.
- It sets up an audio library to loan tapes of lectures and sermons by well-known preachers and venerable Koran tapes and to use video technology to advance the call and to convey images of the Afghan and Palestinian struggle.

The Islamic current is making all these intrinsic efforts in the universities in order to channel the students' capacities, to serve the students, and to enlighten them within a sound Islamic framework free of addiction, coeducation, anarchy, and laxity. This is why blows are aimed at this current from every direction, and there is no power and no might except with God.

#### **Faculty, Students Comment on Asyut University Security**

45040071 Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 7 Nov 88 p 3

[Article by 'Isam al-'Ibaydi]

[Text] Students at Asyut University have many and varied concerns. Not only do they endure what students at other universities suffer, such as high textbook prices, crowded classrooms, poor laboratories, and campus congestion, but they have their own special worries. Going to college at Asyut University is thought to be taking a risk with unforeseen consequences. Students are reluctant to go, and their relatives, awaiting their return, remain apprehensive and nervous, having not forgotten the scores of young people who were victims of a clash with security forces. Some of these students could not be blamed for anything except for happening to be in a place where a demonstration was held.

Ayman Husayn, a student at the Asyut University College of Law, says, "The absence of security at the university is the most important problem facing university students. Before going through the main gate of the university, I feel as though I were entering a military barracks. Policemen on both sides stop students and ask each one for his university card. They look at us suspiciously as though we were thieves. Can you imagine that students like us are afraid to talk to their fellow students about anything outside the subjects of study because they are afraid a security man might overhear them or a

colleague might inform against them? Students have this fear because detectives recruited a number of students to report to them the conversations which take place between students."

The student relates an incident that happened to him. He says, "I was at the college attending a lecture when the gymnasium incident occurred. That incident involved students from the Islamic University who refused to hold a concert and destroyed musical instruments. Security men interfered. As soon as we walked out of the classroom after the lecture, we noticed a large crowd of security men who ordered us off the campus immediately. But when we waited around to find out what was happening, we were stunned by a violent attack from central security soldiers who proceeded to strike and kick us indiscriminately. They even followed us to the main gate on our way out of the campus. When we went home, each one of us had sustained an injury. Thus, for no reason at all we became victims of barbarism and ignorance."

#### **'We Can't Express Our Opinions'**

Jamal Husni, a student at the Asyut University College of Business, says, "The most important problem university students have is the inability to express their opinions and suggestions. If, for example, I wanted to put up a newsletter on the wall, I would have to go by the Security Office and get the approval of security personnel for the published material. In most cases they reject everything we present to them. In fact, they advise us to leave such things alone and, in a veiled threat, they tell us to mind our own business."

#### **'Permissible for Them, Prohibited for Us'**

Sayyid 'Abd-al-Maqsud, [a student at] the Asyut University College of Law, says, "The university is part of society. I don't know why there is an attempt to separate the university from society. We are always being told that political activity is prohibited at the university. But the question I ask those who tell us that is this: 'If political activity at the university is forbidden, why doesn't the president of the university adhere to that?' Last year the president of the university served as secretary of the National Party in Asyut Governorate. He met every day with a professor in the College of Education who also served as secretary of the National Party's youth organization in the governorate. The two used to meet with their party's youth leaders, and they used to make every effort to isolate the competition's candidates, that is, members of the Islamic movement or any other movement. They did that to give their own candidates, who are rejected by all university students, an edge in the elections.

"Isn't this political activity? Doesn't this in fact inject politics into the university? Is political activity at the university permissible for the president of the university and his assistants but forbidden to us, students?"

### 'I Will Not Participate in the Elections'

'Abdallah Kamal al-Din, a member of the religious movement says, "I ran in last year's elections for the Athletic Committee, but when the candidates' names were announced, I was stunned to find out that my name was missing from the lists of candidates. A delegation of individuals who had been disqualified went to see Dr 'Abd-al-Raziq Hasan, president of the university, who told them, 'I had nothing to do with that. The vice president for Students' Affairs is responsible for this.' The delegation then went to see that official who told them that it was the president of the university who was responsible. When they went back to the office of the president of the university and confronted and pressed him for an answer, he told them, 'Go to the security people. They are the ones who crossed out your names.'

"A member of the delegation then asked the president, 'Aren't you the president of the university, and aren't you responsible?'"

"Unable to take any action, the delegation then withdrew from his office."

The student adds, "The president of the university devised another method this year to disqualify students he did not want in the students' unions. Three weeks ago he started enforcing penalties on those students, penalizing one of them after the other. His goal was to make it impossible for them to run in the elections because the rules bar anyone who has been penalized from running in the elections.

"For all these reasons I do not intend to run in the elections this year because I know the outcome in advance."

### The University Guard Is Rejected

Murtada 'Abd-al-Rahim, a student in the College of Business, says, "Actually, I think there is no reason for having university guards, especially since they started interfering in everything. A scene I will never forget as long as I live involved a student who is a member of an Islamic group. That student wrote a statement attributed to the prophet on the blackboard and started speaking about it before the professor came into the classroom. A short time later the professor arrived, and the student concluded his remarks. As he was about to return to his seat, an officer came in and grabbed him in front of all of us and the professor as well, who stood by helplessly. When the students became rowdy, he tried to get them to stay quiet. The officer left the classroom, still holding the student, and the professor tried to appear unperturbed as he explained the lecture to us.

"I will never forget that scene as long as I live. That is why I am calling for the dismissal of university guards and their replacement by university employees and students. The agents of security people have been implanted

in our midst. They are our own colleagues who write reports about their fellow students, and people are arrested on the basis of these reports."

### Textbook Prices Are Rising

Muhammad 'Abd-al-Na'im, a student in the College of Law, shifts to another problem, that of textbooks. "This year the price of a textbook is 15 pounds, and that is above and beyond what we will pay when we get each sections of the various notes [we have to purchase]. This means that the price of one book could be 20 pounds. Despite the announcement that 12 pounds would be the highest price for a textbook, that announcement is not being adhered to at all. Even the monetary subsidy which we used to receive and benefit from is now disbursed in the form of one or two books. These books are given to us before the end of the school year. By then each student would have already purchased all books.

"The food coupons on whose basis we students can be served meals outside the university are seized by university employees and workers. That is why there is a severe shortage of those coupons, which are issued to us one week and denied to us the second week. And so it goes throughout the school year."

### Employees' Heavy-Handedness

Ramadan 'Abd-al-Sami', a student in the College of Agriculture, says, "The poor treatment we receive from employees in Students' Affairs is one of the most important problems we are facing. Each one of them treats us as though he were an emperor, and any student who protests is given a beating by security agencies and may even be arrested. Many of these employees receive the reports prepared by the detectives' agents. This way those students can turn in their reports about their colleagues to one of those employees without having to go to the security office.

"University employees seize the clothing and all other goods from the university branch of Sidnawi [a department store]. They select what they want for themselves and their children, leaving nothing but poor quality clothing for us. That's why we don't shop at the university branch of Sidnawi. Sometimes we have to shop there because the university gives us social assistance in the form of goods we can purchase from Sidnawi for a certain sum."

I met with a number of professors. I wanted them to tell me what they thought about the students' problems and about those things they were suffering from.

### Open the Doors!

Dr Fawzi 'Abd-al-Radi Rashwan, instructor at the Mechanical Engineering Department in the College of Engineering says, "I see no reason why the campus should be surrounded by all these armed forces. This

provokes professors' and students' feelings and interferes with learning and with lectures. No one, whether he is a student or professor, is allowed onto the campus. We are not allowed to enter the campus until these armed forces are certain of our identity. All this makes us angry, provokes our feelings, and hampers us."

Dr Fawzi Rashwan had this to say about political activity inside the university: "Anyone has the right to express his opinion with total freedom. Otherwise, thought and development would come to a standstill. The university cannot be isolated from society's problems. It is a part of society, and it has to interact with it."

Dr Muhammad Raja'i al-Tahlawi, dean of the College of Engineering at Asyut University says, "I don't approve at all of political activity in the university for students or professors. I don't even approve of it for the president of the university. Political activity belongs outside the university, not in it."

"I say this because I know there is conflict in politics. If political conflict finds its way onto campus, chaos would prevail and disturbances would be everywhere."

#### A Meeting With the President of the University

After finding out what the problems of students and professors were, we had to meet with the university's top official, Dr 'Abd-al-Raziq Hasan, president of Asyut University. I told him about the problems that I had heard the university had, and he replied, "First of all, as far as the subsidy is concerned, we found that it would be better to give students books or to let them use the copying machines and printers used by the university for a nominal fee. In my opinion, this is better than giving them cash."

"Regarding the presence of security on campus, let me affirm that only university guards can be found on campus. All universities in the world have university guards to protect university establishments and ascertain the identity of those entering the campus so that no saboteurs can slip in amongst those entering the university. Saying that the guards provoke students and professors is something that I strongly deny. The university guard was founded to serve students and professors."

About the intervention of security in student elections, the president of the university said, "Security people did not interfere in student elections: they did not cross out names or change lists. Some students were disqualified as candidates in compliance with university rules which stipulate that anyone who runs for office in students' elections should have had concrete activity in the committee in which he seeks to hold office. Those who did not meet those conditions were disqualified."

About forbidding political activity at the university, the president of the university said, "Politics belongs outside the university. The university is a place for learning and

studying only. That is why I have never approved of political activity at the university. In the past, when political activity was permitted on campus, partisanship found its way into the university, disturbances occurred, and students who subscribed to different movements clashed with each other."

I asked, "What about the penalties which were imposed on some students to disqualify them for the next students' elections?"

He replied, "This is not true. I call upon any student who has been unfairly penalized, as is being said, to disqualify him for the elections to come forward and to tell me what happened. I will settle his problem immediately."

About freedom of speech, which is missing from the university, Dr Hasan said, "Security has absolutely nothing to do with freedom of speech. College deans are the ones who have the last word on that matter. They put no restrictions on freedom of speech. Unless an opinion violates university traditions, everything is permitted, except that which violates religion and traditions."

#### Correspondent on U.S. Aid, Renewed Soviet Relations

45040051 Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 6 Oct 88 p 1

[Article by Sati' Nural Din: "Commentary on American Aid, Renewed Soviet Relations"]

[Text] Just as the area of cultivated land on the banks of the great Nile is shrinking, so is the area of the central state authority which used to represent with this enchanting river twin reasons for Egypt's existence and survival throughout the ages.

What is frightening about Egypt's current crisis is that the national central government is being drained and consumed like the Nile waters by institutions or alternate manifestations that open Egyptian doors wide to all sorts of dangerous possibilities, thus giving rise to strange economic forces such as "businessmen," "investment companies" and other trusts, and drug dealers.

In the face of these forces, it is easy for anyone to detect the government's failure and the despair of the people who are looking outside of Egypt for solutions to their piled-up crises and are following the foreign debt problem and proposed solutions the way they follow the rising prices of bread, cucumbers, and tomatoes.

Abroad, the picture looks gloomy because the political options are limited, or are limited to the government which inherited this course and did not initiate it, and which finds itself incapable of either pursuing this course or changing it, keeping in mind that this is not what it wishes to do nor is it within its reach.

Therefore, the only thing menaced Egypt can do is to come up with temporary remedies that delay but do not cancel the due date, such as negotiations with the IMF and economic aid from the East and West and from some Arab countries.

To the west of Egypt stands the United States, which is now buying up Egypt retail after selling it wholesale. Annual financial aid cannot go past the \$3 billion Israeli ceiling, and American banks and other service companies take back what Egypt receives.

Economic advisors are not alone in their contention that Egypt is assisting America instead of the other way around as it is supposed to be. Any amount of assistance costs Egypt dearly in consulting, transfer, and operations fees which sometimes exceed the value of the aid, while the returns are not enough to meet the urgent needs of the Egyptian economy.

And advisors are not alone in saying that the amounts of money the West spends on the infrastructure are fruitless because the country needs to build a production base that can help finance the infrastructure or the comprehensive national development objectives.

Even the subway system does not enjoy, in this sense, the presumed popularity in a city chocked with traffic jams at all hours of the day. It is said, for example, that the Aswan Dam cost \$400 million which is the cost of 1 km of the subway system.

Confidence in the West, therefore, is lacking not only because the Egyptian debt to it is very large and very heavy, but because it is not laying the foundation for a true capital structure that can rescue Egypt by distributing and focusing production and investment on agriculture and industry in accordance with Egypt's food and commercial needs.

The opposition goes farther than that. It maintains that America does not want to help Egypt because it is investing for itself, using its own money for the sake of increasing its capital which benefits a small minority of Egyptians. If the Egyptian Government requests more aid, American demands are raised as well to the point of asking for military facilities.

The American Embassy in Cairo, one of the largest in the world (close to 400 employees) puts out a monthly (not a quarterly and not an annual as is customary) report on economic trends in Egypt. This report includes exact tables—not available to government agencies—on Egyptian balance of payment figures, Egypt's revenues from the Suez Canal, remittances from Egyptians working abroad, investments and tourism—a major GNP source—in addition to government spending, deficit figures and, consequently and most importantly, the changes in foreign currency reserves and hence Egypt's ability to pay its debts to the United States.

From abroad as well, Soviet-Egyptian relations loom up again after regaining some of their fervor about 2 years ago. However, they continue to be governed by American provisos which Egypt has approved and Moscow has not opposed so long as they allow its actual return to a country from which it was expelled during the first half of the seventies.

It is frequently alleged in Cairo that the arrest of the Egyptian advisors in the United States 2 months ago on the charge of trying to smuggle American medium-range missile technology out of the country was an indirect reply to the steadily growing relations between Moscow and Cairo.

Whatever the case, the state of affairs shows that the Soviet Union took a new direction when it agreed in May 1987 to reschedule Egypt's military debt of over \$7 billion that had been outstanding since the October 1973 war, and reached an agreement with the Egyptian Government to excuse a great part of the \$4 billion interest due on these debts.

This was coupled with a \$1 billion trade protocol which placed Egypt back in the number two position among the developing countries, after India, in trade with the Soviet Union which amounted to 6 million rubles in 1987.

Bilateral relations recorded their most salient development when the Egyptian minister of foreign affairs, Dr 'Isamat 'Abd-al-Majid, visited Moscow last May where he ratified the principle of political counsel similar to that which exists between Cairo and Washington. It was agreed to raise the amount of exchange to 1.85 billion Egyptian pounds, to allow the Soviet Union to take part in implementing the 5-year plan projects aimed at developing or establishing new industries, and to enter into new ventures.

Perhaps the most prominent example of this Soviet openness to Egypt and Egyptian capitalism is the invitation extended to a delegation of Egyptian businessmen from Port Said to go to Moscow to hold negotiations on joint ventures. This visit occurred last month.

During 'Abd-al-Majid's visit to Moscow, it was decided that the Soviet Union would contribute 3 billion rubles (\$5 billion) in the form of long-term loans (15-20 years at 5 percent interest) to finance a number of production projects, provided that payment would be made in goods produced by these projects: agreement to expand the steel factories in Hulwan and the iron factories in Naja' Hamadi; to renovate the Alexandria naval shipyard in Alexandria and the Nasr Company; and to build an electric power plant in 'Ayn Musa.

From this angle, this overview of Egyptian foreign policy—which does not take precedence in any Egyptian debate on inflation, unemployment, and debts—is astonishing because it does not reflect Egypt's economic

relations with the outside world which, even for the ordinary man on the street, pivots around the close and dazzling alliance with the United States, perhaps because the Soviets have so far failed in their media campaigns to explain what they are doing in Egypt, for the sake of the Soviet Union of course, which nonetheless is more beneficial to Egypt in the long run than all the Western aid put together.

Conversely, very few Egyptians profess the benefits of the new relations with the Soviets which at present are not subject to any political pre-commitments and are based only on the two countries' economic and trade interests and benefits, perhaps those of the Soviet Union more so than Egypt, even though their exploitation by the Egyptian Government may stop the inevitable collapse, as stated in the most recent American Embassy report.

From this angle as well, we can move on to a seemingly immature political conclusion that Egypt stands to gain the most from the international climate of detente that has allowed the Soviets to return to Egypt through the American door on the principle of helping to prevent the collapse of a strategically important country in an area vital to the whole world.

But where do the Arabs fall in this policy that hides Egypt behind one of its worst economic crises, something some people believe epitomizes the plot against Egypt which has been transformed from the strongest economic and military Arab power into the greatest Arab problem in need of help from any Arab country.

At the leadership and grass-root levels, the Arabs' return to Egypt, whose chauvinism triumphed over that of others, was given the welcome of a prodigal son rich in money and oil resources. There is a schism at the top, however, over Egypt's return to the Arab League between a tendency, represented by the minister of defense, Field Marshal 'Abd-al-Halim Abu-Ghazalah; the minister of foreign affairs, 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid; and the minister of state, Butrus Ghali, that opposes this step that signifies unnecessary commitments, and a pro-return tendency represented by President Mubarak and his advisor, Usamah al-Baz.

But this schism is in form only and is of no importance, not only because economic talks with the Arabs take precedence, but because there are irrevocable Egyptian constants unrelated to the hopes pinned on the possibility of holding an ordinary Arab summit in Riyadh next month to be attended by Egypt. One of these constants is that bilateral peace with Israel will be unable to go beyond its current boundaries if it fails to take the shape of the European and world peace that brought about the 1975 Helsinki Conference for Peace and European Cooperation to include all parties, all issues, and all boundaries.

In this sense, the Camp David Accords file, the second part pertaining to the Palestinian cause in particular, is automatically closed because the Egyptian minimal demand is Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. As for how this can be attained, the end justified the means. Cairo is pushing the PLO toward full coordination to the point of once again raising the confederation issue (as did the Palestinian delegation that visited Amman last month). Cairo is awaiting the PLO's decision and is recommending that it be postponed until after the American and Israeli elections because the uprising is a political initiative and, therefore, a counter-initiative must be presented by the other side.

Cautious official statements about the settlement issue reflect concern for the uprising as a political initiative that must be exploited to the maximum and for the PLO as the sole legitimate representative which is easy to deal with but which harbors uneasiness about the Jordanian monarch's decision to disengage himself from the occupied West Bank, a move he claims to have discussed in advance with Cairo, even though this is not true as evidenced by the Egyptian split over whether it will benefit the cause or not. It is a path which is still open to controversy even though both sides, the Jordanian and the Palestinian, have been following it.

Thereupon, discussion of foreign policy topics, such as the strange alliances and feuds of inter-Arab relations, and such as the Middle East, which may yet pay the price for international detente, are rendered superfluous and unrealistic because the more important issue is how to receive one's monthly salary before its purchasing power declines further and further.

Sandbags go up around the windows of the police academy in the al-Azhar area to fend off Muslim fundamentalists and between them the enchanting Nile rumbles its eternal tunes while those who are concerned about Egypt drowning walk its banks. Meanwhile, Egyptian TV's Channel Two, on its program, "How to Invest Your Money," initiates a discussion on the banks' inclination to raise interest rates on savings and Channel One runs birth control ads.

### **Writer Ponders Possibilities for Revolutionary Change**

*45040095 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 22 Nov 88 p 6*

[Article by Dr Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman]

[Text] As they say, it is impossible to avoid change for good and it is impossible for the status quo to last forever, as they say. If we exclude the possibility of change via elections, as we demonstrated in our first article, then it becomes inevitable that change will occur in another way.

Under our current circumstances, what way can lead to change?

First, there is the possibility that a "quantitative" change or a "family coup" may occur within the framework of the NDP [National Democratic Party], a coup similar to the one staged by Tunisian President Zine El Abidin Ben Ali.

We have not yet forgotten that some of our writers urged President Mubarak to stage such a "quantitative" change or "family coup" so that the procession may truly maintain its old lines and that a large-scale change may be made either in persons or in the existing organizations and institutions. The national burden of anger mounting in the hearts will be thus diffused, a new hope in the possibility of a peaceful democratic change will grow and the rug will be pulled from under the feet of the national opposition forces, some of which may be even attracted to the ranks of the "new" regime.

#### False Coup

Such a coup would not be a real coup because it would be an extension of the same regime. It would guarantee all participants in the preceding phase of government security; safety; and immunity from trial, investigation or inspection for both themselves and their property. Such a coup may even encourage these participants (with their reputation as cabinet ministers and deputies) to turn to the economic and commercial field. Furthermore, it may permit some of them to be appointed to uninfluential official positions in the diplomatic, information or planning areas or as consultants. The coup may be compelled to bring some of the participants before the courts so as to clear the others in the regime and to blame the preceding phase's corruption and violations on those tried. The coup will then release these people one after the other for one reason or another so that they may live safely and securely because they are the regime's kinsmen and tribe. This would be in contrast with the treatment meted out to the "alien" opponents who would be sent to the gallows after farcical trials or who would be sent to detention camps without trial to stay there for long years (amounting to one quarter century). There would be no objection to torturing and murdering them, burying them alive or to sending them beyond the sun!

#### Inadequate Coup

The national demands that are currently projected forcefully and clearly would not allow such a coup to be sufficiently successful. The expulsion of Maj Zaki Badr and Dr al-Mahjub, for example, would be welcomed by the popular forces and by the opposition political parties. Bringing bank robbers before the courts, convicting them and exposing the prominent party and government officials protecting and supporting them would undoubtedly have a positive impact among the masses. The introduction of large-scale changes among the ministers, governors and chief editors of the government-controlled press would also be an effective and desirable act

and is likely to guarantee the regime a large degree of acceptance and support and to dissipate a similar degree of the steam of popular wrath and mass rejection.

#### Tension Will Ruin Everything

But holding new elections in the same old fashion, meaning "the lying computer fashion," would be sure to ruin all the positive results that could be achieved from effecting the abovementioned reforms and we will inevitably suffer a "national" setback that will lead us back to the starting point immediately preceding the staging of the internal or family coup. It is most likely that we will find out that this is what will happen in Tunisia. This is due to the fact that all the political forces insist on enjoying their right to contact the masses and totally reject any falsification of the masses' assessment of their weight. A "family coup" in Tunisia or elsewhere cannot, under any circumstances, engage with the other forces in free competition in the parliamentary or presidential elections because such a coup's leaders know for certain that engaging in free political competition is tantamount to suicide itself. The free masses will renounce them as they spit out a pit, the courts will immediately receive them with open arms and their acts will guarantee them a lengthy stay in jail, if they do not send them to their grave.

#### Possibilities of Family Coup

The gist of what can be said about this way of change—the way of family coups—is that it is possible. However, this way has actually been followed and it is not unlikely that it is the subject of study and examination at present. It might be deemed at any critical moment that it is the only life buoy. However, such a coup is just a palliative, and an adulterated and harmful palliative at that. It will not serve our national cause; it may even harm this cause and delay the sound development that fully releases the nation's will so that the nation may select its president freely and elect its representatives of its own will. Consequently, the national forces must reject any "family coup" in Egypt, must expose its true dimensions to the masses and must firmly resolve to hold free and unbiased parliamentary elections that truly reflect the Egyptian nation's will, considering that such free elections are the only sound proof of the uprightness of any official authority and of its inclination to move toward the desired national reform. In the preceding article, we excluded the possibility of the NDP's acceptance of truly free elections. Therefore, this party alone must shoulder the consequence of its rejection before the masses. It is a heavy and back-breaking consequence which is likely to hasten this party's end and the start of a "new era" and of a profound qualitative change that is compatible with social development and keeps pace with it.

#### Military Coup

Secondly, there is another possibility in case the ruling party rejects free and impartial elections, which it is certain to do. In case no family coup is staged, it is likely

that we will be surprised by a military coup staged by some adventurers on the basis of the sweeping general popular desire for change. Such a coup is likely because the NDP may insist on keeping the current rigged parliamentary council until the end of its term. The NDP may even rig the next parliamentary elections and may insist on extending Husni Mubarak's presidency for a third six-year term through the "yes or no" voting method, without any change or modification. It will thus maintain its overwhelming majority and it will legislate and issue the laws it wishes through this majority. The popular wrath will then escalate, riots will erupt and crises and problems will multiply. Such signs are of special significance to the adventurers who ordinarily interpret the signs as an appeal for movement and as a fertile political ground for coups.

#### Communique No 1

With communique No 1, the adventurers will promise the people to dissolve the People's Assembly and the NDP, to free the press from the government's grip and to reduce the prices of sugar, soap, oil and of tabaqi bread.

At such a time, nobody will rise to rescue the NDP and its overwhelming majority. It is more likely that millions will march to support the coup which will be called the "revolution" or the "true revolution," regardless of its identity and objectives, because the masses will then be solely preoccupied with overthrowing the old tyrants.

#### Retreat From Democracy

There is a third possibility, namely that the regime may retreat from the "crime" of the current democracy, basing its retreat on the outbreak of disturbances and riots, dispatching the leaders of the political parties enjoying strong and growing popular support to jails and detention camps, giving central security and its police and other intelligence forces a free hand to bear down on the partisans, the unionists and the student leaders. This "retreat" may be tied to a point other than disturbances and crises, namely the regime's awareness that the popular forces are about to compel it to wage free elections supervised by the judiciary and unimpeded by the tampering of the Ministry of Interior and its computer.

The NDP must then choose between "retreat from the limited current democracy" and "political annihilation." It will, of course, opt for the retreat.

#### General Revolution

Finally, there is a fourth possibility, namely the eruption of a general popular revolution similar to the one which toppled Numayri in Sudan and Marcos in the Philippines. It is most likely that the army will be instructed to suppress it and it is also most likely that the army will join the ranks of such a revolution. This revolution is what will establish a qualitatively—ideologically, socially, economically and politically—different regime

which accurately and sincerely reflects the Egyptian people's will and which keeps pace with the profound cultural changes that have accumulated in Egypt throughout the past two centuries.

There is no doubt that every Egyptian hopes that the political change will take place by way of free parliamentary and presidential elections. But the NDP has blocked this path indefinitely.

This is why I have not [sic] proposed that party and popular forces that believe in democracy draft for themselves a "five-year political plan" to confront such possibilities. I say a "five-year plan" because Egypt will witness parliamentary and presidential elections in the next five years. These are the two main occasions for the desired political change.

### IRAQ

#### No Plans To Rebuild Nuclear Reactor

44040140 Paris *AL-MUSTAQBAL* in Arabic  
19 Nov 88 p 6

[Text] Informed Arab sources asserted that Iraq "is not in a hurry" to recommence activities on building the nuclear reactor which the Israelis destroyed more than 7 years ago. The sources mentioned that there are no discussions on the subject with French officials and that the Iraqi vice-president Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma'ruf indicated during his visit to Paris last week that recommencement of work on the nuclear reactor's construction and advancement of the Iraqi peaceful nuclear program "requires a political decision," that such a decision has not been made, and that Iraq may not even need the program.

#### Velayati: Iraq Must Release Ailing Prisoners

46400040d London *KEYHAN* in Persian 8 Dec 88 p 2

[Text] 'Ali Akbar Velayati, the foreign minister of the Islamic Republic, wrote a letter to Perez de Cuellar, the UN secretary general, concerning the unilateral decision of the Tehran regime to stop the exchange of prisoners and announced that such exchange will only continue if Iraq immediately sends to Iran the ailing prisoners who, in accordance with previous agreements, were supposed to have been sent to Tehran in the first phase of the exchange but as yet have not been sent.

### ISRAEL

#### Members of Council of Torah Sages Profiled

44230025 Tel Aviv *YEDI'OT AHARONOT* in Hebrew  
10 Nov 88 pp 30, 31

[Article by David Golan]

[Text] Unlike other political parties, the bodies of Agudat Yisra'el and SHAS [Torah Observing Sephardim] are not free to make decisions on vital matters of principle.

If SHAS and Agudat Yisra'el get into the coalition, it will not be their activists who will make the decisions. Their function is only to be public representatives. The ones who have the final say are a few elderly rabbis who meet once every few years, if at all, and determine major political issues.

Once they have decided on something there is no reconsideration and no appeal, and the political bodies deal only with current, rather than basic, questions.

Even the voting of orthodox Knesset members is decided by the various rabbinical councils. Thus, in the previous Knesset, it was the Council of Torah Sages who decided that SHAS should leave the coalition over the conversion of Shoshana Miller, and it was the same council that determined the rotation between Knesset Members Menahem Porush and Ya'aqov Gros and ruled in favor of Porush.

Secular politicians are trying to win them over. Thus, Shim'on Peres tried unsuccessfully to be received by Rabbi Shakh. The latter refused to see him, and despite the fact that he is currently the spiritual leader of two factions, the two never met.

Shamir went on a visit to Bene Beraq 3 years ago and asked to meet with Rabbi Shakh. The rabbi turned him down, and Shamir had to change his agenda for the day.

It was not by chance that Peres and Rabin met this week with Rabbi Ovadya Yosef and presented to him the political programs of the Alignment. In the final analysis, he and the members of the Council of Torah Sages will tip the scales. They have held the key to coalition more than once, and the character of the state is influenced by their philosophy. And they are enveloped in mystery and enigma.

The Council of Torah Sages was established in 1984, when SHAS came into being. This is a council of Sephardi Torah scholars who are younger than their Ashkenazi colleagues in Agudat Yisra'el, and who determine the political-ideological line of SHAS Knesset members.

The council was formed by merging two councils of sages that had been active with SHAS in the municipal elections of Jerusalem and Bene Beraq.

Their leader is Rabbi Ovadya Yosef, a former chief rabbi of Israel and a Torah expert. He is 67 years old and came to Israel at the age of 2 from Baghdad. He is a graduate of the Porat Yosef Yeshiva in Jerusalem. His father had a small grocery store in the Buchari neighborhood, and in his free time served as cantor and liturgical poet at the synagogue.

Rabbi Ovadya Yosef has 11 children. His youngest son, Ya'aqov Yosef, held the SHAS seat in the previous Knesset. Rabbi Ovadya's brother is a chaplain in the paratroopers with the rank of major. Two of his sons-in-law also served as military chaplains. His sons did not serve in the IDF.

The Council of Sages represents Yemenite and Iraqi rabbis; the Moroccan community is not represented in it. Its birth place was the Porat Yosef Yeshiva in Jerusalem.

The council came into being with the same speed that SHAS did. Currently it consists of five rabbis, all of whom are graduates of the yeshiva and are close to Rabbi Yosef.

The second in command in the council is Rabbi Shalom Cohen, 64, born in Jerusalem, and the son of a notable family. He is a Torah scholar, does not read newspapers, and is far removed from politics. He spent many years studying at Porat Yosef, then became an instructor and educator there. He was one of the founders of the Katamon branch of the yeshiva, and is now its principal.

The other council members are Rabbi Shabtay Aton, 61, a native of the Old City, and head of the Reshit Hohma Yeshiva; Rabbi Shim'on Ba'adani, 48, born in Yemen, viewed as Rabbi Shalom Cohen's protege, who was his teacher at the Porat Yosef Yeshiva from an early age, currently he is the head of the Torah Ve'Hayim Yeshiva in Bene Beraq. He is a product of Lithuanian yeshivot, is more extreme than Rabbi Ovadya Yosef in matters of religion, and is more aggressive than the latter.

The most interesting and fascinating among the Torah Sages is Rabbi Reuven Albaz, who is considered to be the most influential in getting people back to Orthodoxy. Rabbi Albaz, 47, came from Morocco as a child. He became more and more religious as he grew up, and finally he devoted his life to religion.

Later he began to tutor children from the Bet Yisra'el neighborhood in Psalms. One day, a group of young men happened to come into the synagogue where he was with the children. The young men were at the time beginning a career in crime. Rabbi Albaz invited them to stay, and 1 year later they returned to religion. That is how he began his huge project of bringing young people from the fringes of society back into the fold of Judaism.

While engaged in the project, he studied at the Porat Yosef Yeshiva and took classes with Rabbi Ovadya Yosef. An attempt to co-opt a North African representative into the council, Rabbi Gabri'el Toledano, head of the Or Baruh Yeshiva, had failed. The rabbi had not liked the council.

The Torah Sages appeared with Rabbi Yosef at several SHAS major electoral meetings. This week they met at his Hazon Ovadya Yeshiva in Jerusalem to decide with whom SHAS will go and what its requests will be.



Rabbi Ovadya sat at the head of the table dressed in a gold-trimmed robe. The SHAS Knesset members were invited to speak. The Sages consulted among themselves and made decisions. This week, for example, they decided to ask the Alignment and the Likud to clarify some of their positions. In the meantime they recommended postponing going to the president. SHAS will not take one step without their approval. Rabbi Shakh from Bene Beraq looks on from a distance. He knows from what direction the wind blows and what will be decided, but he will not impose his view. For the time being, Shakh has no council. Rabbi Ovadya Yosef is gathering power.

The Council of Torah Elders was established in 1912 at the founding meeting of Agudat Yisra'el in Katowice, for the purpose of providing spiritual leadership to the party.

At its peak the council consisted of 16 rabbis who mapped out the ideological line of the party and its Knesset members. Its members were adms [abbreviated title: Our Master, Teacher, and Rabbi] and heads of major yeshivot, most of them Hassidim, and some Lithuanians. They were respected, Yiddish speaking rabbis in their 80's and 90's. Sephardis had trouble joining because of language difficulties.

The Council of Torah Elders derives its power from the personality, scholarship, and pious authority of its members.

The Agudat Yisra'el representatives in the Knesset do not take a step without the knowledge of the council. It is the council members who decide who will represent the party in Knesset. They have laid down guidelines for coalition negotiations and have recommended with whom to go and with whom not to. They authored the abortion law and the autopsy law, and they decide how funds are to be appropriated. Most of the decisions are passed by consensus.

Until November 1983 the Council of Torah Elders was chaired by the leader of the Lithuanian faction of Orthodox Jewry, Rabbi Eli'ezer Menahem Shakh, head of the Ponivzh Yeshiva. He quit against the backdrop of the disagreement among the council members over the "Who is a Jew" amendment.

He shared the title with the admor of Gor, Simha Bunim Alter. The Admor of Gor is 86 years old and very ill, and has not left his house in the past 2 years. When seats become vacant in the council, the Torah Elders themselves bring in new members. If it is an admor who passed away, his heir to the admor title automatically gains membership. The Torah Elders have not met for 3 years now, and that is the reason Rabbi Shakh has not yet been replaced.

So far, Hassidic and Lithuanian rabbis have sat together on the Council of Torah Elders. The Lithuanian council members and the admor of Belz, Rabbi Yisakhar Dov Roke'ah, have defected to Rabbi Shakh's new party, Degel Hatorah [Torah Flag]. Rabbi Simha Zissel Barvida, head of the Hebron Yeshiva; Rabbi Shalom No'ah Barozevsky, head of the Slunim Yeshiva; Rabbi Abraham Ya'aqov Zeleznik, head of the 'Etz Hayim Yeshiva; Rabbi Nisim Karlitz, head of the Hazon Ish Academy; and Rabbi Moshe Shmu'el Shapira, head of the Be'er Ya'aqov Yeshiva, are now pledged to the Degel Hatorah party.

Rabbi Shakh now intends to establish a new council of sages as a decisionmaking body for Degel Hatorah. In the meantime he does the job himself, in parallel to the decision of the Council of Torah Sages.

The Council of Torah Elders is at this time chaired by the admor of Viznitz, Rabbi Moshe Yehoshu'a Hager. Also in the council are the brother of the admor of Gor, Rabbi Pinhas Menahem Alter, head of the Sfat Emet Yeshiva; Rabbi Abraham Weinberg, the admor of Selonim; Rabbi Shmu'el Eliya Tawb, the admor of Mudzhik; Rabbi Abraham Yehoshu'a Tabersky, the admor of Mahanovka, and Rabbi Yehi'el Yehoshu'a Rabinowitz, the admor of Biyala.

When Degel Hatorah was founded, the majority of the Torah Elders switched allegiance to it. The Council of Torah Elders was left with one old and ailing rabbi, the Rabbi of Gor, and another four or five adms.

The new Agudat Yisra'el Knesset members are in disarray. There is no one to decide for them in the interim. They are considering establishing a new Council of Elders.

#### **Bene Beraq Yeshiva Students Discuss Views on Society**

44230024 Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew  
9 Nov 88 pp 4, 5

[Article by Tzafrir Rinat: "The God-Fearing"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] The Puniveizh Yeshiva, the largest yeshiva of the Lithuanian faction, is located on a hill in the heart of Bene Beraq. Some 800 youths live and study there from the age of 13 to the late 20's. The number of applicants is very large, and admission is very strict. Prestige. From the outside, the building looks elaborate and impressive, but on the inside it is neglected and dirty. Books are thrown pell-mell on shelves in the rooms. The rooms are dismal, with plain tables and beds and nothing that could make life more pleasant. The allocation for each yeshiva student is between \$100-400 monthly, and that is rather tight. "The food is pretty bad and the portions are not big enough." They used to pinch

their favorite dish, cholent, on Sabbath eve, until Rabbi Shakh ordered food raids stopped, and of course, his word is as good as a law. Since then the cholent has stayed in the kitchen.

Daily schedule: Reveille at 0700, and from then until the lights are out at 2200, the day is divided into three portions called "orders," all of which are devoted to study. One order in the morning, one in the afternoon, and one in the evening. In between there are the meals and a short rest at noon, in the rooms. Aside from the three orders, the students study by themselves or with a partner, which is called "havruta." All free time is devoted to study matters.

Home Leave: Most of the students at Puniveizh, like at other yeshivas, board at the school. The dormitories are normally attached to the yeshiva. At the small yeshivas the students go home once a month. At the large yeshivas they go home more often, usually on weekends, almost every week.

Entertainment: "We sometimes play practical jokes. Once we brought in someone who pretended to be a Kabbalist. We brought some of the other colleagues in after we told him all sorts of things about them. It was very funny to find out who believed in that nonsense."

Radio: They are very curious about it. They do listen to the radio sometimes. There is no specific interdiction. Some of the students even have walkmen with cassettes. Most of the cassettes are educational or are recordings of the rabbi, but some are music. On the radio they listen mainly to the news.

Television: "No such thing, for fear of licentiousness. But we do watch important programs, elections, for example."

Newspapers: "We do not read them. They always write against Orthodox people. They make us look like monsters. We do read the Orthodox press. Sometimes we read 'AL HAMISHMAR. It is printed at the same printer as YATED NE'EMAN and comes attached to it. It is actually a good newspaper, no abominations in it."

Movies: "Do not see any. You think that is art? Well, yes, we have seen some. 'Gone With the Wind' and 'Dr Zhivago.' Where? One manages, one goes out."

Music: "Many people listen to music. I love Arik, Mati Kaspi, and Shalom Hanokh, too."

Women singers: "Do not mention it." "A female voice is a shameful thing." "Cannot stand screaming like Tina Turner." "Actually, Na'omi Shemer sings nicely."

Rock-and-roll: "Who is that?"

Books: They read mainly philosophy and science, less of what is called fiction. "One Hundred Years of Solitude?" No one has heard of it. "I read the books of Yehoshu'a Bar-Yosef. As far as I am concerned, one must know one's enemy."

Leisure: "Leisure is a belittlement of the Torah."

Trips: Until recently the traveling spirit was rife at Puniveizh. So far it has not been decided whether it is a good spirit or an evil one. The yeshiva students used to hire cars and criss-cross the country with maps and routes which were passed from hand to hand. The trips became more and more adventurous, and a few students died in road accidents. Rabbi Shakh intervened, ordered a stop to the dangerous excursions, and forbade renting cars. To be on the safe side, the students deposited their driving licenses with the yeshiva office.

Sports: "Only for health purposes. We do some exercises and we play matkot [a racket game] on the beach. Not interested in ball games."

One needs intelligence for ball games, too: "Yes, but it is a kind of intelligence that concerns physical potential."

Did you take an interest in the Olympic Games? "As little as in last year's snow."

Motorcycles: "Motorcycles are not respectable. A yeshiva student on a motorbike? It is reminiscent of horseback riding, and that is not a dignified sight, either."

Sex: "The evil spirit. In contrast to the Hassidim, we do not deal with the instinct by repression and sublimation. We simply do not think about it. We overcome it through study. One has to overcome it."

What about those who do not? "There are a few who go with girls without permission."

Masturbation? Homosexuality? "It exists here not because men are attracted to men, but because there is no one else to relieve one's lust with."

Sex education? "What would I do with it? Until marriage there is no practical use for it. Only close to marriage time."

Wedding and sex: There is no gradual, natural development as in the secular society. The Orthodox are expected to learn the whole thing in one night. Orthodox youths of all beliefs come to their wedding night without any previous sexual experience. Some had not even seen a woman close up before the wedding. And all of a sudden they must have intercourse with one. "Must" is used here advisedly, because the deed must be done on the first night, that is a commandment. Only in special cases, when the groom's father feels that his son is about to faint with excitement and the bride's father notices

that she is particularly nervous, the parents will contact the rabbi after the wedding and ask for advice. The rabbi will sometimes allow the couple to delay the commandment for 1-2 days until they are more used to one another. (From "The Orthodox," by Amnon Levi) [passage omitted]

Army: "We do not recognize the secular authority of the state and of bodies that threaten religious life. The IDF is very threatening. We help the fighting soldiers through study and prayer. You have no idea how anxious we are for their lives. The rate of study is increased at times of war. Once, during one of the wars, when the supervisor thought that the students were not studying enough, he called us 'murderers.'"

Exemptions: Exemptions are obtained by authorization from the Council of Yeshivas. In the past they were also secured on the basis of psychiatric diagnosis. That phenomenon disappeared after Rabbi Shakh forbade it.

Politics: "Very important. In the last election the rabbis allowed the cancellation of Torah study to help out Degel Hatorah. We paid house calls and distributed propaganda material. We are a movement for the rights of the Orthodox citizen. We do not care about the rulings of Habad or the National Religious Party, but we do care about municipal services in our neighborhoods and aid for housing and education."

For whom would you have voted if you had not been religious? "If we had not been religious we would have voted RATS [Citizens' Rights Movement]."

The secular population: "They are like babes in the hands of the gentiles. The lifestyle of the secular youth is coarse and bestial, but there are differences. Some are more immoral than others."

Fun: "Our only fun is Europa and Time cigarettes."

Jokes: What is the difference between a mouse and a Hassidic rabbi? Both have a long tail behind them and a small head. But the mouse has a better chance of becoming a Talmud scholar.

## JORDAN

### Ministry Calls for Decreased Water Consumption 44040061 Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 18 Oct 88 p 11

[Text] Amman—On the occasion of the observance of Arab Environment Day on the 14th of October every year, sources of the Ministry of Water and Irrigation emphasized that the problem of supplying water suitable for human consumption remains a current problem which affects numerous societies in the form of water shortages and the exposure of water resources to pollution.

Sources at the ministry confirmed that Jordan's population growth, estimated at approximately 4 percent annually, has been accompanied by a noticeable increase in the use of water for all purposes, which in turn has recently placed several Jordanian water resources in danger of being depleted.

The ministry stated in a report, issued by its public relations administration on the occasion of Arab Environment Day, that Arab food security is linked to the provision of water resources, which is a problematic issue inasmuch as rain water, the main source of surface and ground water resources in the Arab world, fluctuates over time and from place to place.

The report states that UN studies show 15 million children dying annually in developing countries due to the unavailability of potable water, and that four-fifths of the juvenile deaths in these countries result from sickness and infectious diseases caused by drinking contaminated water.

The report adds that if death by drinking contaminated water is terrible, death by dehydration is even more terrible. It also indicates that water shortages can result from natural causes, such as drought and scant rainfall, or from human error caused by the mismanagement of nature through deforestation, fires, soil erosion and the wasteful use of water.

The report calls for the conservation of water resources through the control of consumption, and recourse to other available means such as carefully studied administrative methods and appropriate technical means. It emphasizes the danger posed by the continued exposure of Jordanian water resources to overuse.

The report cautions against the danger of excessive consumption. At the same time, it indicates that water resources might be vulnerable to an even greater danger, namely pollution, if there is no improvement with regard to the exploitation and administration of water resources, and if suitable methods to protect and conserve water resources are not applied.

The report mentions that the average rainfall in Jordan fluctuates between 50 and 600 mm per year, and that most of this rain falls on the mountainous heights facing the Jordan Valley-Dead Sea-'Arabah Valley-Red Sea depression, whereas approximately 80 percent of the area of the kingdom receives less than 200 mm of rain annually.

The report stresses that the reduction of waste, or unnecessary water consumption, is of vital importance in coping with the scarcity of water through the different programs, ways and methods being pursued by the ministry to provide sufficient water resources in view of the fact that estimations made by the International Bank indicate clearly the scarcity of water resources in Jordan.

**Land Reclamation Project Discussed**  
44040090 Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic  
22 Oct 88 p 4

[Article by Ma'mun 'Arar]

[Text] Amman (PETRA)—Arid lands form 13 percent of the kingdom's total land area, or about 12 million dunams, mostly located in the eastern and southern regions. This is a significant percentage, if we consider that the area of cultivated land in the kingdom is 6 percent of its total area. Furthermore, if these arid lands remain without reclamation, the neighboring agricultural lands will be threatened with the danger of desertification.

Aware of these dangers, the University of Jordan, through its Faculty of Agriculture, has produced studies to determine the best ways to exploit and develop these lands through improving soil characteristics and fertility, preventing erosion, increasing productivity by the introduction of new plants and crops adapted to prevailing environmental and climatic conditions, and increasing and developing water and irrigation sources to satisfy agricultural needs and requirements.

The attempt took place on a 2,000-dunam project located near the town of al-Muwaqqar, southeast of Amman. Its first phase ended during the years 1985-87. After the government entrusted the project lands to the university, it was decided to extend the project for a second phase during the years 1988-91.

**Dean of the Faculty of Agriculture**

Dr Mahmud Duwayri, dean of the Faculty of Agriculture, summarized the goals of this project as follows: establishing suitable practical solutions to render land with 100-200 mm of annual precipitation agriculturally productive using economical and easily implemented methods; creating the best and most efficient ways of exploiting surface water; improving soil fertility, preserving its productiveness, and halting its deterioration; working to develop natural plant cover; introducing new plant varieties and improving the prevailing pasturage.

Also among the goals are: introducing crops adapted to prevailing conditions in the regions; determining the best agricultural uses by determining the productive capacity of the lands, especially those that suffer from desertification; working to develop integrated agricultural systems to help stop the danger of desertification; studying the possible introduction of growing plants native to the areas; and studying the effect of collecting surface water on the increase of the ground water reservoir.

Concerning the characteristics of this region, the dean of the Faculty of Agriculture said that it is affected by desertification processes, with evidence pointing toward the advance of the desert toward it during recent

decades. However, its lands still have a capability for economically feasible production, if they are exploited at the proper time and by suitable methods. Therefore, this area must not be left without an agricultural use based on a carefully devised strategy, so that neighboring agricultural land in the western highlands is not threatened with the danger of desertification, and also because of the benefit such use will have in increasing the agricultural area.

Total costs of the project in its two phases are 462,682 dinars.

**Principles for Implementing the Project**

Concerning the principles that were followed in implementing the project, Dr 'Awni Tu'aymah, technical director of the project, said that broad outlines for the studies were defined on the basis of two hypotheses. First, since the lands located in these regions have factors present that enable them to produce economic crops, the studies would have to take into account the environmental, social, and economic factors of the region.

The second hypothesis was based on the principle that, although these lands have the ability to produce economic crops, the available quantities of surface water will not be sufficient for the exploitation of more than 30-35 percent of the region's area. Therefore, studies dealing with the development of the region by preserving the dominant pasturage plants or by introducing others will form the foundational elements of the project.


Dr Tu'aymah summarized the region's problems as follows:

**Climate**

Yearly precipitation in these areas ranges between 100 and 200 mm. The amount and distribution of rain varies from year to year. Since the rain falls in the form of thunder storms, a large amount of the water is lost through surface run-off, and only a small amount of water is stored in the soil. If one adds the high rate of evaporation because of high temperatures and strong winds, one finds that the amount of water that remains for plant growth is small for the growth of plants and very small when compared to the amount of rain that falls on the area. This phenomenon leads to sparse plant cover and consequently speeds the processes of erosion. These in turn lead to depletion of the soil's fertility.

**Water-Caused Soil Erosion**

Water-caused erosion is a basic characteristic of this region. This is due to the low density of plant cover resulting from bad distribution of precipitation and its loss. A result of the increasing erosion rate is the removal of the fertile layer of soil. The land becomes unfit for the growth of native plants. This phenomenon in turn speeds the soil erosion process, especially in low areas.



### Wind-Caused Soil Erosion

This kind of erosion is a leading cause of rapid soil deterioration, since its effect extends over wide areas. It has a twofold effect. Lands subjected to this kind of erosion deteriorate primarily because of sparse plant cover, the soil's meager ability to retain moisture, and weakness of the soil structure. Wind erosion takes place when particles of soil are carried from the area and settle on the surface of the ground in another area. Protection of the first area from erosion therefore leads to preservation of the second area.

Thus, optimal use of areas suffering from the danger of desertification is one of the most successful present ways to preserve neighboring producing lands threatened by the advance of the desert.

### Retreat of Plant Cover

The kind and distribution of plant cover is affected by a number of factors, including: grazing practices that harm pasturage plants and shrubs, bad distribution of rain, and bad soil characteristics because of deterioration.

### Overgrazing

Increased demand for red meat in Jordan has led to increased pressure on unprotected natural grazing land. This deprives plants of the opportunity to produce a sufficient amount of seeds to preserve their species in sufficient numbers. Prevailing grazing methods on natural grazing land in Jordan, especially in seasons of good rain, lead to a decrease of the seed reserves in the ground

to a level that does not allow the supply of seeds to be renewed. The plant cover then continually decreases, and the soil becomes unable to withstand erosion processes.

[Dr Tu'aymah] said that one of the most important problems the experts must solve includes the provision of water in sufficient quantity and at the right times of the season by means of water harvesting, improvement of soil characteristics, and prevention of soil deterioration, so as to provide proper conditions for native plant growth. Also, plants suited to the prevailing climatic conditions should be provided and plant cover increased to preserve the natural balance.

As part of the first phase, a soil survey was conducted. Detailed maps of the soil types common in the region were made. Land use maps were prepared, based on differing soil characteristics and possible problems arising from use of these lands.

A detailed survey of the kinds of wild plants found inside the project and in the surrounding area was taken.

As part of the second phase, a topographic survey of the area was completed. It will be used in determining the best sites for the construction of earthen dams. Three dams are to be constructed, with a capacity of 85,000 cubic meters, to restrain flood waters. Available information indicates that it might be possible to fill the dams four times a season. It would thereby be possible to provide about 34,000 cubic meters of water. The quantity of water that passed across the dams during four floods in the 1986-87 season approached 2.5 million cubic meters.

## LIBYA

### Reports Describe Status of Agricultural Projects

#### High Productivity in al-Kufrah

45040063 Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic  
16 Sep 88 p 8

[Text] Al-Kufrah Agricultural Project is producing large amounts of grains and vegetables. Al-Kufrah Production Project is located in al-Kufrah, which is 945 km from Benghazi Municipality and 1,950 km from Tripoli Municipality. The road between al-Kufrah and the two municipalities, which lies at 415 meters above sea level, is a paved road covered with asphalt.

#### First, the Project's Affiliation and Functional Organization

The project is subordinate to the General Organization for Agricultural Production, whose headquarters are in Tripoli Municipality. It is tantamount to the parent of all projects and an agricultural school for grains and legumes in the Great Jamahiriya.

**Second, Its Functional Organization: General Administration; Production and Technical Affairs Administration; Administrative and Financial Affairs.**

The follow-up office is subordinate to the General Administration.

Plant production is subordinate to the Production and Technical Affairs Administration. It has five agricultural units: Unit A, Unit B, Unit C, Unit D, and Unit E. The Production and Technical Affairs Administration also has a vegetable farm, a cattle breeding branch, a prevention office, an agricultural research office, a central workshop, a heavy machinery workshop, a traffic and industrial safety office, a distribution and maintenance office, an office for cyclical irrigation, an office for pumps, and an office for agricultural machinery.

Under the Financial and Administrative Affairs Administration are the office of administrative affairs, the public relations office, the production workers' affairs office, the archives, the financial affairs office, the review office, the office of wages and salaries, the office of warehouse accounts, the records office, the files office, the requisitions office, the transportation office, the five warehouses, the Benghazi office, and the services office. Each office or division mentioned cooperates with its administration by performing the work according to provisions stipulating that the work be done on scientific principles suitable to the nature of the soil, the temperature, irrigation, the area, and the project location. This will be made clear in this brief report. Each office takes into consideration reducing costs and expenses. Each office gives special consideration to increasing productivity to its highest rate and taking care of the machines that are used in operations by implementing maintenance programs for each machine and reducing administrative costs.

Scientific principles are being implemented by experienced professionals to achieve the following:

- 1. To reduce splitting in grain spikes and to plant crops at a suitable time so they would ripen before the season for hot, windy storms;
- 2. To plow the earth deeply every 3 years in each area to provide natural resistance to grass and weeds; to preserve moisture in the soil; to break the hard layer; to devise programs suitable to the kinds of crops planted and their needs; to devise an irrigation schedule so that 1,500 hectares of land cultivated with crops can be utilized in the summer and in the winter; and to conduct experiments to expand areas where blackeye peas, durra, sugar cane, beans, peas, chick peas, soybeans, yellow corn, sunflowers, and lentils are cultivated.

In addition, the tools are to be provided. These are the appropriate machines for cultivating the crops, which are being cultivated primarily for the purpose of reducing the cost of producing the strategic crop—wheat.

One of the objectives of the project is to implement and prove the validity of the statement that people whose food comes from overseas are not free. Another objective is to implement the resolutions of people's congresses which affirm the importance of production. These resolutions affirm that it is important to achieve self-sufficiency and to do without imports. The project was established this year to achieve these goals.

**Al-Hadabah Project**

45040063 Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic  
7 Sep 88 p 6

[Text] The second phase of al-Hadabah Agricultural Project was inaugurated in Tripoli yesterday noon amid celebrations commemorating the 19th anniversary of the Great First of September Revolution and the 10th anniversary of the revolution of the partners in production.

There was a major popular celebration on this occasion. It was attended by the assistant secretary of the People's Congress and the People's Committee for Tripoli Municipality. The celebration was also attended by the secretary of the Farmers' Congress and large numbers of people who are members of the Basic People's Congresses in the Abu Salim Municipal Branch.

The second stage of the al-Hadabah al-Khadra' Project is considered one of the largest production projects in Tripoli Municipality. The total area designated for this stage amounts to 1,500 hectares. This area, which is under perennial irrigation, is divided into two sections, each of which is 750 hectares. The first section is divided into 15 fields, each of which is 50 hectares under cyclical irrigation. The second section is under perennial irrigation.

The primary aim of the project, which relies on treated water from the sewage treatment plant in al-Hadabah, is to produce feed. In addition, the project will produce vegetables grown in the project's greenhouses as well as eggs and poultry from the project's poultry farms.

Included in the project are soil leveling operations, fence construction, civil engineering operations, road construction, irrigation systems, electricity systems, water tanks, greenhouses, and poultry farms.

The agricultural cycle in this project is divided into two seasons: the summer season, during which sweet corn, sugar cane and clover are cultivated; and the winter season, during which oats, a hybrid barley, legumes, and clover are cultivated. Preparations are now under way for cultivating the winter cycle crops.

Sources in the People's Committee of the Tripoli Municipality informed JANA that, during the first stage of the 1986-1987 agricultural season, 1,588 kantars of oats and 1,511 sacks of oats were produced from 330 hectares. During the same season, 445 kantars of barley and 831 bales of hay were produced from 384 hectares. During

that period, 531 kantars of wheat and 1,965 bales of hay were produced from an area of 315 hectares. One hundred kantars of sweet corn and 3,794 bales of oats were produced from an area of 51 hectares.

The sources indicated that 360,430 tons of vegetables were produced in greenhouses during the same period. Egg-laying poultry farms produced 12,176,300 eggs and meat poultry farms produced approximately 153,000 birds.

In addition, the al-Hadabah al-Khadra' Agricultural Project Fair was inaugurated. The fair will have a model of the project and samples of the project's agricultural products.

### **Numerous Projects Completed in al-Zawiyah Municipality**

45040061 Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic  
15 Sep 88 p 5

[Text] Numerous projects in various areas can be seen with the dawn of each new day in al-Zawiyah Municipality, just as they can be seen in other municipalities. Anyone traveling in al-Zawiyah can see and get a sense of the true effort which is being made to achieve more cultural accomplishments in the health, communications and economic sectors and in land reclamation and other sectors as well.

The following are some of the accomplishments which were achieved in the municipality and which make all citizens proud.

The food processing plant in al-Ma'murah: Tomatoes, peppers, oranges, and lemons produced by farmers are received daily at the plant and turned into canned juices. A pickle packaging plant in al-'Aziziyah has also been completed; its average production is four tons an hour.

The television plant in al-Zawiyah: Experiments on manufacturing television sets were started some time ago and have now been completed. The plant's average production is 80,000 sets a year.

Thousands of various kinds of plastics which are used in numerous industries are produced daily at the plastics plant in Surman. The plant also produces plastic household products.

Fully equipped hospitals in Sabratah, Surman, al-Zahra', and al-Zawiyah have been completed. They include various specializations, and they are managed by highly qualified Libyans. In addition, health centers have been completed in al-Mayah and in Juda'im. Hospitals have been completed in Bi'r Mu'ammara, in Bahsi al-Humrah and in Babi Surrah.

Total costs for these hospitals and health centers amounted to 1,421,756 dinars. The total cost for the road systems connecting the various branches of the municipality and extending to remote areas, and for agricultural projects, is 4,871,466 dinars.

A post office building has also been completed in the al-Fatih municipal branch in Bi'r al-Ghanam at a total cost of 318,000 dinars.

Public sports fields have been completed in al-Zawiyah, al-Ma'murah, al-Harshah, al-'Alaliqah, Abu 'Isa, Surman, Sabratah, al-Zahra', al-'Amiriyah, and al-Zawiyah. These include football fields; handball, basketball, and volleyball courts; a gymnasium; and all accompanying facilities.

Greenhouses have been built in al-Zawiyah, al-Zahra', Surman, and Sabratah.

A poultry farm has been completed in al-Ma'murah over an area of 20 hectares at a cost of 20 million dinars. The farm has 9 stalls for fattening chickens that can accommodate 135,000 birds; 2 stalls for white chickens which can accommodate 3,000 birds; 1 stall for turkeys; and 1 stall for rabbits.

There are elementary, preparatory, and secondary schools in all branches of the municipality. In addition, six schools for basic education were built in al-Zawiyah, 2 March, Surmat, Sabratah, and al-'Aziziyah; two schools for industrial education were built in al-Zawiyah and 2 March; and two schools for secondary education were built in Surman and Sabratah. The total number of classes in these schools is 120, and the total cost of these schools came to 7,560,000 dinars.

The al-Bariqah Oil Marketing Depository has two tanks for super gasoline and two tanks for oil with a total capacity of 16,603 cubic meters. There is one oil tank with a total capacity of 21,460 cubic meters. There is one tank for heavy oil with a capacity of 1,693 cubic meters, and one tank for liquified gas with a capacity of 3,280 cubic meters.

The main pumping station in that depository is connected to the pipes which run to Lutiya and to the Janzur Depository for heavy oil.

The project includes management offices, maintenance workshops, warehouses for spare parts, platforms for packing products, and a gas filling unit that can fill 1,200 cylinders of gas an hour.

- 1. In manufacturing clothing and textiles: one cooperative that manufactures clothes and one cooperative that manufactures hosiery.
- 2. In the metal industries: one cooperative for agricultural equipment; one cooperative for manufacturing nails; two cooperatives for general lathe work; 11 cooperatives for repairing cars; and one cooperative

for manufacturing pushcarts.

- 3. In the leather industries: one cooperative for manufacturing shoes and another for manufacturing clothing.
- 4. In the electrical industries: one cooperative for manufacturing cooling equipment and air conditioners.
- 5. In the construction materials industry: two cooperatives for cement bricks.
- 6. In the mining industries: 1,600 cooperatives for stone blocks and one cooperative for bricks. The number of cooperatives which are involved in production is 154.
- 7. In the chemical industries: one cooperative for manufacturing perfume; two cooperatives for manufacturing paint; 15 cooperatives for manufacturing potassium; one cooperative for manufacturing soap and soap products; nine cooperatives for producing plastics; and a number of cooperatives under construction.

The total cost of building the depository amounted to 13,700,000 dinars.

#### The Cooperatives in General

Since cooperatives have a significant effect on increasing production to the maximum possible limit, various types of cooperatives were established in different parts of the municipality. A list of cooperatives which are actually producing follows:

- I. The Clothing and Textiles Industry
  1. Sixteen cooperatives for manufacturing outer garments
  2. One cooperative for manufacturing blankets
  3. Three cooperatives for manufacturing T-shirts
  4. Seven cooperatives for manufacturing hosiery
- II. The Leather Industry
  1. Two cooperatives for manufacturing shoes
  2. Two cooperatives for manufacturing bags
- III. Electrical Industries
  1. Two cooperatives for manufacturing light switches and electricity outlets
  2. Three cooperatives for assembling and setting up circuit boards
  3. One cooperative for manufacturing electrical household appliances
- IV. The Construction Materials Industry
  1. Ten cooperatives for manufacturing tiles
  2. Four cooperatives for manufacturing cement bricks
- V. The Mining Industry
  1. Twenty-three cooperatives for stone blocks
- VI. The Chemical Industries
  1. One cooperative for manufacturing paint
  2. One cooperative for manufacturing potassium
  3. Two cooperatives for manufacturing soap and soap products
  4. Forty-four cooperatives for manufacturing plastic

#### VII. The Metal Industries

1. One cooperative for manufacturing nails
2. Two cooperatives for general lathe work
3. One cooperative for manufacturing pushcarts
4. Three cooperatives for metal crafts
5. Four cooperatives for manufacturing aluminum
6. Two cooperatives for manufacturing small carpentry tools
7. One cooperative for manufacturing metal fibers
8. One cooperative for manufacturing spare parts

More than 1,500 craftsman's licenses were issued. These include licenses for car repair; tire repair; repairing cooling devices, refrigerators, and electronic equipment; watch repair; precious metals; bicycle and shoe repair; smithing and carpentry workshops; packing pumps; milling grains and spices; glass cutting; hand weaving; tailoring; locksmithing; and repairing brakes.

We wish to indicate that the aforementioned accomplishments in various fields were inaugurated amidst celebrations which were held to commemorate the 19th anniversary of the great First of September Revolution.

**Report Depicts Limited Progress in Fish Industry**  
*45040066 Tripoli AL-MUNTIJUN in Arabic*  
27 Aug 88 p 5

[Article: "Shedding Light on Marine Wealth Development and Production in the Great Jamahiriyyah"]

[Text] Fish wealth in the great Jamahiriyyah is considered a major source of food in view of its great importance in providing a valuable source of good nutrition, namely, fish of all species, varieties, and sizes. The great Jamahiriyyah has the longest and greatest shoreline on the Mediterranean Sea which is rich in this resource that has assumed an important, strategic place in basic nutrition.

This long shoreline notwithstanding, the great Jamahiriyyah was unable in the past, due to many factors and circumstances, to exploit this resource to the fullest. However, after the creation of a special secretariat for this wealth, the Marine Wealth Secretariat, and in the course of only a few months after its creation, this secretariat has employed all the material and human resources at its disposal to promote this sector and to make good use of it in the people's interest.

This secretariat has made good and fruitful progress, drawing up work plans and programs, lending a helping hand to the sectors, and making available whatever capabilities it has by organizing the sector, operating tuna fisheries and refrigeration and freezing facilities, and maintaining and repairing trawlers and boats.

#### First, Organization of the Sector

Regarding the organization of the sector, the following decisions were issued a short time ago:



1. The General People's Committee's decision to organize the secretariat.

2. Ratification of the secretariat bylaws by the General People's Committee for Public Services. .

3. The General People's Committee's decisions to set up the following companies:

- The Libyan Sea Fishing Company.
- The National Fishing and Marketing Company.
- The Gulf Sea Fishing Company.
- The National Fish Canning Company.
- The Marine Maintenance and Supplies Company.

The General People's Committee's decision to set up a fish farm project. [No number as published]

The General People's Committee's decision to amend the mandates of the aforementioned companies. [No number as published]

The General People's Committee's decision to organize and merge companies located in municipalities with the aforementioned companies. [No number as published]

A contract signed by the secretary of the General People's Committee for Marine Wealth with the Producers Investment Company to build and operate six fish farms. [No number as published]

A contract concluded by the former Marine Wealth Executive Agency with Tunisian suppliers to operate a number of Tunisian trawlers in Libyan territorial waters for tuna fishing. Furthermore, most subcommittees formed from the higher committee to evaluate and audit the companies have been terminated. [No number as published]

## Second, Operation of Tuna Fisheries

As part of the effort to increase fish production, the following tuna fisheries have been put into operation:

Al-Jazirah Tuna Fishery; Missuratah-Zurayq Tuna Fishery; Missuratah-Marsa-Zuwarah Tuna Fishery; Subratah-Zulaytin Tuna Fishery; and al-Qarbulalli Tuna Fishery.

Nonetheless, the output from these fisheries has not met expectations. Production amounted to only 155 tons divided between the Jazirah Tuna Fishery, with an

output of 95 tons, and the Zurayq Tuna Fishery. The output of the remaining fisheries was negligible, underscoring the output and economic unfeasibility of these fisheries and the fact that the only way to fish tuna is by using the modern methods instead of stationary fisheries.

Within this framework, the General Popular Committee for Marine Wealth has concluded a contract with some Tunisian suppliers to operate Tunisian trawlers in Libyan territorial waters using the trolling method of tuna fishing, a method that is still experimental.

## Maintenance Work:

- Ten trawlers have been assigned to the Libyan-Greek Sea Fishing Company by order of the secretary of the General People's Committee for Industry. The company has invited foreign companies that specialize in ship maintenance and repairs to submit bids for the maintenance of these trawlers. Bids have actually been submitted and the best one has been selected. A memorandum has been submitted to the General Popular Committee asking approval to conclude a contract with the company winning the bid.
- Four trawlers under maintenance in Italy.
- Two trawlers under maintenance locally, one of which will be put into operation in the very near future.
- Two trawlers recently received from the armed services in very bad shape, in addition to 10 boats, only 3 of which are operative and the rest inoperative due to technical reasons.
- The Libyan-Tunisian Sea Fishing Company: It has three working trawlers at present, one of which was put into operation recently and the rest are in need of maintenance.

## Fifth, [number as published] Fish Production:

Even though the bluefish fishing season is still in its early days, amounts fished so far augur for an outstanding fishing season, especially since a large number of lighted fishing boats have been put into operation and the necessary equipment has been made available. Add to that the General Popular Committee for Marine Wealth's determination to raise the fishing industry's output capacity and to provide all the necessary resources, such as freezing holds, equipment, and other things. We expect the 1989 bluefish season to be outstanding by any standard. Regarding carp and mullet fish, although accurate data on the number of boats currently in operation are not available, figures and statistics provided by the operating companies indicate that this sector is back on the right track.

Following is a review of each company's fish production compared to last year:

**I. Jamahiriya Fresh Fish Production: 1 Jan'88 to 30 Jun'88**  
**Jarf & Bu-Niqala Fish Compared to 1987 Production of Same Period**

Producer	1987	1988
National Fishing & Marketing Co.	186	210
Libyan-Tunisian Sea-Fishing Co.	49	69
Arab Sea-Fishing Co.	50	94
Gulf Sea-Fishing Co.	—	243
<b>Total</b>	<b>285tons</b>	<b>616tons</b>

**II. Blue Fish, According to Production Areas**

Area	Amt. (in Tons)	No. of Operating Boats	Remarks
Tripoli	69	21	
Subratah	175	7	as of 9 July
Zuwarah	130	5	
Al-Khums	42	4	
Missuratah	—	2	No data
Zuwayr Tuna Fishery	60	—	Tuna, catfish
Al-Jazirah Tuna Fishery	95	—	Tuna, catfish
<b>Total</b>	<b>571</b>	<b>39</b>	

**III. Fish Canning Plant Production, 1 Jan'88 - 30 Jun'88**

Plant	Raw Sardines (tons)	Raw Tuna (tons)	Raw Smelt (tons)	Canned Sardines (125g)	Canned Tuna (200g)	Canned Tuna (400g)	Canned Tuna (2Kg)	Canned Smelt (2Kg)
Zuwarah	—	512,006	0.550	—	13,887	11,703	112,150	122
Subratah	—	330,105	8.165	—	—	236,817	99,367	3000
Janzur	114.76	501,207	—	393,845	930,910	—	27,135	—
Al-Khums	—	382,448	—	—	—	101,247	71,041	—
Benghazi	—	59,019	—	—	—	78,770	—	—
<b>Total</b>	<b>114.76</b>	<b>2,790,785</b>	<b>8.75</b>	<b>393,845</b>	<b>944,797</b>	<b>428,537</b>	<b>259,693</b>	<b>3,122</b>

**The Libyan-Tunisian Sea Fishing Company:**

The company's output for the first half of this year was 69 tons of various kinds of fish, divided as follows: carp, 42.984 tons and bluefish, 25.784 tons.

Compared to its production for the same period last year, the company has realized a 20-ton increase over last year, noting that its activities center around just two trawlers and one boat.

**The National Fishing and Marketing Company:**

The company's trawlers produced about 210 tons in the aforementioned period, compared to 186 tons last year. Accordingly, the company realized an increase of only 24 tons, noting that five trawlers are in operation, one of which went into the fishing business only last June.

As for the company's marketing activities, 103 tons of various kinds of fish were marketed during the period in question, an increase of 103 [as published] over last year, noting that the company imported 575 tons of canned tuna from Spain as part of its efforts to make fish products available to the public.

The company did not import any frozen fish due to the fact that fresh fish is in plentiful supply.

**The National Fish Canning Company:**

The company's production of canned fish and the amounts of raw material used for processing from 1 January 1988 to 30 June 1988, were as follows:

- Sardines: 114,760, yielding 393,845 cans.
- Smelt: 8,710, yielding 3,122 cans.
- Tuna: 2,790, yielding 1,633,027 cans.

**The Libyan-Spanish Sea-Fishing Company:**

Accurate official data on this company's deep-sea fishing activities are not available. However, the company imported 50 tons of canned tuna for its marketing company and 50 tons of frozen fish during the holy month of Ramadan.

**Third, Refrigeration and Freezing**

As part of the efforts to provide adequate refrigerated storage capacity to accommodate the amounts of fish it takes to keep the fish canning plants in operation for long periods of time throughout the year in order to lower costs and maintain fish product prices year round with a view to realizing a reasonable return for plans and consumers alike, an addendum to the contract concluded with the "Techro-Frigo" Company has been signed. This addendum calls for the construction of five refrigeration

complexes and the importation of a number of refrigeration and storage units for use at fishing sites where such services are available. Other contracts are underway to import more of these units, as follows:

- Quick-freezing holds: up to 35 meters; 1 ton/5 hours.
- Quick-freezing holds: up to 35 meters; 1 ton/5 hours.
- 20-ton mobile ice makers with a 20-ton storage compartment.
- 25-ton refrigerated containers, up to 5 degrees centigrade.
- 20-ton ice block makers to be mounted on fishing trawlers.

Moreover, refrigeration complexes with capacities commensurate with the size of fishing activities in each port or harbor have been figured in most fishing harbor projects to be implemented under a plan prepared for this purpose.

#### **Fourth, Trawler and Boat Maintenance and Repair**

A major problem the sector is facing is the lack of maintenance and repair facilities for sea trawlers in the Jamahiriyyah while operating companies are forced to send their trawlers abroad for maintenance work despite the high costs involved in this process.

Therefore, the General Popular Committee for Marine Wealth is tackling this problem by setting up a new company called the Marine Maintenance and Supply Company to build and maintain trawlers and boats, manage supplies for the sea-fishing sector, and undertake other tasks.

### **SAUDI ARABIA**

#### **New Agricultural Projects Described**

44040136 Jeddah 'UKAZ in Arabic 17 Nov 88 p 12

[Text] His Excellency Dr 'Abd-al-Rahman Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz Al al-Shaykh, minister of agriculture and water, issued a permit for the implementation of ten agricultural projects in different regions of the kingdom at a total cost of 43,811,554 riyals.

The first project, involving the production of barley, fodder, and fruit, is being undertaken at a cost of 3,686,000 riyals in the region of Kharij. Its production capacity is 484 tons of barley, in addition to 712 tons of fodder, 145 tons of fruit, and 30 tons of dates.

The second project involves the production of barley, fodder and fruit and is being undertaken at a cost of 3,466,000 riyals in the region of Hawtah Bani Tamim. Its production capacity is 198 tons of barley, and 1980 tons of fodder, in addition to 112.5 tons of fruit and 67.5 tons of dates.

The third project includes the production of barley, fodder, and fruit and is being undertaken at a cost of 4,324,800 riyals in the region of Ha'il. Its production capacity is 231 tons of barley, 2310 tons of fodder and 209 tons of fruit in addition to 121 tons of dates.

The fourth project includes the production of barley, fodder, and fruit and is being undertaken at a cost of 3,570,000 riyals in the region of Tabuk. Its production capacity is 307 tons of barley, 2070 tons of fodder, 227 tons of fruit, and 22 tons of dates.

### **SUDAN**

#### **Government Avails Investment Opportunities to Expatriates**

45040131a Khartoum AL-USBU' in Arabic  
29 Nov 88 p 4

[Article by Amal Ibrahim: "New Opportunities for Investment in Agricultural, Industrial, and Service Areas"]

[Text] When one talks about encouraging investment of Sudanese expatriates' savings, the people concerned may not be aware of the areas in which they can invest their savings or of whether there is a binding law in accordance with which the government offers the investor guarantees and facilities in return for his investment.

In this context, the Ministry of Finance and Economy has submitted a 1988 bill to encourage investment of Sudanese expatriates' savings. In this bill, the ministry defines the areas in which investment may be made. To make it easier for every expatriate to enter this sphere, we will present this bill which is supposed to go into effect in 1988, of which only 1 month remains. The areas in which investment may be made include:

The industrial sector which covers: Engineering plants for the production of maintenance parts and spareparts; smelters; metal and wooden furniture plants; plastics (for home and office use); lime and gypsum plants; plants for the production of ice and carbonated drinks outside the capital and the Central Province; brick plants; wood mills; plants for the production of flour mill stones; small commercial printing presses; plants for the production of rugs and runners; plants for dyeing yarn and sewing thread; plants for the production of fishing nets; plants for the production of tools used to install electrical connections; plants for the production of faucets and waterpipe connections; plants for the production of joints, locks, and door bolts; plants for the production of children's toys; and plants for assembling regular and small bicycles.

The agricultural sector: This sector includes agricultural projects around the provincial capitals and the major cities for the production of fruits and vegetables, small livestock-breeding and fattening projects, agricultural projects, fishing projects, chicken farms, projects for

dairy products, projects to cultivate and process fodders, projects (for agricultural way stations), and various-size projects for the production of oil seeds.

In the area of services: All means of transportation; fishing and tourism companies; companies to drill underground and artesian wells for irrigation and drinking purposes; agricultural service companies; technical expertise and consulting firms; private hospitals and wellness clinics; agricultural pest-control companies; companies for the construction of low-cost and economy housing; small sifting and shelling companies with an area of no more than 2,000 m<sup>2</sup>; and small refrigeration plants for the storage of fruits, vegetables, meats, fish and poultry.

How are investment applications submitted?

For the application submitted to the General Investment Secretariat's department concerned through the Expatriates Affairs Agency to be complete, it must be coupled with an economic and technical feasibility study on the project; a certificate issued by the Alms and Tax Bureau or by a diplomatic mission abroad stating that the applicant owes no taxes; a copy of the applicant's passport, residence permit, or work permit. When initial approval is given, the applicant shall make remittances as follows through official channels:

If the project is to be set up in the nation's capital, in al-Jadid, or in al-Thawrah: 20 percent of the investment sum;

If the project is to be set up in Madani or Port Sudan: 10 percent of the investment sum;

If the project is to be set up in any part of Sudan, excluding the abovementioned cities: 5 percent of the investment sum.

#### Facilities and Benefits

Full exemption from customs fees on machinery, equipment, and tools needed for production and on buildings constructed for the project. Land is provided at an incentive price. Business profits shall be exempted from taxes as follows:

1. A 2-year exemption on projects set up within the jurisdiction of the nation's capital, in al-Jadid, and in al-Thawrah.
2. A 3-year exemption on projects set up in Madani and Port Sudan.
3. A 5-year exemption for projects set up in the various parts of Sudan, excluding the abovementioned cities.

The authorities cited in the 1980 investment encouragement law and the gentlemen governors of the provinces shall be empowered to examine and make decisions on applications submitted by expatriates within the areas specified by the list attached to the bill.

#### Government Discovers Illegal Dealings in Foreign Currency

45040131b Khartoum AL-USBU' in Arabic  
29 Nov 88 p 1

[Article by Salaih Mukhtar: "Den for Dealing in Foreign Currency in and out of the Country Raided and Significant Documents Seized; Intelligence Source: Travel Agencies, Hotels, and Business Offices Involved in Currency Transactions"]

[Text] The Central Intelligence's Foreign Currency Trade Control Squad has been able to score another triumph and to raid a den dealing in extremely large quantities of foreign and Sudanese currency at a residence in (Arkuwayt) Quarter.

A high-level source at the Central Intelligence has stressed this to AL-USBU', revealing that the squad has also been able to seize significant documents that show that the den members are involved in currency transactions with Sudanese expatriates. The source also noted that the date of the seized documents is 1 November 1988, i.e., after issuance of the free banking market law. This proves that the people concerned are deeply involved in this crime and shows how irresponsible some Sudanese expatriates are who seek to serve their private interests, totally disregarding the public interest.

The source further revealed to AL-USBU' that the intelligence authorities have discovered interesting things internally and that it has become evident to them that numerous merchants work under different guises, such as travel and tourism agencies, hotels, import and export agencies, and so forth, to conceal their suspect activities. The source asserted that the intelligence authorities will continue to watch the movements of these and other people whom he called the "big fish," who are still at large, adding that these authorities are observing the situation carefully and closely.

The dear reader will find with this article an example of some of the documents seized by the intelligence, namely letters exchanged by expatriates and people dealing in foreign currency here.

[Boxed item] Al-Khubar, Saudi Arabia

Esteemed brother, my blessed greetings. How are you? What is new with you and the entire family? We are well and in excellent health.

Upon receiving the \$200 sent with this carrier, I beg you [word indistinct] to exchange them on the black market. If the price is very good, they must be exchanged. We have heard that the price has risen to 18 pounds.

I beg you to convey my greetings to all your children and to the entire family without [word indistinct]. My greetings to all.

### **Prominent Jurist Discusses Various Aspects of Shari'ah Laws**

45040048 Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic  
12, 13, 14, 16 Oct 88

[Article by Dr Amin Makki Madani: "Attorney General's Law Presented for Discussion"; first paragraph is introduction]

[12 Oct 88, p 5]

[Text] Dr Amin Makki Madani, professor of law at Khartoum University, a leading lawyer, a transitional government cabinet member, and one of the most active intellectuals in the period leading up to the uprising, has given AL-AYYAM this exclusive essay he prepared about the alternative laws in their legal, political, and social aspects. Because of the essay's importance, we will publish the text in more than one installment.

The subject of the laws by which the country is governed has continued in one way or another to engage Sudanese public opinion throughout the post-independence period, and especially since September 1983, when the now deposed [Numayri] devised the September Laws on the pretext of applying the Islamic Shari'ah. We saw how these laws were promulgated; they had been formulated in a closed room in the Government Palace in complete secrecy, not only from the masses of the people, but also from the various legislative bodies and advisors, including the attorney general, cabinet, and members of the legislature. The laws were finally announced through the information media and went into effect immediately after the tyrant signed them. The People's Assembly then approved them all without reservation or amendment in the first session, despite the constitutional unsoundness of such temporary orders. (The constitution in effect at the time permitted the issuance of temporary legislation only in important, emergency matters and in case the People's Assembly was not in session.)

From the very first moment, it was perfectly clear at home and abroad that Numayri had turned to promulgating these miserable laws in such a distorted fashion neither in order to apply God's Shari'ah, nor because of his deep belief in it, but rather in a final attempt to save his regime, which had exhausted all tricks, lies, and delusions to stay in power, but had not succeeded. The economy had collapsed. The cost of living had risen. Basic commodities were unavailable, the black market had revived, and services had declined. Corruption was rampant at the summit of political power. Turning to

coercion and oppression, the regime shackled freedoms through emergency laws and repressive agencies. This became perfectly certain when Numayri resorted to proclaiming a state of emergency in April 1984. The darkest and most unjust period in the Sudan's ancient and modern history then began, a period that moved the conscience of the entire world. The people stood up as a whole, and the entire world stood witnessing and condemning what was happening in the Sudan—the oppression, arrests, searches, fabricated charges, and summary trials before emergency courts headed by ignorant, immoral judges (as they were described by the martyr to [freedom of] thought, Professor Mahmud Muhammad Taha). The regime's supporters, security police, and courts of ignorance and coercion vied with each other in stopping public and private vehicles, searching passengers, and arresting citizens on the roads, from inside homes, and in private places. The courts vied with each other in imposing punishments of imprisonment, amputation of limbs, whipping, execution, and crucifixion. Those who were convicted were reviled in the information media, with no consideration of the effect this might have on society and of the degradation of men, women, old people, and children. No consideration was given to how this was harming the Sudan's good name abroad, the generosity of the Sudanese character, and the Sudanese spirit of tolerance and harmony. People's flesh still shudders because of sham trials like those of Salah-al-Din al-Misbah and Fatimah Ahmad Ibrahim, the Ba'thist students, and al-Wathiq Sabah-al-Khayr. The latter was executed and crucified—not for an act proved before the court, but because of his purported previous criminal background. Then there was the case of [judicial] amputation of the right hands and left feet of workers of the central administration—a case that was transferred from Sannar to Khartoum, so that the now deposed president's orders about the amputation of opposite limbs could be carried out. There was the case of the Wadi Sayyidna accountant whose hand was cut off because of public funds—funds to which the president of the republic and his ruling entourage were allowed unrestricted access. There were many cases of injustice, oppression, and intimidation. The crime of what was called "attempted fornication" was invented, a crime unknown to the Shari'ah. All this was not restricted to Muslims; it included Christians and non-Muslims, which had a great effect in widening the split between citizens of North and South and some citizens of the West. It increased the sharpness of the civil war in the South.

It led to the conspiracy to execute the shaykh, thinker, and professor, Mahmud Muhammad Taha, who protested the despotic conditions, criticizing the September laws as having no connection with the Islamic religion and as having humiliated the Sudanese people. The regime seized the opportunity to hatch a plot. It tried Mahmud under the State Security Act on the ground that the brochure the Republicans had distributed violated that law and the penal code. He was convicted and sentenced to death by the court of the case, although the

appeals court, which upheld the death sentence, based the condemnation on the charge of apostasy. This was a charge that had not been investigated, for which no indictment had been presented, and for which the accused had not been tried. Indeed, apostasy itself was not a crime under the criminal code at that time. In a blatant violation of the law, the constitution, and prevailing practice in the legal profession, the appeals court upheld the death sentence. The subsequently deposed president closed the episode with "legal considerations" he devised to end the show. He claimed he had thoroughly scrutinized all the books of Islamic jurisprudence and law and had found nothing to justify lifting the death penalty from Shaykh Mahmud. The latter faced the gallows on 18 January 1985, with smile of mockery on his face at the charade and its murderous heroes, a smile that promised them swift retribution and an end to the age of tyranny.

#### Shari'ah Laws and Islamic Society

Such were the September Laws, such was their purpose, and such was the way they were practiced. The entire world witnessed what was happening in the Sudan and disapproved of what was going on among the Sudanese who were known for tolerance, patience, good character, and enlightenment. There was disapproval of most leaders of public activity in the Sudan—trade unions, political parties, organizations, and personalities. Conferences were held and brochures were distributed attacking the laws and demanding their repeal. The present prime minister was perhaps one of the persons most opposed to those laws. In the famous sermon he gave at the Feast of Immolation in 1983 (he was arrested for it and put into preventative detention in Cooper Prison), he is said to have spoken as follows:

"The 'hadd' punishments of Islam are an inseparable part of Islam's political system—a system that equalizes the distribution of wealth and spreads mutual responsibility and brotherhood, a system that combats theft at the root by what is sufficient to satisfy need, a system that combats fornication by sound upbringing and facilitation of marriage, a system that combats the root of wine-drinking by correct upbringing. It is in this domain—the sound and just reform of forces—that Islam lays down deterrent punishments. This is reason itself and correct judgment, because cutting off the hand of the thief in a society based on injustice and deprivation would be like throwing someone into the sea with his hands tied and telling him, 'See to it that you do not get wet!'"

As Dr Muhammad Fathi 'Uthman, who wrote the introduction to Mr al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's book, "Shari'ah Punishments and Their Relation to the Islamic Social System," has indicated (page 9): "Some people picture application of the Shari'ah as being the cutting off of hands and feet, stoning, whipping, and retaliating for a wound with a similar wound. At the same time, they do not make it clear that applying the Shari'ah means

guaranteeing a just wage and fair terms of work, social security for the unemployed or the person who by reason of sickness, disability, or old age is unable to work, and state responsibility to provide the means for a person to exercise his rights to education, work, and social security. Indeed, it means the state's responsibility to guarantee the material means for marriage to those men and women who have reached the age of marriage." In his book, "Islam and the Sudanese Experience," published in November 1985, Mr al-Sadiq al-Mahdi criticized at length the experiment of the September 1983 laws on the ground that applying "hadd" punishments was a matter in Islamic law dependent upon the provision of preventative measures encompassing political, economic, and social conditions. It was a matter that required a society in which justice was available and people had enough to satisfy their needs. Thus, gradualness was required, so as to keep pace with these changes, until the preconditions were present for the application of "hadd" punishments.

#### What Did al-Turabi Say?

In a lecture he gave after his reconciliation with the May Regime, Dr Hasan al-Turabi, the present attorney general, spoke about the dangers of hasty application of the Shari'ah, the need for independent judgment by qualified experts on Islamic law, and the fear that "hadd" punishments would be applied to the poor and homeless. About the first point he spoke as follows:

"This is a plan to which we shall accustom ourselves with the same gradualness that the Islamic Shari'ah employed when, at the time of its revelation, it proceeded gradually to impose duties. We see that the duties and observances of Islam first came in milder form. Worship at first consisted of two cycles of bending and prostration; afterwards it was completed. Fasting was voluntary; then it became obligatory. Almsgiving was at first a general obligation; then it was made specific with limits and definite amounts. The same held true for prohibitions. An aversion to the charging of interest was aroused in people; they were told that almsgiving was beneficial for people and that whoever people deem 'increases upon the people's wealth, increases not with God' [Qur'an 30:38]. Then the taking of interest was prohibited much more strictly, as well as anything added above the principal. Wine was likewise prohibited gradually. People were admonished that some things they made from the fruit of the palm tree were good sustenance, while other things were intoxication. Then they were told that whatever economic considerations they calculated (just as today we sometimes hear about the money that alcoholic beverage factories yield to the government) and whatever benefits they deemed wine to bring, its sin was much greater, and that the loss suffered by the community from time wasted in drinking parties, traffic accidents, and violence was much greater than the millions the government collected from taxes on intoxicating beverage factories or duties on imported beverages. People were urged that the evil of wine was greater than its benefit. Then they were told not to touch it at the

times of prayer, so that they were forbidden at certain times. Finally, the matter was conclusively decided. Taking an example from this prohibition that was gradually tightened, today we want to apply it in our society gradually, basing this upon the principle of 'necessity' in Islamic jurisprudence."

Dr [al-Turabi] went on to say the following about the subject of contemporary independent judgment by experts on Islamic law:

"Sometimes people think that the rules of the Shari'ah that must be applied are ready made and contained with all their ramifications and details in the books; all we have to do is take them from inside the books and put them into the Sudan law gazette, so that they become law of the land. But the matter is not so easy. As you know, Islamic society has for a long time moved away from full application of the Shari'ah. Many things have happened during this time, especially in recent periods, during which our life has developed culturally and industrially. From the West, patterns of living have come to us that were not part of our ancient way of life that was familiar to our jurists and for which they deduced the appropriate rules. In our way of life today, there are wide gaps on which contemporary Islamic jurists must focus their attention, making new independent judgments and deducing new rules for them, or adapting old rules that jurists made for a previous way of life, rules that need to be adapted to suit the time, the place, and the developments. Before us lies an accumulation of items of jurisprudence to be dealt with by independent expert judgment. The task is not merely the responsibility of the jurists of Islam; it falls on the government, too. Unavoidably, one must depend on the government to organize this extensive application of independent expert judgment. For this job, the government must provide a large number of experts competent to make independent judgments in Islamic law. It must provide scholars who know and understand the methods of Shari'ah law. These people must deliberate to apply the eternal criteria of Islamic law that have authority over every time and place, applying them to this reality after having examined it carefully. This is a considerable endeavor which needs a completely revolution and broad efforts in which we hope we shall be granted success."

#### Proposed Alternatives

If we return to the sequence of events before the uprising, within days—nay, hours—of the execution of Shaykh Mahmud [Muhammad Taha], the formation of the Trade Union Grouping developed into a more effective form. Secret activity intensified, along with meetings, conferences, consultations, and articles in overseas newspapers. The end in fact began for the May regime. The immediate spark was ignited by the masses of the people in the uprising of 26 March; it culminated in the march of Wednesday, 3 April, which confirmed the end of the hated May regime.

Thus, the September laws and their brutal implementation were among the most powerful immediate causes of the overthrow of the May regime and of the Sudanese people regaining honor and freedom under democracy and national unity. From this came the National Compact, which was signed by the forces of the uprising, announcing the birth of the National Grouping at the dawn of 6 April 1985. It specified the following: "Guarantee of citizens' honor and basic freedoms to organization, expression, belief, work, movement, and all other freedoms, according to the texts of international charters of human rights, through a democratic system guaranteeing the rule of law and independence of the judiciary."

It was natural for political and trade union organizations to rally around the demand for repeal of the September laws and a return to the pre-1983 laws, following a review of them and removal of the texts the May regime had added infringing upon freedoms and human rights. The initiative was taken by the unions of lawyers, engineers, and physicians and by the Trade Union and National Grouping. Based on his consistent position toward the laws—a position that had led to his imprisonment under the May regime—the present prime minister announced before and during his election campaign, as we have already reported, that the September 1983 laws humiliated the Sudanese people, were not worth the ink in which they had been written, and were inevitably destined for the garbage heap of history. However, the transitional government failed to deal with the laws due to the position of some of its members in the two cabinets, that repeal of the laws had not been proposed as a slogan of the uprising. Other members of the transitional government claimed that because the matter was too serious and important for the transitional government to tackle in the space of a single year, it would have to be left for the elected body. [The government] tried to place the matter on the agenda of the transitional period, but in vain; and thus a historical opportunity to get rid of those distorted laws once and for all was lost. It is said that the [National] Grouping continued to demand the repeal of the September laws and removal of all the coercion, oppression, and intimidation of citizens and threat to national unity and stability they contained. This led to the Kokodam Agreement, which all forces of the National Grouping, including representatives of the Ummah Party, signed with the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement on 24 March 1986. The agreement explicitly called for the need to hold a national constitutional convention. A number of steps were agreed upon at that time, including repeal of the September 1983 laws and all laws restricting freedoms, in preparation for the holding of the conference. The democratic forces, especially in the National Grouping, worked rapidly for the holding of the conference. The present prime minister confirmed that the constitutional conference's agenda would have to include all the controversial issues that would have to be settled affecting the destiny of the country, such as the identity of the

Sudan, the formula for governing the country, the religion-state issue, balanced development, and just distribution of national wealth, etc.

[13 Oct 88 p 3]

[Text] (Dr Amin Makki Madani continues his essay on the alternative laws, saying:)

As for any real efforts toward repealing the laws, the transitional government, as we have mentioned, failed to deal with the question, preferring to leave it to the elected government. With the formation of the first coalition government, a number of bodies, including the Lawyers' Union, were entrusted with the task of presenting drafts of alternative laws to the government. Among the matters entrusted to the union were the penal code, civil procedures, evidence, and traffic. Since the prime minister had promised the public that he would present the alternative laws within 40 days, he asked the Lawyers' Union to present the alternatives quickly. It must be mentioned at this point that the union, in the person of the former attorney general, made it clear to the government that it still adhered to its general assembly's decision, which clearly stated that the September laws should be repealed and that the 1974 laws, amended, and with the emergency rules and provisions added by the May regime removed, should be reinstated. The attorney general advised the union to agree and begin the task entrusted to it. The union did in fact form various committees—I had the honor of chairing the one dealing with the penal code. The committee worked round the clock, completed a draft of the laws in question, and presented the draft to various government departments in October 1986. However, the laws in question were never published, never presented for discussion, and have not been spoken of from that date to this! Finally, one must mention in this context the question of confidence in the union because of its stand against the decisions of the general assembly and the Union of Arab Lawyers. However, what was said in the newspapers was nothing but a lie that the minutes of the Sudanese Lawyers' Union and the Arab Lawyers' Union disprove.

#### Proposals of the Unity Committee

Then came the turn of the Unity Committee composed of all key political figures, including the parties of the present government, including representatives of the National Islamic Front, the Lawyers' Union, and national personalities. The committee worked for 4 months and completed five laws, including the penal code. These it submitted to the government, and the prime minister received them at a gathering held in the gardens of the Constituent Assembly on 13 March 1986. As for the dispute over the question of "hadd" punishments, the committee members, except for the NIF, agreed to recommend their abandonment until the Constitutional Convention should meet.

All the members, including the NIF, agreed at that time on fundamental questions. Among the points of agreement were that the country's constitutional and legal foundations should be determined by the Constitutional Convention, the decisions should then be approved by the Constituent Assembly, and Islam should not be imposed on non-Muslims in any part of the country. This was the dominant notion until the formation of the current government, at which time the attorney general took the initiative of forming a committee to draft alternative laws, "taking into account all the proposed laws that have been presented to the government." This was to be done within the 60-day time limit for the presentation of alternative Islamic laws that the NIF had stipulated in its terms for entering the government. (The prime minister changed the 60-day period to "the beginning of the rainy season.") Thus, the deadline for publication of the laws was set between the Ummah Party and the NIF. The DUP objected and in turn presented a draft law of its own, which was apparently not taken into consideration.

#### The Attorney General's Proposed Criminal Law

Before speaking about the draft law that the attorney general presented to the Council of Ministers and which was referred to a ministerial committee for review and for recommendations about it to the council, it must be mentioned that in one of his speeches about the peace initiatives in the few weeks following the formation of the unity government, the prime minister made many statements, including the following: "Separation between religion and state is a myth"; the Constitutional Convention has no connection with the subject of the laws; the Muslim majority has the right to apply whatever law it thinks appropriate, and the Constitutional Convention has no right in this matter. This apparently involves a clear retreat from the prime minister's announced positions that we mentioned above. Indeed, the new position really represents a complete torpedoing by the prime minister of the very idea of a constitutional convention; for the question of applying these controversial laws cannot be taken up in isolation from a number of other subjects, such as classes of citizenship and discrimination between citizens because of religion, race, or any other reason. If the Constitutional Convention is also going to concern itself with the question of form of government—centralized or decentralized, federal or regional, or something else—how can he be ready to decide the question of the application of the laws on geographical bases. This necessarily means defining the form of government—i.e., dividing the country politically into North and South—before the Constitutional Convention. What will be the use of the Constitutional Convention, if it is confronted with predetermined matters relating to the form of government, the laws to be applied in parts of the country divided in advance, and a definition of degrees of citizenship involving discrimination between citizens regionally or individually because of religion?



That this was the case became certain with the issuance of the draft criminal law that the attorney general presented to the Council of Ministers in the context of alternative laws. In reality, this was the same draft that the NIF had originally proposed at the beginning of 1987. Here one must praise what Mr Muhammad 'Uthman al-Mirghani said about hastiness and limiting the matter to an opinion representing a particular political group, as quoted in the newspaper AL-AYYAM (27 September 1988): "We are people who are as concerned as can be about Islam. There is no disagreement about its fundamental principles, but we emphatically reject subjecting religion to security goals and unfounded independent judgments. I see no sense in the imposition of laws not drawn from their basic sources, namely the Book and the Sunnah. We emphatically reject all the individual legal judgments that attempt to fashion these laws to agree with their position." In this area, it will never be right for any political body to claim that it contributed to this effort.

Perhaps the first thing one notices in the aforementioned draft law is that the so-called "attached memorandum" that precedes it explicitly mentions that the proposal strives to respect the Shari'ah as "principal source of legislation," notwithstanding the fact that this is a matter covered by Article 4 of the transitional constitution, which explicitly states that "Islamic Shari'ah and customary practice [urf] are two basic sources of legislation," thus implying that customary practice is equal to the Shari'ah as a basic source of legislation. As long as governments have not amended Article 4 of the transitional constitution, this intentional omission of reference to customary practice as a source of legislation doubtlessly violates the explicit text of the constitution. Apparently, the drafter of the legislation clearly intended to ignore prevailing customary practice, particularly that of non-Muslims and citizens of African, non-Arab, or non-Islamic stock. The "attached memorandum" expanded upon the subject. It indicated that the proposal used the technical term of Islamic jurisprudence [viz., 'urf, customary practice] to link the law with the nation's authentic Arab heritage. However, one should note that the draft law defines "hadd" crimes similarly for North and South, maintaining a difference only in the matter of the "hadd" punishment or chastisement [ta'zir]. This raises an important question about the application of customary practice as a source of legislation. If we take the crime of "zina" [adultery or fornication], for example, in the context of the problem of polygamy, degrees of consanguinity that preclude marriage, and premarital pregnancy, and compare the purely Islamic view with the customary procedures followed by some of our tribes in the South and West, it becomes very clear that the draft law has ignored customary practice and social tradition even for non-Muslims. The draft law relieves them of the "hadd" punishment, but punishes the act as a crime by the criteria of "the Muslim people of the North," masters of the country.

### The Draft Law and National Unity

Even assuming that the law accords with the constitution and rests on the principle that the Islamic Shari'ah alone is the source of legislation, one clearly notices that the accompanying memorandum and the law itself have failed to make clear the legal school [madhhab] or schools to which one must turn in interpreting the law. Perhaps we remember the chaos that accompanied the 1983 law, which allowed the chief justice to issue edicts from time to time, indicating the legal school the courts were to follow in interpreting a particular provision. This made the chief justice another legislator, in open violation of the principle of separation of powers and independence of the judiciary. Naturally, this leads to chaos and conflicting rulings in various parts of the country and legal schools.

Perhaps these two examples—and particularly the fundamental differences the prime minister supported—are enough to stimulate debate on the question of whether the draft law has received enough attention and time from qualified specialists in matters of Shari'ah, Islamic jurisprudence, law, economy, and politics, for us to arrive at a law that suits our modern conditions, as the memorandum asserts. My colleague, Professor 'Ali al-Sayyid has handled this aspect of the question (AL-USBU' newspaper, 23 August 1988). [He has written] about the importance of collective independent legal judgment, the necessary qualifications of the independent legal expert [mujtahid], and the opinions that the current attorney general and prime minister put forth about the problem of independent legal judgment in their previous writings. This is a matter of great importance, given the basic differences between the different schools of Islamic jurisprudence. Even within a single school there were differences during the formative period of Islamic law. How much more so, given our circumstances today, with all the innovations in our life that require even greater efforts at independent judgment by experts in Islamic law.

Judges choose them according to their knowledge or ignorance, the sources available to them, or the independent opinion they think appropriate, especially when legal schools disagree or when there are differing opinions within a single legal school. We have seen how a hand was cut off because of [embezzlement of] public funds, in accordance with the minority opinion in a particular legal school, which moved the judges at that time to carry out the sentence publicly, with the result that he was dismissed from presiding as a judge in one of the emergency courts during the terrible period. If the current law is approved, questions will arise about the source of a particular judgment, which legal school and which opinion within a single school ought to be followed, etc.

Then there is the matter that the entire law of God has become subject to vote and to the settling of questions of Islamic jurisprudence among deputies who are in fact

ordinary citizens who lay no claim to knowledge of Islamic law, or to the character of experts qualified to make independent judgments on Islamic law, or to the character of judges. As God has revealed [in the Qur'an, 12:76]: "Over every man of knowledge is One who knows."

Perhaps the most dangerous part of the draft law is that it provides for the division of the country into two parts: the Southern region, and the remainder of the country. The attached memorandum claims that this comes "in fulfillment of a unanimous political commitment"! Without doubt, this misrepresents the true state of affairs, since there is no political unanimity about this question. As we have said previously, the question of the form of government and the decision as to whether it should be centralized, regional, federal, or a confederation was left to the Constitutional Convention to decide along with other controversial questions.

#### Why the Hurry?

The seriousness of this matter became clearly evident in a memorandum by the prime minister himself a few days after the draft law was brought up before the Council of Ministers. He brought up some fundamental problems in the proposal and disagreed about them with the drafters of the law. Specifically, he denied that apostasy is a secular "hadd" crime or that wine-drinking was a secular "hadd" crime. He also denied that stoning was one of the punishments decreed in the Islamic Shari'ah. Thus, fundamental disagreements of this kind on basic issues concerning the imposition of "hadd" punishments appeared in the first debate of the draft law. Add to that what the attorney general stated a few days ago: that the select ministerial committee charged with reviewing the law introduced no fewer than 60 amendments to it. How many amendments will be introduced to the bill if it is presented before the Constituent Assembly, to public opinion, or to experts in Islamic and civil law? So we again ask, Why the hurry?

From this point of view, the draft law really oversteps and even challenges and openly breaks with the political consensus, particularly in the criminal code, since this is a government law not subject to regionalism. Furthermore, exemption of the Southern region from "hadd" punishments and "qisas" [corporal punishment in retaliation for injury] constitutes an open contradiction to the constitutional texts dealing with citizen's rights and duties and nondiscrimination between citizens. Article 17 of the transitional constitution provides for the following:

1. All persons in the Republic of the Sudan are equal before the law.
2. Citizens are equal to each other in rights and duties and in opportunities to work and earn, without discrimination because of birthplace, race, color, sex, religion, or political opinion.

[14 Oct 88 p 3]

[Text] Without a doubt, application of parts of the law—particularly the criminal code, which is a government law applicable to all parts of the country—to the North, with the South exempted, constitutes open discrimination between citizens because of religion. That is to say, the drafter of the legislation has wrongly assumed that the North is "Dar al-Islam" [the domain of Islam, i.e., territory controlled by an Islamic government], where Islamic Shari'ah laws are applied, and that the inhabitants of the South, non-Muslims, live in "Dar al-Harb" [the domain of war, i.e., territory not under the control of an Islamic government]—thus their exemption. This amounts to open discrimination between Muslims and non-Muslims, in violation of the constitution. The draft law also discriminates between Muslims themselves, since "hadd" punishments do not apply to Muslims living in the Southern Region, while they do apply to the Muslims of the North. Furthermore, it discriminates between non-Muslims themselves, since it exempts non-Muslims living in the Southern Region from the law, while "hadd" punishments (apart from the "hadd" for drinking wine) apply to Christians residing in the North, even though this violates their freedom of belief. Perhaps we should pause to ask what the drafter of the legislation had in mind by not applying "hadd" punishments to Muslims living in the South. If the basis for application of the Islamic Shari'ah is the three Qur'anic verses that state, "Whoso judges not according to what God has sent down—they are the unbelievers...the evildoers...the ungodly" (Qur'an 5:44, 45, 47), how did the drafters of the law allow themselves to divide a single Islamic state all of whose citizens should be subject to Shari'ah rules, so that they chose to apply the Shari'ah in one part of the state, but not in the other? Did they permit themselves to believe part of the Book and disbelieve the other part?

The same question arises about the reported exemption of the national capital on the ground that it is the capital for all citizens without distinction. The attorney general tells us that the prime minister also inclines toward this opinion. We do not know how this can be correct. How can the attorney general free himself in this regard from the schools of Islamic jurisprudence and sanction what God forbade in the three Qur'anic verses quoted above?

We may perhaps find a clear answer to this question in what the scholar Dr 'Abd-al-Qadir 'Awdah says in his book, "Islamic Criminal Law," volume 1, page 279:

"The fundamental principle in Islamic law is that this law applies to all who reside in "Dar al-Islam", however numerous its governments, and however different their systems. It makes no difference whether Islamic territory be subject to the rule of a single state, as was the case in the time of the Umayyad dynasty, or subject to the rule of many states, as is the case today. The Shari'ah applies

to all inhabitants, whether they are advanced or backward, whether they live in the plains and valleys or in the deserts and mountains. Differences in their religions, languages, or races are of no consequence."

#### What Did They Say in January 1987?

It should be mentioned here that the principle of legal decentralization was previously espoused openly by the NIF in the "Charter of the Sudan" that it published in January 1987. There, the front stressed that the Shari'ah should be the source of legislation in general, because it was an expression of the democratic will of the majority. The front explicitly approved the document and issued an unambiguous "fatwa" [a formal legal opinion], stating that any legislative authority in a region with a majority population of non-Muslims could exempt the region from the general applicability of national laws for any criminal or penal rule derived from the Islamic Shari'ah. A number of persons are said to have defended this approach in the newspapers. They attempted to justify it on the ground that penal laws also differ among [the states of] the United States and [the republics of] the Soviet Union. The argument will probably not deceive many people. The republics of the Soviet Union or the states of the United States, though their regional legal provisions may differ, were not divided on religious bases. Furthermore, just as in every federal system, there is a maximum to what the individual state in the United States can legislate on—in the "Federal List" and the "State List," for example. No state can issue any law that impairs citizens' fundamental freedoms contained in the constitution. Some of us may recall American Supreme Court decisions overturning legislation passed locally in some states in cases of racial discrimination in mixed education and public transportation because that legislation violated the constitution. In the Soviet Union, the Supreme Soviet makes the laws, and no republic can issue legislation conflicting with that of the Supreme Soviet.

#### Don't Distort Words

Advocates of immediate application of this law argue that the ruler is obligated to apply God's command; he does not have the power to apply positive law. They confront us with the principle, "Dominion belongs to God," to deny any opposing argument or opinion. But neither they nor we can fail to see that even if laws are quoted from revealed texts, the question of governance is a human one first and last, one that inevitably is subject to the desires and inclinations of those human beings who claim to govern in the name of religion. A quick glance at the history of Islamic government after the death of the Prophet, from the great civil war that ensued after the murder of 'Uthman ibn 'Affan, through the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties, to the Islamic caliphates and states that succeeded them, will show us how Islamic government was influenced by human beings—

caliphs, imams of the faithful, kings, presidents, and mullas. In the end, governance belongs to human beings, even if they claim to speak in the name of God's legatee.

This problem of governance raises many questions about the reasons for applying Islamic laws without dealing with the matter of governance itself and the way of choosing the ruler. Shall we continue under a parliamentary system, with many parties and majority rule through a head of the executive apparatus, or a prime minister and a sovereign head of state, and an independent judiciary? Or shall we be faced with an imamate of the Muslims? Can we settle the matter of his selection, which took four different forms on the four occasions when the "rightly guided caliphs" [the first four caliphs] were chosen after the Prophet's death? Which of the options will apply to us: elections, inheritance, appointment or swearing allegiance to the [new] caliph during the lifetime of the [previous] imam, choice by people of influence, or the sovereignty of Islamic jurists? Shall we have political parties with differing policies, principles, and political programs, or shall we have a single party—the "Party of God"—with everything else "the Party of the Devil"? Will the principle of "shura" [consultation] be applied, and will it be based on a parliamentary majority? Or will it follow the principle that "shura" is not compulsory for the ruler, on the ground that dominion belongs to God and that the ruler is the one who carries out this matter? Will the ruler be responsible for justice and equity, or will they be left to an independent judiciary that imposes its decisions even on the ruler and imam? By what means, if any, will the ruler or imam be called to account—and the ministers, for some of whom the country's history stopped with the Mahdist Revolution and began again the day the approval of the [Islamic] criminal code was signed? And are they—regional rulers, government ministers, governors, subministers, up to the judges to whom execution of the law is entrusted—[to do so] according to the provisions of the constitution? Will the imam rule for a fixed term or for an unspecified one? Can he be removed if he misgoverns and deviates from the welfare of the people? Since the advocates of immediate application tell us that approval of the law will fill the land with justice, that it will bring down manna and quails, that the sky will rain gold, that crime and sin, fear and need will disappear from society, and that the country will turn into gardens where we shall enjoy a life of plenty, our current rulers who advocate immediate application [of Islamic law] ought to give us some indication or information about their political program for governing, how it will deal with the problems of the masses, and the plans they have made for settling the problems of the economy and services.

#### This Is an Insult to Islam

Without doubt, commencing with the criminal code without dealing with the aforementioned problems is in itself an insult to Islam. It amounts to portraying the Shari'ah as if it were a number of humiliating corporal punishments and had no relation or connection to the

character of Islamic society. In reality, criminal law is a subsidiary branch, an external aspect; the Shari'ah's real fundamentals that our rulers ignore today are the root and essence. How far we are from justice, security, and sufficiency [to fulfil people's needs]! What is the policy of the Islamic state toward education, health, family planning, social care, transportation, housing, and the environment? What about labor relations, the worker's position in the factory and the farmer's in the field, the bases of production relations and industrial relations? If we may dare to ask such a question, what is our position on the least of things or the greatest of resources? How shall we achieve a productive public sector, prevent inflation, and preserve the purchasing power of the currency? How shall we deal with foreign debts? We do not wish to become lost in areas called "requirements of the modern age": technology, progress in industry and human relations in many modern areas such as VCR's, modern airplanes, aerial surveillance, human and veterinary medicine, commercial relations, intellectual property, the rights of printing and authorship, government and citizen relations to agricultural and residential land, ownership of real estate, science's progress in learning the sex of a fetus, artificial fertilization, limb implants, and kidney and heart transplants—and all these developments of the age. How far we are from all this! What do our rulers, "ulama", statesmen, and men of religion think the position of the Islamic Shari'ah is on all these things? Why the penal code? Why amputation, flogging, stoning, and crucifixion in this society of ours? To whom will these punishments be applied? To the rulers, capitalists, and parasites—or to protect them? Again, why the penal code, when there are dozens, hundreds of laws that demand our independent judgment, discussion, and time to determine the framework of the Islamic society that we want, before cutting off the hand of Kawal and Majuk, flogging Margaret, Umar, and Hasan, crucifying al-Wathiq, and executing Mahmud? Is the Islamic political system epitomized in applying colonial Westminster democracy in its full form, while attacking the penal code as colonial and against our heritage and presenting weak alternatives, and keeping all other economic and social systems with the same inherited colonial system—except for replacing the "usury" of interest with the "Islamic" systems of partnership, resale with a stated profit ("murabahah"), and sleeping partnership ("mudharabah"), systems which have won the approval, if not the envy, of the "usurious" capitalistic banking system because the "Islamic banks" realize profits surpassing those of ordinary banks? Many knowledgeable people and experts have written about them as what they call "Isla-usurious" [a portmanteau word composed of "Islam" and "usurious"] banks.

#### **This Is Just the Beginning!**

Before entering into some of the details of the draft law, and while asking about the reasons behind the choice of approving the penal code rather than the other Islamic laws, the question arises as to how it is possible to apply a penal code without its being accompanied by a code of

criminal procedure and a code of evidence. A criminal code cannot be applied without these two other codes—unless, perchance, our present rulers wish to approve the alternative criminal code now before the Constituent Assembly and apply it using the codes of civil procedure and evidence that were issued as part of the wretched September Laws, which everyone has agreed must be changed. If we take the 1983 code of evidence, for example, we find ourselves faced in advance and before the issuance of the alternative laws with a case in which a Muslim woman judge—and we have not yet settled the matter of women acting as judges according to the principles of Islamic law—rejected the testimony of a non-Muslim woman doctor on the ground that she was not "of good character," as defined by the Islamic Shari'ah. And an Islamic lawyer rejected on religious grounds the decision of a civil court appointing a Coptic lawyer to head an arbitration body. And this is just the beginning!

What is this compared to the provisions of the 1983 Foundations of Decisions Law, which is still in force? That law allows civil or criminal courts to interpret anything about which no provision is contained in the other laws according to what is contained in that law. It grants the judge the right in the first place to use his independent judgment to decide the disputed question according to what he determines to be in accord with the Islamic Shari'ah. As we have already said, this makes the judge a legislator, in violation of the constitution and the principle of separation of powers.

#### **Isn't This Folly?**

If we look at the content of the law in some detail, we observe that it contains absurdities that reach the level of ludicrousness when it comes to applying the principles of legal regionalism and the division of the country into North and South. While paragraph 3-5 exempts the Southern Region from the application of the "hadd" rules on wine-drinking, theft, false accusation of unchastity, apostasy, and the "hadd" punishments for highway robbery and adultery, paragraph 7 of the law charges with a crime any Sudanese who commits while outside the Sudan an act deemed a crime in the Sudan and under the law of the country in which he committed the act—the charge to be made upon his return to the Sudan. Thus, if a Sudanese commits the crime of drinking wine in Saudi Arabia or a "hadd" theft in Kuwait, he will be subject to the "hadd" penalties when he returns to the North. However, if he had committed the same crime in the south of the country, he would not have been liable to "hadd" punishment. If two Sudanese, one a Muslim resident of Malakal, the other a Christian whose home was Kusti, met in Qatar and drank wine, and each of them returned to his place of residence, the Christian would be punished for his deed in the North, while the Muslim would escape from any punishment in the South. And there are many similar strange examples.

[16 Oct 88 p 3]

[Text] (This is the last installment of Dr Amin [Makki Madani's] essay about the proposed criminal laws.)

One notices that apostasy has been loosely and broadly defined, unlike the definition of apostasy in Islamic jurisprudence. The Qur'anic verse [2:217] states, "And whosoever of you turns from his religion and dies disbelieving—their works have failed in this world and the next; those are the inhabitants of the Fire; therein shall they dwell forever." Apostasy therefore is turning back from Islam or breaking off Islam. According to the books of jurisprudence ('A. 'Awdah, "Islamic Criminal Law," page 706), apostasy has two basic elements: turning away from Islam, and criminal intent. It must, that is, be willful. The aforesaid section of the law, however, includes in the crime no mental element, such as intention, willfulness, or knowledge. Instead, it is aimed at the material element. Strangely, the section does not stipulate "departure from Islam," but merely "promoting departure from the community of Islam." As everyone can see, the intention behind this is clear in the context of the current political climate. It makes it possible to intimidate political opponents with the allegation of "promoting departure from the community of Islam," especially if we bear in mind that the law has not defined what "the community of Islam" is. Is it the community the Shi'ah, or exclusively the followers of a particular legal school (Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanafi, Hanbali, or any other school)? Taking the trial of Professor Mahmud Muhammad Taha as a precedent, it is most likely that the community of Islam is really "the community of the ruler." In this connection, it is worth pointing out the coincidence in time between the presentation of the new emergency regulation and the proposed law. This was no accident, despite the fact that approval of the emergency regulation was justified as a measure related to the flood disaster. The inclusion of a section on preventative detention by the executive authority alone and the curtailment of the right to strike, even legitimately and under normal conditions, expose the government's intention to deal with the opposition and impose a civilian dictatorship. But human memory should not forget that state security laws, emergency trials, and the apparatus of repression and violence that dominated the country until April 1985 did not prevent the masses of the people from regaining their freedom and dignity.

#### More Destruction of the Constitution

There may not be enough space here to deal with the content of the proposed code in detail, particularly the purely legal aspects. However, it should be noted that the proposal reduces the articles of the criminal code from 458 to 188, a reduction of 270 articles, in accordance with the Salafiyah school, which opposes detailed legislation and prefers leaving the formulation of a criminal charge to the judge. This makes the judge a legislator, contradicting the constitutional principle mandating separation of powers. The matter requires detailed study

from the point of view of criminal law and penal policy, and one must also study the effect of this abridgement. The least that can be said about it is that it completely ignores settled procedure and established Sudanese legal jurisprudence, in complete opposition to what was said in the "attached memorandum." The proposal clearly relies on generalization and vagueness in defining crimes, when a criminal code necessarily should be explicit and clear in its provisions. Otherwise, it violates the constitutional principles that prohibit indictment on a charge without an explicit text (Transitional Constitution, Article 27). This is based on the Qur'anic verse [17:15], "We never chastise, until We send forth a Messenger." There was no accidentalness or arbitrariness in the more than 400 articles in the codes of 1925, 1974, and even 1983. The compilers of the legislation intended to discriminate between degrees and kinds of criminality. They intended to define the person of the criminal and his legal and ethical responsibility. This is the way kinds of crime should be defined and punishments established.

#### Restoration of the Punishment of Flogging

Another important observation is that the proposed law restores to the provisions of the law the punishment of flogging for crimes other than "hadd" crimes. This punishment had been eliminated in the most recent revision of the penal code (the 1987 Miscellaneous Amendments Act), which seems to have failed because it was not brought before the Constituent Assembly at the scheduled time.

In general, the punishment of flogging is one that modern systems of criminal law have eliminated, since it humiliates and degrades the individual—as is clearly stated by international charters of human rights to which the Sudan has subscribed, particularly in the period after the uprising. Furthermore, Article 29 of the transitional constitution specifies that "no accused person shall be subjected to enticement, intimidation, or torture. No punishment that is savage or demeaning to human dignity shall be inflicted on him."

The "attached memorandum" adds that new provisions have been created, such as crimes against the protection of the environment, terrorism, and assault on personal liberty. But this claim can be disproved, since all these crimes have been in the criminal code for more than half a century. Furthermore, the drafters of the law should not claim credit for the law's removal or elimination of the crimes in the repealed State Security Act and political crimes; this was already done by the law proposed by the Lawyers Union or the laws of the unity committee—if the attorney general had only had found an opportunity to read them.

In conclusion, we see that issuance of the penal code in such a form and with such haste clearly violates and contradicts provisions of the constitution and deviates from the political agreement to postpone the entire

matter until the Constitutional Convention, particularly since the proposed law divides the country into North and South on the basis of religion. This violates religion and the constitution, threatens democracy and national unity, and increases the danger and damage of the ongoing civil war in the South. Since we have not yet approved a permanent constitution for the country, since the Constituent Assembly itself does not have its full membership, and since many momentous issues are supposed to be decided in the proposed Constitutional Convention, there is no need to approve the draft law in its present form, which threatens the future of democracy and even stability and national unity. We must all therefore intensify our efforts to oppose those laws. We must implore the people's deputies to act with deliberation and take everything said above into consideration before it is too late, before the country's unity is broken, before citizens are divided into Muslims and non-Muslims, Arabs and Africans, and before the majority attempts to impose a culture, language, and religion on the minority.

#### Let Us Resist This Intimidation

Civic duty imposes this upon us out of concern for future generations and to preserve democracy and national unity. No doubt, the battle is not easy. It will encounter every kind of resistance and war. It will be insinuated that religion has been abandoned. Everyone who opposes the imposition of these laws will be accused of godlessness, atheism, being an agent of communism and Zionism, belonging to a fifth column, and other such forms of intellectual intimidation. The feelings of the simple masses will be whipped up against the opponents, on the ground that they are enemies of Islam and against the Islamic Shari'ah and God's revelation. This becomes perfectly clear from the manner in which the law was discussed in the Constituent Assembly. The debate was marked by emotionalism. The speakers became disorderly and threatened one of the opposition deputies that the first "hadd" punishment for apostasy would be applied to him after approval of the law, and that they were ready to die for the Shari'ah. Thus they implied that democracy either would be made serviceable to their ambitions, to the protection of their economic and social interests, and the entrenching of their political power, or else there would be "jihad", martyrdom, and licence to kill opponents. But all of this must not turn us aside or impede the course of the fight against this perverted law, for the repeal of the September 1983 laws, and the issuance of democratic laws that preserve the rights of citizens and the unity of the country—until the Constitutional Convention meets and a minimum of agreement is reached about all the destiny-shaping questions, including those of religion and state and the rights of citizenship. While we are under democracy, we must not lose sight of the experience of what happened during the May dictatorship. We must not be deceived by the slogan of applying the Islamic Shari'ah raised by politically motivated people whose object has been described as

follows by the Egyptian lawyer, Professor Khalil 'Abd-al-Karim, in his book, "Application of the Shari'ah, No to Rule":

"[Their goal is] seizure of power to create a theocratic religious government whose slogan is, "Dominion belongs to God alone"; a government that will be the shadow of God on earth and rule by divine right; one that will allow no opposition parties or resisting newspapers. It and those who rule in its name will be "the Party of God," while the others will be "the Party of Satan. In the Persian government in Iran that claims to be Islamic they have an example and model."

Professor Khalil 'Abd-al-Karim points out that the new Salafis often fall back on interpreting the Qur'anic verse, "Whoso judges not according to what God has sent down—they are the unbelievers." They interpret it as a basis for government in the general sense—i.e., the policy of the state, and not simply governance—meaning the imposition of "hadd" punishments and the application of "qisas" [corporal punishment in retaliation for injury], as the verse was interpreted by leading exegetes among the venerable fathers of Islam [al-salaf al-salih] centuries ago. This approach makes itself evident in setting aside the opinion of the people and in considering the ruler God's caliph [khalifah, "successor, vicar"] on earth, follower of the Messenger of God in the legislation and law he brings. This happened during the rule of Numayri, who announced that he was "an imam of the Muslims." His retinue of mercenaries and hypocrites swore allegiance to him on that basis. This also happened under the governments established by the dictator Zia-ul-Haq in Pakistan or by Ruhallah Khumayni and his fascist gang in the land of the Persians.

#### What Is Your Reply?

Finally, we must put some questions to the advocates of immediate application of the Islamic Shari'ah, especially the prime minister and attorney general, whose statements and writings less than 5 years ago we have called attention to. Has what happened in the Sudan since 1983 been that the Sudan's political and economic system has changed and altered between that date and 1988 so as to insure just distribution of wealth between citizens? Have we succeeded in realizing the sufficiency [to fulfil people's needs] that militates against theft? Have we combatted adultery and fornication by national education and facilitating marriage? Does cutting off the hand of the thief today in this society that is based on sufficiency [to fulfil people's needs] and on justice give us an immunity that is different from someone who throws his brother, hands bound, into the sea and warns him not to get wet? I have found nothing more eloquent in this regard than the question posed by my friend and colleague, Lawyer Mahmud Hajj al-Shaykh, in the union's seminar in his home on 12 September 1988. Concerning the announcement that the proposed law had been deposited with the Constituent Assembly, he said, "We expect the announcement will say, 'Praise be to God,

who has bestowed His grace upon us and completed His favor toward us. Through His help and our effort, the force of our resolution and sincerity of our faith, we have successfully passed through the stage of building an Islamic system that stands before your eyes, based on pillars of faith, sacrifice, and good example. We have taken preventative measures to remove need and necessity. We have defeated poverty and destroyed disease to the extent that is reasonably possible. Social justice has spread greatly and peace has been established. The climate has become favorable for applying the 'hadd' [provisions of Islamic law]. We have therefore prepared the criminal code and will present it to the Constituent Assembly."

Have we reached this degree of sound education, widespread justice and sufficiency, preservation of dignity, freedom of opinion and expression, work, suitable housing, medical treatment, peace and stability, availability of transportation and education, and lack of harmful disparity between individual incomes? Have all Islamic laws suddenly come to be found inside the Book [i.e., the Qur'an], so that they can be copied into the gazette of the republic and become law of the land without the need for independent judgment ("ijtihad") about such basic matters as the "hadd" [crimes] whose nature and punishment are established by texts of unambiguous meaning, so that one may not change them by decreasing or increasing, not to mention the independent judgment [necessary] in modern matters not dealt with by the Book and the Sunnah?

Are the ideal conditions for application of the Islamic Shari'ah fulfilled for us in a society based on a plurality of parties—sectarian, tribal, ideological, or secularist? Will power always go to the party or parties having a numerical majority? What is our position on "shura" (consultation)? Will everyone to whom the present law grants it have the right to vote, be a candidate, and hold office, regardless of sex, religion, or age? Shall we keep the division of powers and maintain what is known as the independence of the real sovereign power over us, whether head of state or prime minister? Must the ruler fulfil the conditions of being a Muslim, male, pious, and God-fearing? Do our rulers today, including the ministers and regional governors, fulfil these conditions? Is there an imam of the Muslims, one to whom allegiance is due? Do we have a judicial system that is just and knows the Shari'ah, or will you take us back to the circuses of the emergency and so-called "quick justice." These are a few perplexing questions. Perhaps you think some of them ought to be taken into consideration as you hurry to apply the "hadd" [punishments] and postpone the fundamental questions relating to an Islamic society, social justice, and equality, oblivious of the fact that the first duty of the ruler (as you indicated when you were out of power) is to provide a dignified life and extend justice, before imposing "hadd" [punishments] on the hungry and deprived.

If you can answer these questions in the affirmative, then approve the draft law, sincere with your Lord, your

public, and your consciences. What good news this is concerning the welfare of our people! A life of plenty and ease, clothing, peace, tranquillity, health, medical care, education, transportation, freedom from need, and justice—for them, their masses, and their children! You are responsible first before your consciences, second before this great people who have produced you, and first and last before God.

May God help us all. In Him is success and right action.

### Unions Discuss Striking as Weapon

45040124a Khartoum AL-ASHIQQA' in Arabic  
29 Nov 88 pp 34-36

[Article by In'am Muhammad al-Tayyib: "Strike Week: 1.4 Million Workers Threaten To Strike; Will Government Agree To Raise Minimum Wage to 300 Pounds; Workers Strike Poses Threat to Communication and Transportation Activity and to Water and Electricity Services"]

[Text] A series of strikes have recently been staged by various groups. Last week witnessed the strike staged by clerks, warehouse clerks, teachers, control officers, aviation engineers and water workers. Other extremely important groups, such as workers, teachers and technical engineers, continue to threaten to strike. If they did strike it could paralyze the strategic utilities. Because strikes have motives and because they result in grave consequences and losses, AL-ASHIQQA' has gotten together with the unions that are threatening to strike to find out what their demands are, what losses and damages the country incurs as a result of strikes and whether striking in itself, in addition to negotiations with the government which often founder and result in strikes, is a weapon to achieve these demands.

Let us begin with the workers group, which is considered an important sector in this country, then look at teachers and next technical engineers to find out what their demands are; then let us have a session with the employer in another part of this report.

### The Strike as a Means to an End

A strike by workers involves 1.4 million workers in 42 labor unions from the various institutions, factories, ministries and from all the service sectors.

We asked: Why a strike and what are its motives?

Yusuf Abu-Shamah, the secretary general of the General Federation of Sudanese Labor Unions, has said that the policy of the federation, in its capacity as a national labor movement, is to settle disputes between worker groups and the agencies concerned through negotiation and dialogue. Striking is not an end in itself; rather, it is a means to achieve the workers' demands which we consider to be fair and legitimate which are to raise the worker's minimum wage to 300 pounds now that it has



been agreed that the current minimum wage is not enough to meet life's simplest requirements. Several meetings were held with the former minister of finance and a committee was formed in October 1987 from the Labor Federation, the Ministry of Finance and the Civil Service Commission. The committee's activities continued for four months; during this time it studied the memoranda which were submitted by the federation and which demand increased wages. The memoranda contained a study conducted by the federation to assess the wages a married worker with three children needs to be sufficient. This study made it clear that at 1987 prices, such a worker needed 1,047 pounds. In view of Sudan's economic conditions, we agreed with the Ministry of Finance and the Civil Service Commission to set the minimum wage limit at 300 pounds monthly. In March 1988, the joint committee presented its recommendations to the Council of Ministers to be approved as a binding agreement.

#### **Slow Procedures and Disavowal of Responsibility**

After the recommendations were submitted to the Council of Ministers, we waited for a long time, added Abu-Shamah with rage. We followed up on the issue with the agencies concerned and demanded that the agreement we had concluded be implemented; we reminded them that the market developments, as evidenced by an insane inflation, were insufferable and that the worker, who does the producing and whose requirements are many, had become impatient with his living conditions. In that period, the wage committee was formed and we were included in this committee despite our disapproval. We refused to join this committee because those affected by its modifications had already been given wage increases, contrary to the worker. Things proceeded slowly and then came to a complete halt as a result of the circumstances Sudan experienced during the floods. The workers continued to work industriously in the hope that what we, as a labor organization, had promised them when we concluded a binding agreement with the government would be fulfilled.

#### **One-Month Grace**

The federation, according to its secretary general, continued its efforts to achieve the workers' rights in order to guarantee the workers an honorable life commensurate with the efforts they exert.

The secretary general added that when the Sudanese workers federation convened its congress, one of the most important things it did was to examine the situation. The conferees agreed that the issue of increased wages and of implementation of what had been agreed upon was faced with obstacles, procrastination and lack of seriousness on the part of the government; they agreed that it was necessary to take a decisive stance, especially since the figure previously set had increased sharply with the terrible inflation which made it extremely difficult for the worker to earn a living.

The congress decided that the agreement already concluded with the government had to be implemented within one month of convocation of the congress, held on 11 October, or else we would go on strike to express our adherence to our demand for modified wages. The resolution of the congress is binding, considering that it is the highest authority and that its resolutions cannot be surpassed.

When the congress was concluded, we submitted the resolution to the prime minister and demanded that implementation be speeded up. But no response was received and the grace period ended on 11 November. The prime minister and the minister of finance were contacted and several meetings were held. It also became evident from the work of the wage committee that this committee did not adhere to the 300-pound figure, that it did not approve the minimum wage modification, and that it tried to merge the entire [wage] structure and to modify the wages of groups whose wages had already been modified. It also became evident to us that in the government's opinion, especially that of the minister of finance, the modification which is required and already set could not be implemented. Because we cannot back down on the resolutions of the congress and because the government has not adhered to what had already been agreed upon, it has become inevitable not to use the means that will restore our rights; this is to strike.

#### **General Strike**

Nearly 1.4 million workers will be involved in a general strike and the consequences will be grave, according to the federation's secretary general who added: The strike will include free professionals, such as bus, taxicab and autobus drivers, in both the public and private sectors. It will also include factories, agencies, ministries and all establishments employing a number of workers.

Moreover, the international consequence will be grave. Some may consider the stance a political one. The negative result is to paralyze work throughout Sudan, including public transportation activities, banks, health, electricity, water and telephone services, (private sector) transportation, such as bakasi [pickups converted to transport passengers], trucking and taxicab services. The strike will also include workers in the food industries such as those in the sugar and flour plants. It will further include the public and private industrial and service sectors, the railroads, the general union of nurses, represented by 42 unions in the various parts of Sudan, and eight regional federations in all parts of Sudan.

The General Federation of the Sudanese Labor Unions is firm on its position and the strike will be launched in all parts of Sudan on 3 December and will continue for three days unless a satisfactory agreement is reached with the government, i.e. unless the resolutions (of the joint committee) are implemented immediately.



### **A Raise for Teachers**

Teachers are also threatening to strike. Intermediate school teachers have declared that they will strike. As a result, studies will be suspended because 20,000 teachers in academic schools and 5,000 in technical schools will strike for demands which the Teachers Union has submitted and which have not been met. Muhammad Hasan Wada'ah, secretary general of the General Union of Intermediate School Teachers, has said that the education issue, as an all-encompassing and indivisible issue, involves the supply of textbooks, the environment and the teacher. As a teachers union, we believe that these three basic points on which teaching is founded have serious problems which need to be tackled quickly and earnestly in order to move the educational process forward. This is why we have set priorities for improving the position of teachers and why concerted efforts were launched as of February 1987. We have submitted detailed memoranda calling for elimination of the positions of top educational supervisors and technical advisors; they call for the creation of jobs for a number of other grades to insure normal administrative continuity; they call for the elimination of the differences which have led to administrative problems as a result of job imbalance. We have also stressed the need for the jobs in the Sudanese intermediate teachers training institutes to be passed to intermediate school teachers and the need to reinstate teachers dismissed from the service in accordance with the law on ending service in the public interest.

To achieve these demands, meetings were held with officials at various levels. We negotiated in accordance with the agreement between the unions representing teachers in the three [elementary, intermediate and secondary] stages. On 18 October, we submitted a memorandum containing demands concerning the intermediate stage. We have gotten some results from the government which has provided a hardship allowance. Important aspects involving job bottlenecks have not yet been dealt with yet.

### **Teacher Status Is Shaken**

The general objective dialogue has continued. We, as a union, believe that teaching is the mother profession and that this profession, as well as the teacher's moral status and wages, have been shaken. We have resorted to direct warning by exercising our legal and legitimate right, having lost hope of seeing our demands met through dialogue. Regarding the academic and moral losses emanating from a strike, the union's secretary general has said: The teacher has a cause and his strike must draw some attention because the teacher deals with a living creature, namely the student, who needs to have his mind developed every moment of his life. A teachers strike will bring about devastating educational consequences for the student. The teacher is a model for the student and he is not expected to display deficiencies. Moreover, the educational process is programmed.

Activities and curricula are implemented according to a set plan in which the main consideration is time, estimated in the Sudanese schools at 200 days [annually]. The student needs this time, which is calculated by the period, to absorb the curriculum. Any disruption, delay or suspension works against the student because he will not then have enough time to tackle the curriculum. Therefore, the educational losses emanating from a strike are enormous.

The Intermediate School Teachers Union had declared a strike but the government asked for a grace period to negotiate. Meetings continue to be held and the strike has been suspended until 5 December to give the authorities concerned an opportunity to reach agreement on the demands. Otherwise, it is back to striking.

### **Engineers Also Have Cause**

The great role performed by telecommunications is extremely significant and serious. The General Union of Technical Engineers has tried to develop ideal formulas for the Telecommunications Authority whose administration is poor and disintegrated. The general union has threatened to strike. Rather, it has actually gone on strike because of the failure of the authorities concerned to respond to the union's just demands. These are the statements of Murtada al-Jilani, the union chairman, who has submitted an urgent memorandum to the prime minister noting that the demands were made as a result of everybody's conviction that the authority's work in the telecommunications area is inferior, is deteriorating and is failing; this is due to a lack of a planning policy and to the authority's failure to make any effort for administrative organization. This is in addition to the failure of the authority's management to achieve any of the objectives which had dictated transforming it from an agency to an authority.

In the engineering area, we have the Sudanese space plan which has cost \$1 million and many aspects of which have been marked by failure due to poor planning. The authority has also continued to import equipment without any planning. The Union of Technical Engineers has stressed the need for forming fact-finding committees to investigate the failure and the violations, as well as the word and content of the decree creating the authority so that it may be able to regain control over all means of telecommunication.

Because the cited demands constitute a continuation of a prolonged and continuous appeal, the technicians have threatened to strike if these demands are not considered, rather met.

There are other circles that want their demands to be met and that are threatening to strike, including the Clerks Union, the Warehouse Clerks Union, the National Radio and Television Authority Union, the Meteorologists Union and others, in addition to workers, teachers and engineers.

We wonder: Should the government wait until the danger is upon us and until the country is paralyzed by these strikes or is it time for the government to act? A future installment will explore the viewpoint of the employer, as exemplified by public service and administrative reform agencies and the Civil Service Commission.

**Reporter Describes Security Situation in Darfur**  
*45040124b Khartoum AL-ASHIQQA' in Arabic*  
29 Nov 88 pp 11-13

[Article by 'Isam Mahjub al-Mahi: "Darfur: Country Is not Only Being Devoured From Its Peripheries But Is Also Being Mangled Internally; Darfur Citizens Organize Procession and, Consequently, Coalition Breaks Up; World Will Witness Struggle for Food-Producing Areas; Internal and External Factors Led to Calm That Precedes Storm; It Is Not Armed Looting But Organized Crime To Terrorize and Cause Emigration"]

[Text] At times, it is the journalist's fate to possess information which he cannot publish. At other times, the information he has gathered becomes worthless because it is superceded by events.

The journalist may lose his patience and dump his papers in a waste basket out of despair or may hold his peace reluctantly. I rarely do such a thing.

When the security conditions again deteriorated in Darfur, Dr Tijani al-Sisi, the province governor—a young man whom I came to know for a few moments and in whom I discerned tranquillity and the ability to absorb equally the citizens' wrath, the wrath of the government parties when they disagree among themselves, and the wrath of the opposition—held a surprise press conference in which he declared that entire villages were being burnt and annihilated by foreign gangs and that 139 citizens had been killed in just one week. When I heard this, I rushed to examine my papers to look for what I had written, but not yet been able to publish, about the trip I had made as a reporter accompanying Muhammad 'Uthman al-Mirghani and his delegation during their visit to Darfur.

Here I am conveying to the reader some of what is in my papers. There is more that will not be published at present. We continue to have the opportunity to address the citizens before the government does. The government is aware of all that we write. If it isn't, then this is a big catastrophe. The citizen has empowered this government to rule on his behalf. He has perhaps also empowered it to speak in his name, and it does so constantly. He has, furthermore, tasked it with ensuring his safety and security, which is the least that any citizen, be he rich or poor, demands. In this, the government has failed.

**Once Again, Darfur in Circle of Events**

Darfur citizens organized a peaceful procession in Khartoum and demanded that the government confront the citizens with the facts about the security conditions and about foreign intervention in the province. Consequently, the coalition between al-Ummah Party and the DUP [Democratic Unionist Party] broke up. The prime minister took the two parties' accumulated disagreements to the Constituent Assembly and asked the deputies to support his effort to include the [Islamic] front in the government.

The Darfur citizens' procession in the capital, opposed by al-Ummah Party, supported by the DUP and planned jointly with the DUP and Islamic Front deputies, caused the breakup of the two parties' coalition and the formation of the current concord cabinet after a lengthy period.

The Islamic National Front entered the government and maintained total silence on the developments in Darfur, on which the front's official media and the media sympathizing with it had joined to expose the government and depict it as incapable of shouldering the responsibilities of defending the citizen's security and stability. This stance touched off a new disagreement between the front leadership and the its deputies from the province. This disagreement became so complex that the deputies' activities were suspended. Behind the scenes there are reports to the effect that these deputies have resolved to shift to another party that takes a consistent position toward the issues of the province, that did not change its position in the coalition which broke up because of the Darfur issues and that has not changed its position in the agreement which is being threatened by the province's intensifying security problems.

The silence of al-Ummah Party itself, which has 30 deputies from the province's 34 geographic districts, and its failure to acknowledge the true nature of the thorny security conditions are no longer acceptable to the party's genuine bases in the province, over which this party has nearly ensured its influence. This motivated Dr Tijani al-Sisi, the province governor, to make public the province's deteriorating security conditions whereas the previous governor had tried not to declare the facts, not to say that he had tried to conceal the facts from the citizens and from the central government.

In his latest press conference, Dr Tijani al-Sisi declared that the security conditions in Darfur are deteriorating, that organized armed looting operations are escalating, that citizens are being killed and that villages are being burnt. An onlooker who ponders this becomes certain that the developments in Darfur are likely to intensify and that the relative calm the province has experienced recently is no more than a natural product of the political relaxation emanating from the interplay of several internal and external factors; this includes of course, the

Libyan-Sudanese unity plan which was supposed to have a cover to strengthen it and lead it to success—a cover in the form of stable security conditions in the province. The factors also encompass internal factors such as the visit by Muhammad 'Uthman al-Mirghani, the DUP leader. This visit had been expected to lead to the government's adoption of a firm position. This caused those in charge of the organized armed looting to wait for the expected measures. Consequently, sabotage activity in the province declined for a time.

#### **Al-Mirghani in Darfur**

As fate would have it, I accompanied Muhammad 'Uthman al-Mirghani and his delegation on his first visit to the province last July. The DUP had a chance to keep in close contact with the developments in the province, to study them on the spot and to determine the consequences of the province's worsening security and poor living conditions.

Al-Mirghani and his delegation visited Fashir, Nyala, Da'in, Kas, Nirtitti, Zalingei, Wadi Salih, Kabkabiya and al-Junaynah. The visit provided a great opportunity to explore the problems of the citizens in the province. Muhammad 'Uthman and a number of the delegation members met with the military commands of the armed forces and the police, with the administrative officials and the province notables and listened to public and private reports on what was going on in the province.

What I know is that al-Mirghani was more eager than the others to learn the exact details of the events and that he got his information only from the circles directly connected with the events. He was not content with the information he got from the inhabitants and the notables of every area he visited, even though these are the people directly hurt by the armed looting, astronomical inflation and unavailability of food supplies. He confirmed his information by checking it with the leading officials of the province. To my knowledge, he put together a complete picture of the conditions in the province.

We know that immediately upon his return, al-Mirghani met with the prime minister and acquainted him with all the confirmed information at his disposal. He also met with the ministers of defense and interior. I recall that a delegation member told al-Mirghani: The situation in the province is very serious. All you have to do is hold a press conference and inform the press, the media and the citizens of the real conditions. This member went even further. But al-Mirghani responded calmly and deliberately: We will do all we can to help the government deal with the situation.

I remembered at that moment what some "politicians" do after they visit an area and gather semi-factual information. Such politicians rush to hold press conferences with this information, adding to it, embellishing it, exaggerating it; they do this to further their aspirations either to gain support for a certain position and continue concealing the

evident facts, or to incite the citizens against the government, depending on the politician's position and on whether he is a ruler or in the opposition.

#### **Struggle Over Food-Producing Areas**

In a meeting we had in Zalingei, an economist specialized in agricultural economics told me that the world struggle is no longer governed by the strategies of geographic positions or by defense or invasion strategies. Rather, the world will soon witness a struggle for the food-producing areas. The world has discovered alternatives to oil and to other forms of energy. Technology can develop the technological means to tackle anything militarily or peacefully. But the world will stand powerless in the face of food production. Food has to be planted and the crop must grow and be harvested. There can be no cultivation except in the soil. He added: Now that you have visited Darfur and seen the green carpet which covers it and the rivers that cross it east, west, north and south, [you realize] that we here do not need to plough in order to plant. If we just "throw" the seeds, they will produce enough food for Sudan and for other countries.

The economist added: Studies have already been conducted and a discovery made of an underground river with a water flow volume greater than that of the Nile River.

#### **It Is Not Looting for Sake of Looting**

I asked a military official about the facts of the armed looting and he said:

Those who engage in organized looting include individuals who own Landcruiser vehicles (each valued at one half million pounds) and carry weapons (of a similar value). Such an individual comes to murder a farmer not with a pistol or rifle shot which could kill the farmer immediately but to use weapons that tear the farmer's body apart. This individual then steals a camel or a she-camel. Is this looting?

When one is told such a story, one cannot but remain silent. The official went on to add: This is intended to terrorize the citizens. This is why the citizens have emigrated, abandoned agriculture and moved to the outskirts of the cities to live their days under the worst form of starvation, sickness and ignorance and to wait for us to help them with whatever keeps soul and body together.

I recall that my mind wandered to Khartoum when I didn't find many men in the areas I visited. Where did the men go? They must have been wandering aimlessly in Khartoum and in the Central Province.

There is nobody to cultivate the green land. Where did the landowners go? They were terrorized and they abandoned the land.

Again, my interlocutor said: There is no armed looting. There is a plan to terrorize the citizens and to make them emigrate.

### Need To Acknowledge Facts

Sayyid Ahmad al-Husayn, the first Constituent Assembly member to acknowledge the true conditions in Darfur, addressed a "political evening" organized in Zalingei, saying:

We cannot solve Darfur's problems without seeking an means to solving the problems. The means is in stability and stability will not be attained unless the organized activities to terrorize the citizens—activities dictated by foreign intervention in Darfur—are brought to an end. What is needed is an official acknowledgement. The resources of the police and armed forces are not sufficient to pursue these foreigners who terrorize the citizens. We are required to reinforce the police and armed forces with vehicles and with weapons to move and defend the citizens. An official acknowledgement of the true conditions will enable us to turn to the friends and ask for their help in securing what is needed. But without such an acknowledgement, what can we tell the friends who fulfill our requests? Can we tell them that we have plundering shifta gangs and that we cannot eliminate them? This is unacceptable.

He said with a resounding voice: When the authorities acknowledged the foreign intervention in al-Karmak and Qaysan, we were able to tell our friends about the real conditions and they rose to help and assist us ceaselessly. But according to the present equation—the equation of the government's silence and its failure to acknowledge the conditions of which you, O sons of Darfur, are aware and under which you live, plus the inability of the police and armed forces to control the situation—we cannot find a real means to establishing security in Darfur.

### Who Terrorizes Citizens?

The question is direct. The answer provided by the province officials reveals the clarification given to the delegation leadership, and this is something we will hold back. As for the answer given by the citizens who spoke spontaneously, it is:

Darfur is a vast area for the struggle between Chadian government forces and Chadian national opposition forces supported by Libya. Both forces possess vehicles for [rapid] movement and sophisticated weapons. I recall that a military official of the province rushed to Kas to inform the delegation that six farmers had been killed along the asphalted Nyala-Kas-Zalingei highway, which means that the murderers were close to the route of the delegation which was travelling by car from Nyala to Zalingei via Kas and Nirtitti. This official asked al-Mirghani to terminate his trip and return to Nyala. But al-Mirghani wasted no time. He rejected the suggestion and declared that the trip would continue along the planned route and that the incidents that had taken place could not justify a change in his plan. The same thing

happened when al-Mirghani was heading for Kabkabiya but he refused to accept the recommendations of the security authorities and carried on with his inspection tour. He visited Kabkabiya where organized looting, as they call it there, reached even the homes.

A province official told me: When we are notified of a looting incident, we have to find a vehicle, often a citizen's vehicle, to take us to the site. Then we have to find gas for the vehicle, often supplied by the citizens. When we get to the site and get ready to pursue the perpetrators, the citizens tell us: Give us these sticks (meaning the weapons we carry) and take these weapons to pursue the perpetrators! We will make no comment on this. Another military official told me: When Sayyid Ahmad al-Husayn was minister of interior, he asked me to go to Khartoum. There, I met with the cabinet officials and gave them a full report on the true conditions, on the people we had managed to apprehend and on the weapons we had seized and confiscated. We did our duty, and there is nothing more I can say.

The same source told me that he had accompanied Dr 'Umar Nur al-Da'im on a tour of the province and that Dr al-Da'im cut short his tour when he received information indicating that the conditions in the area he was planning to visit were serious. Dr al-Da'im obtained all the information that could help him reveal the facts to the government. But upon his return to Khartoum, we were surprised by press statements attributed to him; he spoke of the tranquil security conditions and of the absence of foreign intervention in Darfur and saying that the incidents are perpetrated by gangs that steal livestock and engage in murder. My source said: I was pained by these statements because I was with the man when he saw the abundance of weapons used in the struggle in that area and when he witnessed the worsening security conditions with his own eyes. Rather, he could have been one of the victims of these conditions if it hadn't been for God's mercy, had not the urgent message been received and had he not terminated his visit.

### Darfur Was Here

What is sad and painful is that Darfur is being lost. For every day that passes while we continue to be in this poor state of preoccupation with legislation, with disagreement over the sources of legislation, with polarization and with forming blocs; this for the sake of a narrow gain serving the interest of a concept which, to start, can stay alive and can shape our lives after we deal with our most important problems. For every day that passes, we will pay the cost in innocent lives and in a sacred struggle to regain Darfur which is disappearing before our very eyes without bidding us farewell because we are too preoccupied with expanding the assembly's legislative committee to bid Darfur farewell.

Finally, I do not wish to say that when the legislative committee completes its laws, it will find no people to legislate for and no land to which to apply the laws it legislates.

## AFGHANISTAN

### Two Islamic Forces Declare Unity With Nasr Movement

46400047a Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian  
8 Nov 88 p 2

[Text] News Service—Two Afghan operational commanders from the Provinces of Chaghcharan and Bamian, who have recently come to the Islamic Republic of Iran from the fronts of the crusade against the Russian usurpers, gave a news conference yesterday morning. They discussed the newest political changes in the nation of Afghanistan, the union of the three factions, the Nasr Organization, the Guardians of the Islamic Crusade, and the Islamic Force, and the reason for the halt to the departure of Russian forces from Afghanistan.

At the beginning of this news conference, Mr Naseri, operational commander of the Mujahidin in the Province of Chaghcharan, answered a question from a correspondent concerning clashes between Shi'ite and Sunni forces in the Province of Ghazani. He said: The commotion and rumors that have arisen concerning this clash stating that it had to do with freeing one of the areas are not true. The primary agents for these clashes were government forces and Russian agents, who are always trying in any way possible to sow discord among the Mujahidin forces. For example, they raise the issue of Shi'ism and Sunnism. Fortunately, however, the clashes have been quelled and there is no need for concern.

Concerning the union of the three factions, the Nasr Organization, the Guardians of the Islamic Crusade, and the Islamic Force, he said: This union was brought about because of a need in the Islamic revolution of Afghanistan among the Islamic forces under existing conditions, and it was on the basis of this very need that a group of officials from the Islamic forces undertook, first of all to unite Shi'ite forces, and then to create solidarity between the Shi'ites and the Sunnis.

Explaining that the union is not outside the coalition and that creation of unity is desired by all the groups, he said: Recently a plan to unite all the Shi'ite groups within Afghanistan has been proposed and so far the Mujahidin have reached complete unity in Afghanistan under the joint command of the Nasr Organization, the Guardians of the Islamic Crusade, and the Islamic Force. The other groups have taken a positive approach to joining the union, and we are waiting for their definitive answer.

He said: A union which will soon come into being between the various groups will take the form of an administrative council.

He discussed the delay in the departure of Russian forces from Afghanistan. He said: This problem is due to Russian deceitfulness. We have also doubted the truthfulness of the Russians from the beginning, and we knew that they would not carry out their promises.

He also said that Moscow's decision to halt the departure of its forces from Afghanistan was for the purpose of protecting Moscow's agents in Afghanistan, and to prevent the collapse and disintegration of the current government of Afghanistan.

He noted that in any case the Afghan fighters will continue their crusade, and that if the foreign forces do not want to leave Afghanistan on their own accord, they will be driven out by force.

Mr Elhami, operational commander of the Mujahidin in Panjab Province, also noted that during the last 10 years Russia has brought whatever power it had to bear in Afghanistan and has never wanted to use all its resources. Despite this, the Muslim combative people of Afghanistan have not backed down a bit in the face of the Russian usurpers, and this very thing has caused the Russians to despair and brought them to a dead end.

He was asked a question concerning the plan of Pakistan and Hejaz to hold a conference in Mecca to form a coalition government. He answered: We will not accept any government that exists among those pawns of the East and the West or is affiliated with them. We only want Islamic rule in which Shi'ite and Sunni brothers participate in harmony and unity, far from the domination of foreigners.

He said: We believe that the freedom of Afghanistan is possible only in the shadow of the unity of all the Shi'ite and Sunni brothers of this nation. It was for this purpose that the Coalition Council proposed the formation of a revolutionary council composed of the leaders of all Shi'ite and Sunni groups.

### Hekmatyar On Elections, Soviet Troop Withdrawal

46400047b Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian  
8 Nov 88 p 2

[Text] The spokesman for the seven-member coalition of Afghan guerrillas in Peshawar and chief of the Islamic party during a London press conference expressed confidence that the long struggle of the guerrillas will soon bear results.

He predicted that the Najibullah government will fall in the near future, and probably prior to the departure of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

Based on this report, as broadcast by BBC, Hekmatyar said with assurance that the Soviet Union has now understood the reality that it has no choice but to implement the Geneva Accord, and that for this reason it will take its troops out of Afghanistan by the 15 February of next year, the deadline for the withdrawal of its forces.

With regard to the more powerful missiles that the Soviets have recently sent to help the government of Afghanistan, Hekmatyar said: The Soviets cannot solve their problems with advanced missiles.

He said: The main problem the Soviets have in Afghanistan is that the soldiers of this country do not consider themselves obligated to protect the current regime.

The Chief of the Islamic Party said: The only use for these powerful missiles is in a war of cities such as in the Iran-Iraq war. However, in a war with guerrillas such as the Mujahidin, missiles of this type are clearly useless.

He added: In his view, the result of the Pakistan elections, whatever it may be, cannot affect the outcome of the Mujahidin struggles. He added that victory is near.

He said that the predictions of an internal war among the various Mujahidin groups in the future are without basis.

Continuing his remarks, Mr Hekmatyar discussed the decision of the Afghan guerrillas to form a council. He said that the form and shape of the future government and the parliament of Afghanistan will be determined by this council. However, the eight-member coalition of Afghan Shi'ite parties in Tehran completely rejected Mr Hekmatyar's proposed plan.

Concerning the opposition of the Shi'ite coalition to his proposed council, Mr Hekmatyar said: We have reached agreement on the plan to hold elections, form an elected council and the establishment of the future government of Afghanistan by the council affiliated with the entire nation.

We expect all the classes of the nation, all the parties and all the groups to help us with this plan, which is the only solution to the Afghanistan crisis, and not to oppose us.

We expect the brothers whose offices are in Iran to agree with the elections plan. Hekmatyar was asked, since they have no part to play in these elections, how can they agree with the plan? He answered: Elections take place domestically and every individual in the nation takes part in the elections, and no one has been blocked from participation. Anyone can freely take part in these elections. We are sending a delegation to Iran to reach an understanding with these friends so that they will come and take part in the elections. Anyone can be a candidate in these elections.

We need an elected government. Coups d'etat can be prevented with an elected government. We expect the parties who are serving their nation and who want a free, independent and Islamic Afghanistan to help with our election plan, not to stir up apprehension against it, to cooperate so that as soon as possible we can hold elections in Afghanistan and it will have an elected council.

Hekmatyar was asked, the Soviet Union believes that the Afghan Mujahidin continue to receive aid from the United States and Pakistan, and that as long as this continues, the Soviet Union cannot leave Afghanistan. What do you say about this?

He said: I do not think the Russians are serious in their declaration of a halt to their withdrawal from Afghanistan. Perhaps this is simply a ploy to pressure Pakistan in order to solve this problem.

Hekmatyar was asked about the Soviet claim that the Mujahidin are still receiving military aid from Pakistan and that this is a violation of the Geneva Accord. He said: Naturally this is a baseless claim, and we deny it. As long as the Russians are in Afghanistan we will not deal with the problem of arms. Our arms problem will be solved in the trenches. It will be solved in the future in the same way it has been solved until now. We are fighting them with Russian arms, and these are weapons which have been taken on the battlefield.

In the last few weeks we have captured about 100 military vehicles.

## INDIA

**Dissension in Bengal Congress Party**  
*46240003a Calcutta RAVIVAR in Hindi*  
*8 Oct 88 pp 24-29*

[Article by Satyendrapratap Singh: "West Bengal Congress (I) Party Examined"]

[Excerpt] The West Bengal Congress Party (I) is the only party branch in the country which has remained confined within itself for the last decade. The separatism that is prevalent among Congress' members cannot even be properly termed factionalism. It is like the existence of several parties within one party, each with their own camps, organizations, and maneuvers. The only reason is its being deprived of power at the state level continuously for a long time. On the other hand, no doubt as Mamta Banerjee, a parliamentarian, says, the congress needs a full time chairman who can look into the organizational matters devotedly. The following is a specimen of the critical condition of Bengal Congress presented by Satyendra Pratap Singh.

Politically, the Congress Party of Bengal is a peculiar entity. It is unique. It cannot be compared with any other state's Congress Party in the country. Even after securing 42 percent votes it is sitting in the opposition, while on the other hand, with 39 percent votes the Marxist Communist Party [CPM] has been ruling over the state for the last eleven years. Why? In reply, a congress legislator and former central minister Saugat Roy said "Even after getting 49.99 per cent of votes we cannot come into power unless there is dissension in the left front." The CPM comes in power with the help of the Forward Block, Communist Party, and Revolutionary

Socialist Party". Perhaps Saugat Roy does not know that the CPM has been trouncing undauntedly the Forward Block in Cooch Bihar, the CPI in Midnapur, and the RSP in Murshidabad and some areas of south 24-Parganas. It is the CPM that decided who from among the three other parties is chosen to be minister. If the CPM wins the election with the help of these three parties and forms a government, why do they not withdraw from the left front? In answer to this question the Secretary-general of the state congress Soumen Mitra said, "The left and the right fronts form two axes, how can they joint together?" But when he was asked, "What do you have to say about the connivance between Subrata Mukherjee of your own party and Jyoti Basu? Most of the legislators of your own party have made this allegation openly. What kind of axis is this?", Mr Mitra had no other recourse but just to smile. [passage omitted]

Subrato Mukherjee, in the midst of allegations, had the following statements to make, "I prefer to speak for myself than for the party. I am not in favor of negative politics, but I support bandhs and strikes. I have watched power from close quarters and have experienced power personally. I have been the opposition chief whip for 5 years. I am president of the INTUC [Indian Trade Union Council]. There are still some two hundred cases against me. If one wants to strengthen the party he has to go to the blocks and districts and work there. But if one gets a post just by going to Delhi why will he go to the blocks and districts after all?"

Subrata Mukherjee immediately starts talking about the leadership, "The Priyaranjan Committee is doing better work than the Ajit Panja's Committee. Ajit Panja may be said to be a practical man. As a matter of fact it was we who had raised the slogan 'Long live Indira-Priya (ranjan) [love to Indira]. We know how useful Priya is. Had Pranav Mukherjee continued as the Congress chief, we would have formed the government in 1987 and if not, decidedly in 1992. With the passing of time he has been evolving as an alternative to Jyoti Basu."

There can be no comparison with Ashok Dev in the Chatra Prishad (Students Council). He is running a separate organization within the INTUC with just four people including Devi Ghoshal and Mamta Banerjee whom I had ousted. Devi Ghoshal, however, will not be able to win the next election. Most of the closed industries are in his parliamentary constituency. Mamta is displeased with me, behind which is her woman like jealousy, as you will find among women. There is a girl student of journalism at Calcutta University, Tanushree Dey. I had sent her to Italy for training in child welfare. Mamta thought that I was patronizing Tanushree in order to counter her. Tanushree is such a sharp girl." [passage omitted]

Abdus Sattar, the leader of the congress group in the state legislature, has ultimately taken a decision to convene a meeting of the party legislators, although he had continuously been given pressure by the state Congress

Chief Dasmunshi not to do so. Nineteen Congress legislators have written to Mr Sattar requesting the meeting. The agenda is to express confidence in the chief whip and to analyze the present political situation. Among the signatories are Sudeep Bandopadhyay and Saugat Roy of Priyaranjan Dasmunshi faction and Dr Sudipto Roy of Asit Panja's faction. Those, who have not signed but have supported the move indirectly, include Soumen Mitra, Satyaranjan Bapuli, Govinda Nashkar, and Arun Goswami, etc. Actually 37 of the 40 legislators are either against Priyaranjan or are neutral. Abdus Sattar states, "At the request of one-third of the legislators, however, the meeting had to be convened". And then, the telephone rang outside. Mr Sattar spoke in Bengali, "Thirty-six legislators have been united. What difference will Dasmunshi's directives make? If I do not convene the meeting they will oust me".

Subrato Mukherjee wrote a letter to Dasmunshi on the 13th September. He wrote in the letter that it was being sent only to him. The letter was marked highly confidential. He said he would wait for the answer for four days. Mr Mukherjee writes in the letter, "I am fed up with the dirty politics of the legislative party. The people responsible for this are the chief whip and Ashfaq. Ashfaq is no more than an ordinary paid worker but he is managing a store-house of dirty politics. In this situation, it has become impossible for me to fulfill my obligations. Even Ambika Banerjee, the secretary of the legislative party, is kept in darkness on almost all the matters. Under such a circumstance I will be the last person to stay in the party. At least I cannot stay at the cost of my prestige and honor. If you are not able to do anything in this regard please direct me accordingly so that I may tender my resignation". When Mr Mukherjee was asked, "you wrote this letter on September 13 but you had gone to see the speaker of the legislative assembly with your letter of resignation on 9 September. Most of the Congress legislators say that speaker of the assembly belongs to the CPM, so why did Mr Mukherjee go to him and not to Mr Sattar or Dasmunshi?", Subrato Mukherjee replied, "The people who say so should have enough sense to know that the incident is related to the legislative assembly and the speaker is the highest and most neutral person sitting there. I am, however, a Congressman, but please tell me is there any other person like Jyoti Basu in this state?"

The person, who has been most active in this important series of events is Sultan Ahmed. Sultan Ahmed is the first person who has been highlighting the factionism of the state Congress both in Delhi as well as in Calcutta. Sultan Ahmed had written a letter to Oscar Fernandes, the general secretary of All India Congress Committee, on 12 September. Mr Ahmed wrote in this letter, "You are aware of the recent misdeeds of Subrato Mukherjee. Now you please tell us what can we do in this situation? The image of the party has been tarnished by these acts of Subrato Mukherjee. Because of being a 'paper tiger' he creates a dilemma for all of us by frequently making statements in the newspapers. Most of the legislators are



against Subrato Mukherjee. When Mr Mukherjee was removed from the position of chief whip most of the legislators had openly supported the move. He is a chairman of the Public Accounts Committee. He does whatever he is told to do by the left front. He has participated in only eight meetings out of thirty-four, but, he put his signature without fail. He was elected to the senate of Calcutta University with the help of the CPM. The insult meted out to the chief whip Mr Sohan Pal is an insult to the Congress. If a work stoppage or a bye election takes place Subrato leaves Bengal. What has he done for the party? You are requested to please arrange for an appropriate action in this regard. We will wait for your directives". A copy of this letter signed by nineteen legislators was even taken to Delhi by the legislator Saugat Roy.

It is to be noted that out of a handful of Dasmunshi's associates even Sudeep Bandopadhyay and Saugat Roy have opposed him. In the fight for justice they have joined Soumen Mitra, Sultan Ahmed, and Mamta Banerjee. Dasmunshi got another jolt when his old friend Kumud Bhattacharya resigned from the position of Congress chief of south 24-Parganas and decided to hold a separate conference. In this manner, clearly, question mark has been put after the leadership of Dasmunshi. The Bengal Congress is going to split in small fractions. One can learn the art of losing a winning game from Bengal Congress.

**Writer Examines Mamta Banerjee Leadership**  
46240003b Calcutta RAVIVAR in Hindi 8 Oct 88 p 28

[Article by Satyendrapratap Singh: "The Tigress of Bengal"]

[Text] Over the last few years the personality which has evolved rapidly in Bengal Congress is that of Mamta Banerjee. Mamta Banerjee, who was elected a member of parliament for the first time in 1984 had not defeated an ordinary person. She had defeated Barrister Somnath Banerjee, a candidate of the CPM, and that too in the stronghold of the Marxist Party. Somnath Banerjee relates, "I had seen Mamta for the first time only in November 1984. Before that I had not even heard of her name. I had gone to file my nomination papers. On my way back, outside the office of the district magistrate, a girl touched my feet and asked for my blessings. I was astonished. It was Mamta Banerjee fighting an election against me".

Mamta Banerjee is a common person in every respect. A witness is her house situated at 30B, Harsh Chatterjee Street in Calcutta. The mother of the parliamentarian Mamta Banerjee still sleeps on the floor. There is a lack of space in the house with a thatched roof. The office of Mamta is still tin-roofed. It is impossible for Mamta to be in Calcutta without a crowd of people at her office.

And the crowd is no less than that present at the office of a minister or a chief minister. Her mother Gayatri Devi is happy even in this situation. She says, "It is a situation of unique pleasure."

Mamta has a sister and six brothers. They all live together. A house of two rooms, sitting, dining, and sleeping, all in the same space. In the name of property, there is one bed, a worn-out wooden cabinet, and two chairs one of which has no handles. Gayatri Devi narrates, "In rainy days we have to dry our clothes inside by putting a cord across the room. Five brothers are still unemployed. One brother, Asim, could not study beyond the eighth grade and stayed home because there was no money to pay his fees. One brother is a hawker. There is one sister who is to get married.

At the time of her father's death Mamta was studying in a college. Only a few days ago she had taken her admission. After the father's death the economic situation of the house became unstable. She used to pay her fees with the money she received from tutoring at three or four homes. She used to hand over the rest of the money to her mother. Her father was a congressman so there used to be a crowd of people in her house. People used to assemble there. Mamta grew up in this type of environment. She says, "I receive about 1,000 rupees a month. My father had some land. Mother sold that few years ago".

From this background has evolved the tigress of Bengal. Perhaps there has not been a single zero hour in the parliament where Mamta has not roared. She is perhaps the only woman member of the parliament who has spoken eloquently on every topic right from Bofors, Fairfax, Amitabh Bachchan to the closed factories of Bengal, Rabindranath Tagore, Subhash Chandra Bose, Calcutta soccer, film world, and the television, etc. Mamta Banerjee is the only Congress member of the parliament from Bengal who showed the courage to stage a walk-out from the Lok Sabha in December 1986. The issue was a decision of the Central Government to close down two printing presses and another institute all situated in Bengal.

As a matter of fact, she is always worried about the problems of Bengal. That is why, on 4 April 1988 she raised the issue of Haldia Petrochemicals in the Lok Sabha despite pressure from the party leaders and ministers not to do so. Mamta Banerjee had also pointed out the shortages in food supplies to her state. Mamta Banerjee was also one of the 44 signatories, composed of members of the parliament from the eastern region, to the memorandum given to the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in regard to Haldia Petrochemicals. She was one of the organizing members of the signature campaign. It was also Mamta Banerjee who had convened the assembly of the members of Parliament attended by the Industries Minister Vengal Rao on 11 May. Mamta Banerjee had afterwards told Vengal Rao, "If you will not cooperate in reopening the closed factories in Bengal



I will go on a hunger strike in front of your office". Vengal Rao retorted irritatingly that if she had to go on hunger strike she should do it in front of Rajiv Gandhi's office.

On 7 September, Mamta, with others, arrived at the office of Vengal Rao with posters in her hand and started a hunger strike. Vengal Rao rushed to the spot. With respect he took Mamta with him inside his office. He told her affectionately, "Look, you are like my daughter. Why are you waging a fight against me?" Mamta replied, "I have won the election with the support of the common people. I am here for the benefit of my state. If I do not do anything for them how will I be able to face them in the next election? I take part in politics in the interest of the people and not for my own interests". Then, Venkat Rao put it emotionally, "Look, you have never come to me to serve your own interest, therefore, you don't have to tell me all these things. I appreciate your sentiments as well as your sense of duty. I will be coming to Bengal in October to have a talk with the Chief minister, members of the parliament as well as the industrialists there".

Most of the congress leaders of the state viewed it as a dramatic act. Some even went to this extent as to say that after all she had to do something to get publicity in the newspapers. At any rate, Mamta Banerjee has at least proved it that she has not fallen to politics of greed and power.

## IRAN

### **Tudeh Central Committee Members, Others Reportedly Executed**

46400040a London KEYHAN in Persian 8 Dec 88 p 1

[Text] The names of a number of members of the Tudeh Party, the People's Fedai'iyen-e Khalq and the Workers Organization (majority) who have been executed were announced. The total number of this group was 200, of which 31 were members of the Tudeh Party and had been in jail since 1361 [21 March 1982-20 March 1983].

The names of the members of the central committee of the Tudeh Party who were executed are: Manuchehr Behzadi (director of MARDOM newspaper), Dr Hoseyn Judat, Esma'il Zolqadr, Baqerzadeh and Farajollah Mizani.

Others who were executed were: Amir Nika'in (writer and theoretician of the party), Mehrdad Farjad (in charge of Party propaganda), Dr Ahmad Danesh-Shari'at, Akhgar, Dr Borzu Baqa'i, Seyyed Roghani, Saber, Asef, Qalambar, Major Shamsi, Mohammad Bigdeli, Ra'fat Mohammadzadeh, Amir Hushang Nazemi, Hedayatollah Hatami, Sasan Qandi, 'Ezzatollah Razi, Fari-borz Salehi, Farzad Daghdar, Dr Garjani and Col Sey-follah Jasvand. (We do not have the names of six others who were executed.)

According to another report we have received from Iran, last week, two young men, Seyyed Rahim (21 years old) and Seyyed Hasan (23 years old), who had been arrested in Quchan a year ago for activities against the regime and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, were taken out of Quchan Prison and executed along with 30 others.

The above mentioned were executed in Tehran, Amol, Borujerd and Hamadan. Many of them were publicly hanged.

There are no reports on the fate of Nureddin Kianuri and Ehsan Tabari, the two well-known leaders of the Tudeh Party.

### **Demonstrations Reported in Qom, Mashhad**

46400040e London KEYHAN in Persian 8 Dec 88 p 2

[Text] Last Wednesday, the supporters of Grand Ayatollah Golpayegani and Tabataba'i engaged in massive demonstrations in Qom and Mashhad. These two grand ayatollahs are under house arrest, the first in Qom and the second in Mashhad. Since a year ago, the son and daughter-in-law of Ayatollah Qomi have also been in jail. A number of clerics opposing the Khomeyni regime have escalated the unrest of the people in the religious cities.

### **Involvement of Hashemi-Rafsanjani in Dr Sami's Death Reported**

46400040b London KEYHAN in Persian  
8 Dec 88 pp 1, 14

[Text] In Tehran, the interment ceremonies for Dr Kazem Sami unexpectedly turned into a gathering of support for Ayatollah Montazeri. A large number of the supporters of Engineer Bazargan and his Freedom Movement also gathered at the Hoseyniyyeh Ershad (located on Old Shemiran Road). Dr Sami was the minister of health in the Bazargan Cabinet. The seats were filled at his memorial service in the Hoseyniyyeh Ershad, and the large number of people gathered outside the Hoseyniyyeh caused a traffic jam on Shemiran Road.

Mrs Sami, the wife of the murdered physician, said: One of the attackers at the office, who looked like a Hezbol-lah, held a colt revolver in his hand, threw me into the bathroom and stood guard at the door so that his colleagues could murder the doctor. He threatened that if I reported it to the police within an hour, he would kill me as well. But I could not endure it, and after they left, I shouted and called people to help.

Dr Sami was attacked on Thursday afternoon and died the following Saturday morning. From the moment he was taken to Pars Hospital, physicians held little hope for his recovery. One of the blows to his brain in particular was so severe that it appeared that the attacker had twisted a knife in the doctor's brain afterwards.

Ayatollah Montazeri and Mir Hoseyn Musavi were the first persons to offer condolences for the murder of Dr Sami. The officials of the Freedom Movement insisted that his body be kept until they could perform proper funeral ceremonies for him. However, the officials of the Islamic Republic vehemently opposed this proposal, and police ordered the body to be buried immediately. Nevertheless, according to reports from Tehran and quoting passengers arriving in London last week, more than 100,000 people gathered in Ebn-e Baboyeh for his interment ceremonies. He was buried next to the grave of Hasan Shamschiri and close to his mother's grave. 'Ezatollah Sahabi prayed over his body. But, for a long time after the conclusion of the ceremonies, the crowd shouted slogans in demonstration of their support for Montazeri and Bazargan.

#### There Was Talk of His Premiership

From the time the position of Mir Hoseyn Musavi was threatened, in the nonclerical political circles of Tehran, the name of Dr Sami was mentioned as the next prime minister. Among the strong supporters of this move was Sheykh Hoseyn'ali Montazeri. Incidentally, Dr Sami was murdered just two days after he had gone to Qom to meet with Ayatollah Montazeri.

Ayatollah Khomeyni had expressed his interest in the premiership of another supporter of Engineer Bazargan, Dr 'Ezatollah Sahabi. But he had made certain conditions which go against the nature of the Islamic Republic. Among these were holding free elections and freeing all political prisoners. For this reason, they refused to negotiate with him. The supporters of Montazeri and Engineer Bazargan claim that the murder of Dr Sami was planned by Hashemi-Rafsanjani and is undoubtedly part of an intense battle among various political factions, which has escalated with the worsening of Khomeyni's condition. Experts say that Rafsanjani intends to put an end to his greatest rival (Montazeri) while Khomeyni is alive and still supporting him. In Iran, those who follow the events have no doubt whatsoever that Rafsanjani is attempting to implement two major plans: first, to replace Khomeyni himself and, second, to become president, so that at the time Ayatollah Montazeri is to succeed Khomeyni, he will leave no room for Montazeri to do so.

According to the LONDON TIMES, a well-known Iranian who arrived in London last week told Hozhabr Teymurian, the reporter of that newspaper: "The situation in Iran is extremely critical. The government has itself realized that it has failed in all areas and, for this reason, has completely lost heart. Now, various factions are fighting each other to ensure a strong foothold for themselves after Khomeyni's death. For example, the rate of the pound, which is 124 rials [as published] officially and had reached approximately 120 toman, has risen once again and is being exchanged at 200 toman."

Rafsanjani and Khamene'i, who have always been rivals, have now formed a united front against Montazeri. Meanwhile, Hojjat ol-Eslam Ahmad Khomeyni, who has a great deal of influence in the Majlis, controls Hojjat ol-Eslam 'Ali Akbar Mohtashami, the minister of the interior, through his supporters. In Tehran, everyone is awaiting the dismissal of Musavi, and as far as many are concerned, he has already been dismissed. Meanwhile, no one pays attention to the crucial fact that the population of Iran has grown from 36 million to 53 million during the past 10 years.

#### Montazeri Reportedly Expresses Abhorrence at Violence in IRI

46400040c London KEYHAN in Persian 8 Dec 88 p 2

[Text] Ayatollah Montazeri sent a message of condolences to the father of Dr Kazem Sami, in which he expressed his abhorrence at the strangulation that governs Iran. The leaders of the Islamic Republic blame the murder on the opponents of the regime, and Rafsanjani said: This tragedy might have a political motivation. 'Ali Akbar Mohtashemi also announced that a number of suspicious persons have been arrested. Mohtashemi named the Mojahedin-e Khalq as the perpetrators of this murder.

#### Work To Resume on Natural Gas Pipeline

46000030b Abu Dhabi GULF NEWS in English  
9 Nov 88 p 15

[Text] Nicosia (Reuter)—Iran will resume work soon on a pipeline to carry natural gas to the Soviet Union and Europe, the official Iranian news agency IRNA said.

It quoted the KAYHAN newspaper as saying on Monday the National Iranian Oil Company and the Italian firm Saipem had agreed to continue the Igat-2 project, suspended in 1985.

Building the last 20 percent of the pipeline to the Soviet Union and repairing corroded parts of Igat-2 in the central Iranian province of Esfahan would take nearly a year, said IRNA, monitored in Nicosia.

The pipeline was designed to carry 27 billion cubic meters of gas each year of which 17 billion cubic meters would be exported through northern Iran to the Soviet Union and Europe.

"Reports also indicate Iran will hold talks with the Soviet Union to study resumption of gas exports," said IRNA.

It said current Iranian gas production was insufficient to supply Igat-2, but the pipeline would be able to operate after completion of the Kangan-Nar gas complex in the Gulf coastal province of Bushehr.

**Second International Airport Planned for Tehran**  
*46400050b London KEYHAN in Persian 1 Dec 88 p 4*

[Text] In the future Tehran will have another international airport, which will be able to serve about 30 million passengers annually. Tehran's second international airport will be called Haftom-e Tir. Experts in the National Airline Organization announced that this airport and Mehrabad airport will meet the capitol's travel needs for the next 50 years.

Recently the chief of the National Airline Organization announced that currently 9,000 million rials have been allocated for the preliminary construction of Tehran's second international airport. The chief of the National Airline Organization, while announcing the news of the construction of Tehran's second airport, noted that Iran now has 30 airports at various points.

**New Imports Guide Announced**  
*46400050a Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 28 Nov 88 p 2*

[Text] News Department—The executive guidelines for goods imported without transferring foreign exchange from the Ministry of Commerce were announced.

Following the announcement of lifting import restrictions from certain goods needed by society, the executive guidelines for goods imported without transferring foreign exchange were also published.

Based on these guidelines, all real and salaried persons with Iranian citizenship may import goods without transferring foreign exchange by submitting the necessary documents annually for name registration to the centers for the procurement and distribution of goods.

In these guidelines, the minimum age for importers is set at 18 years.

The Ministry of Commerce Public Relations Office reports that during the stages of order registration, import and release from customs, the documents needed for annual registration to import goods include original bank transfers for 2,000 rials to register at each center, photocopies of public notices of business establishment in an official newspaper, photocopies of public notices of the latest changes in salaried persons, and originals and photocopies of documents pertaining to military service status for men.

Those with commercial cards, while being exempt from submitting the needed documents, may import goods merely by presenting the original and a photocopy of the commercial card and paying the registration fee at centers where they are not members.

The above guidelines have four general sections with 39 paragraphs and notes. The text follows:

**Documents and Conditions To Register Importers**

1—All real and salaried persons with Iranian citizenship may import goods without transferring foreign exchange by submitting the documents below annually for name registration to the centers for the procurement and distribution of goods.

—Written application for membership in the center.

—Submission of original identification card and a photocopy of the first page (if there have been corrections, a photocopy of the last page).

—Submission of the original and a photocopy of the first and second pages of the economic mobilization booklet.

—Submission of originals and photocopies of documents pertaining to military service status (for men).

Note: Missing and fugitive persons eligible for military conscription may not import goods without the transfer of foreign exchange.

—The minimum age for importers is 18 years.

—An original bank transfer for 2,000 rials must be presented at each center for registration.

—Two recent photographs.

—Submission of photocopies of public notices of business establishment in an official newspaper and photocopies of public notices of the latest changes in salaried persons.

2—There are no restrictions on registering at more than one center.

3—Those with commercial cards, while being exempt from submitting the needed documents, may import goods merely by presenting the original and a photocopy of the commercial card and paying the registration fee at centers where they are not members.

**Stages of Registering Import Orders, Releasing Goods**

1—Completion of the center's order registration form and the submission of the necessary materials include the following minimum information:

—Name and description of goods.

—Quantity or amount.

—Net and gross weight.

—The FOB and CIF prices of the goods.

—Name of country and selling and producing companies.

—Origin of shipment and customs destination of goods.

2—Submission of a bank transfer for 3,000 rials for acceptance of order registration.

3—Procurement of the authorizations required as indicated in the list of announced goods.

4—Order registration at the center and procurement of authorization to import.

—The authorization to import goods expires three months from the date of issue, and the applicant must open a paper credit account in the domestic banking system within this period, or the authorized goods must reach the nation's customs system in this period.

Note: If the authorized import period expires, it may be extended with a new application, and the commission will be collected again.

—The commission for registering orders at the centers is one percent of the CIF value of the merchandise at the official foreign exchange rate.

Note One: If the prices given for the goods are less than the common prices confirmable by the center, the basis for calculation will be the center's price.

Note Two: The minimum commission to be collected is 3,000 rials.

Note Three: Commissions collected are not refundable under any circumstances.

5—Within a month after the goods arrive importers must report to customs with the warehouse receipt to obtain authorization for release of the goods from the appropriate center. There is a 45-day period in which customs release may be obtained, and this period may be extended for 15 days after expiration.

#### Other Matters

1—The goods imported are exempt from distribution and pricing requirements.

2—Importers may import the announced goods in any quantity for which they have the resources and desire by obtaining the import authorization.

3—The centers for procurement and distribution must publish the numbers of permits issued for public information in the newspaper AMAR according to the categories below:

The range and description of the goods, the authorizations to register orders issued, the authorizations to release goods, along with their quantities and dollar amounts.

4—The correlation of the kinds of imported goods requested with the groups of goods announced is the responsibility of the Ministry of Commerce.

5—It is necessary to observe the regulations for the announced standards and the nation's health laws in import the announced goods.

6—The centers must refrain from issuing permits to import goods of low quality.

7—In instances where the goods in the import application have no previous import record or their quality cannot be confirmed, if necessary the centers may obtain the necessary affidavit or authorization from the appropriate organizations.

8—The centers must act on applications for import permits no more than 4 days after they are received.

9—In the event of disagreements between the centers and the applicants, the deciding authority will be the Committee to Study and Monitor the Import of Goods without the Transfer of Foreign Exchange located in the Ministry of Commerce, and the opinions of this committee are binding on the centers.

#### The List of Goods:

1—Rice: The profit margin for each kilogram of imported rice is 25 rials.

2—Goods used for animal husbandry: Livestock and poultry feed, dried milk, animal husbandry accessories, animal husbandry medicines, and accessories and substances used for livestock veterinary medicine.

3—Goods used in agriculture: Seed, pesticides, fertilizer, flower bulbs, cuttings and seedlings.

Conditions for allocation: Imports of flower bulbs, cuttings and seedlings will be authorized individually by the Ministry of Agriculture.

4—Fishing supplies: Fishing hooks and nets, thread for making fishing nets, and devices to weave fishing nets.

5—Office supplies: Pencils, pencil sharpeners, erasers, mechanical pencils, tape, and 95 X 72 plain office paper.

6—Medical supplies: Allocation of imports is subject to approval from the Ministry of Health, Health Care and Medical Education.

7—Published goods: Books, publications, catalogs, maps, documents and papers, shredders, slides and training films.

Conditions for allocation: Imports of these goods, except shredders, is subject to authorization from the Ministry of Islamic Guidance.

**Comments on 'Positive' Results of U.S. Embassy Occupation**

46400039b Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 3 Nov 88 p 18

[Article by 'Ali Nazari]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

1. The strength of the Imam's line and the religious events in the early days of the revolution. The leftist and pro-leftist groups who lined up against the revolution and the people in the next stages, instead of aiming their weapons at the United States, used the same weapons to tear open the chests of the people. With the special tricks and tactics that they chose, they consistently tried to inculcate in the society the idea that in the revolutionary society, only these gentlemen have the ability to stand against the United States and mysteriously spread the rumor that the religious movements and factions, because of their religious beliefs, lacked the practical potential and power to fight the United States. The same gentlemen, after the occupation of the Spy Nest, tried to call the students following the line of the Imam the pioneers of the nation. But this occupation of the Spy Nest made the people realize that the idea that can crack the false grandeur and prestige of the United States is the idea of 15 Khordad [5 June] that is manifested in the Imam and the committed clerics, and that this valuable step by the Muslim students following the line of the Imam was the reason for the end of the domestic chaos and solved the problems of the minigroups.

2. Another constructive positive effect of the occupation of the U.S. Embassy was the **breakdown of the "myth of the invulnerability of the United States."** Until then, few revolutionary and popular forces in the world dared to protest and attack the interests of the United States. The prestige of the supposed invulnerability of the superpowers, which had combined with special propaganda to aggrandize the power of the West and create fear and inferiority in the Third World countries, had created the belief in the minds of the oppressed and Muslim nations that this group of countries by no means had the ability to confront the United States. For this reason, this proud, guiding action of the students revealed the vulnerability and weakness of the United States in the face of the will of a Muslim nation.

3. Another point was the **defeat and dissolution of the leftist Marxist and non-Marxist movements**, the leftist and so-called progressive slogans of which appeared composed and dignified before the occupation of the Nest. Sometimes, by means of this public deception, they attracted a number of uninformed, sincere Muslims to their organizations. However, the conquest of the Nest better exposed the boundaries between the religious and nonreligious factions, and it became obvious that the same leftist groups had been put at the service of the right wing factions to fight the Islamic Republic, and they took refuge in France and the capitalist bloc.

Among the positive effects and results of the occupation of the Nest, the **void of a strong foreign ministry**, which in fact implements the revolutionary policies of the Islamic Republic, can be pointed out, because the individuals who had been placed in charge of the foreign ministry lacked the ideological standards that conformed to the Imam's line, and none of them had the competence necessary to devise and implement the foreign policy of our regime, which benefits from the ideological and progressive goals of exporting the revolution and revitalizing anti-colonialist thinking in the Islamic world. The conquest of the Nest precisely showed the world and the Islamic world the diplomatic position of the Islamic Republic and, in fact, filled the void signified by the lack of an active, ideological foreign ministry.

4. Another point is the **strengthening of student movements**, as the start of the Islamic struggles in the universities to confront the conspiracies of the minigroups and the counterrevolutionaries, in other words, the preservation and protection of the Islamic goals and authentic values of the movement in the universities. Hence, we must understand that the war against the United States is an overall multidimensional one and, as the Imam stated in the charter of the revolution, "as long as there is oppression and injustice in the world, there will be struggle, and as long as there is struggle, we will be there." Serious and violent struggle against global oppressors is one of the distinct, strategic principles of the revolution, and any sort of reduction or modification of it is like burying our ideological values and goals.

The marking of 13 Aban [4 November] in the history of the heroism and self-sacrifice of the Islamic revolution as the "day of national struggle against global oppression headed by the United States" is the preface to a lasting struggle directed against the interests of the United States throughout the world, and its ratification into law by the honorable representatives of the Majles, in fact, devises the national strategy of the regime of the Islamic Republic to fight the principle of domination and unequal relations in the world.

**Article Comments on Western Anti-Iranian Positions**

46400039a Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 3 Nov 88 p 18

[Article by 'Ali Hoseynpanah]

[Text] The purpose of the new column, "Foreign Media and Iran," is to evaluate the reactions of the foreign presses, radios and televisions to the changes and events in Iran. Today, the mass media of the world feeds, forms and provokes public opinion. The mass media is used particularly by the West as a lever to propagate the ideology and culture of the oppressive system and of capitalism, as well as to fight against the critics and enemies of that system.

Following the victory of the Islamic Revolution, and at its various junctures and stages, Iran has gained an important position and enjoyed wide coverage in the world mass media. News reports and analyses concerning Iran in the past decade have often been placed ahead of other world issues by the Western mass media and that of many other regions. Issues concerning the struggle of the heroic Muslim nation of Iran against the corrupt, pro-U.S. regime of the shah in its various stages; the victory of the revolution; the occupation of the U.S. Spy Nest; the fall of the transitional pro-Western government; the elections at different junctures; the start and spread of the war of Iraq against Iran; the changes on the arena of the war; the liberation of Khorramshahr; the repeated military operations of Iran to take over control of Iraqi territory from the military of that country; the assassinations and executions of and domestic and foreign conspiracies against the Islamic revolution; the Iran-Contra affair and events related to it; the military expedition and aggressive maneuvers of the members of the NATO alliance in the Persian Gulf; the U.S. aggression on Iranian waters, soil and oil platforms; the events of the bloody Friday in Mecca; the downing of the Iranian passenger plane by the U.S. occupying naval ship; the acceptance of Resolution 598 by Iran; and many other events each placed the name of "Iran" at the head of the world events and news.

Meanwhile, the Western mass media has consistently maintained its hostile, "anti-Iranian" position against the Islamic revolution and the interests of the heroic nation of Iran. In their analyses, Western political officials, distinguished personalities and media have continued their incessant efforts to distort Iran and the Islamic revolution. Without a doubt, the Western propaganda machine has greatly harmed the interests and existence of our country, and "propaganda" has been the preliminary tool for justifying all the aggression of global oppressors, imperialism and Zionism against the Islamic revolution and the interests of Iran.

As a step in exposing the content and direction of the Western propaganda machine in particular and the foreign media in general with regard to Iran, we have begun a new column entitled, "Foreign Media and Iran," which will regularly be published on Thursdays and in which the most important positions of the radios, televisions, and presses of other countries of the world regarding Iran will be critically evaluated. Of course, the constructive criticism and opinions of our readers can be very helpful to us.

#### **Other Geneva Talks and the 'Anti-Iranian' Positions of the West**

The start of the third round of talks in Geneva this week is the most important news item concerning Iran to which the world is paying attention. The French news agency writes in an analysis of this issue: It is unlikely that the deadlock in the Iran-Iraq talks will be broken in

the third round of negotiations. The only likely result of this round of discussions will be the stabilization of the state of "neither war nor peace" between the two countries.

Western political circles and media usually mention the reasons for the deadlock in the Iran-Iraq peace negotiations to be Iraq's inclination to resort to its military capability or "historical differences." The members of the Security Council have apparently announced their support for the initiatives of the secretary general. However, the truth is that the dominant inclinations of the West against Iran and resorting to the threat of the "resumption of the war" are the main causes of this negotiation deadlock.

The West is inclined to put more pressure on Iran to give more political, economic and ideological concessions. The disruptions of the peace talks by Iraq have been given the "green light" by Washington. The regime of Iraq is also internally in need of a gain from the war. For this reason, Iraq is unable to base a solution to the conflicts between the two countries on the agreement that has been torn to pieces and declared as invalid from the viewpoint of the Iraqi nation. Hence, Iraq certainly needs to change the 1975 agreement, even if the text of that very agreement is devised and ratified without any changes.

Western reaction to this political behavior of Iraq is one of encouragement. In the Arab political circles, particularly in Iraq and Kuwait, it is said that George Shultz, the U.S. secretary of state, announced last month in talks with the Iraqi foreign minister that the United States no longer supports the 1975 Algerian agreement as a basis of the solution to the Iran-Iraq border disputes.

Also, one of the U.S. under secretaries of state Edward Drwinski, in an interview recently supported Iraq's plan to change the course of the "Arvandrud" River, mentioning it as a permanent solution to the border disputes between the two neighboring countries, and proposed to Iraq the signing of an agreement with U.S. companies to carry out the above mentioned project.

Another indication of the encouragement given by the Western circles and global oppressors to Iraq for its "anti-Iranian" positions is the position taken by countries such as Japan and Italy. Long before announcing their disinterest in continuing the completion of the Iran and Japan petrochemical project, the Japanese informed Iraq of their position. Before everyone else, Iraqi political circles broadcast the news of the disinclination of the plundering Japanese company, Mitsui of Japan, to continue the project in such a way as to suggest that Japan had changed its mind regarding the pursuit of this project upon the request of Iraq. This position of Japan, in addition to submitting to domineering objectives, indicates the inclination of that country to pressure Iran

to be more flexible towards the Western imperialist-reactionary complex. They take advantage of Iraq's disruptions of the peace talks to threaten Iran and demand concessions from our country.

The mistake that has misguided Iraq and the West stems from their short-term evaluation of the condition of the region. They have apparently disregarded the fact that the strategic factors for building power are on the side of Iran, and the conditions at the present stage are very transient and unstable. From the point of view of population, area, economic capacity, geopolitical importance, importance in the spiritual and material balance of the world, and also many domestic factors, Iran is best situated for power in this region. The small countries in the region, including Iraq, must abandon the idea that they will be able to maintain their hostile position against Iran for long. The frenzied leaders of Iraq, along with those who encourage them in the imperialist-reactionary complex of the world, must remember this ancient proverb: Those who "live in the sea must get along with the whale." Certainly those who have decided to live in the Middle East, especially the Persian Gulf, for long must get along with Iran and give up their impudence and dreams of power that will only end in regret. They must open the way to the retribution of the rights of Iran, punishment of the regime of Iraq and compensation for our damages.

Otherwise, it will certainly be the combative people of Iran who will determine their desired victory.

#### **Paper Comments on Improper Behavior of Turkish Officials**

46400048 Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian  
24 Nov 88 pp 1, 11

[Text] Almost a month ago an element of the terrorist hypocrite organization in Turkey attacked several of our country's diplomats in this country. Due to police intervention the incident acquired new and unexpected dimensions. As a result of police protection for the assailant and in reality for the hypocrites, as well as the poisoned atmosphere that this nation's press has created against the Islamic Republic of Iran, Turkey's political officials have not only prevented the extradition of the criminal, they also took ill-considered and unworthy measures, including the expulsion of two diplomats from the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Turkey, the arrest of two visiting diplomats, and the arrest of several Iranians, including a woman and a child who had nothing to do with the incident, even by the admission of the Turkish police.

These incidents are taking place at a time when Turkish officials are making no secret of their government's eagerness to take part in Iran's post-war reconstruction. Therefore, in the wake of this incident the respected officials of our nation must certainly take a second look at the kind of relations we have with Turkey, because political relations between countries must follow principles and rules, and deviation from several or one of these

principles amounts to a deficiency in the whole and it will undermine the ties and contacts. Unfortunately, it can be seen that some countries, including Turkey, alter these principles, and it appears that if it were not for the unilateral good will, tolerance, and continuous effort by the officials of our country, without a doubt relations would have cooled by now and drifted into indifference and oblivion. It is therefore appropriate that these respected officials ignore the evil diplomatic note as long as the other side has not proven its friendship in practice; this is not worthy or permissible, notwithstanding the errors and violations of others. Although we also believe that participation in custom and culture and the longevity of familiarity and friendship carry special requirements of their own, and that one must take the initiative in carrying them out, Turkey, despite the Islamic Republic's friendly and amicable relations in many instances, has disregarded the most important principles needed for perpetuating and sustaining good relations. Turkey has viciously interfered in Iran's domestic affairs, and every time the officials of the Islamic Republic have mentioned these violations to the Turkish side, they have merely apologized without changing their behavior. Yet the volume and kind of these errors, which are committed deliberately and passionately, are too extensive to be forgotten with an apology without serious measures to prevent their repetition.

The list of Turkey's violations is a long one which has brought political relations between Turkey and Iran to a sensitive stage approaching the breaking point. These violations have a 10-year history, because the day after the triumph of the Islamic Revolution a handful of fleeing political losers established themselves in Turkey near the border and carried out destructive and counter-revolutionary activities, while the Turkish government not only failed to put any kind of obstacle in their way, it also made facilities available to them. Of course it seemed strange that the leaders of Turkey would tie their own interests and those of their country to the fate of persons who had been driven away by a nation and an historic revolution. Can this have any meaning other than the absence of good will? In any case, despite the ups and downs in relations between the two countries, Turkish officials have never hastened to show their good will. Perhaps the excessive good will of the Islamic Republic's officials has given them illusions.

In the last few years Turkish publications have been full of futile and horrifying articles by writers without the slightest knowledge or intelligence who think they are trying to stop the wave of "revival of Islamic thought." For this reason they have subjected Islam and the Islamic Republic to the most withering attacks, and although the existence of this weak and degenerate opposition is itself the best witness to the Islamic Republic's righteousness, since these propaganda attacks can undermine the friendly relations between the two countries, Turkish political officials have been reminded and warned of this repeatedly, but they have rejected responsibility every time on the pretext that in their country the

press is free. These gentlemen speak of freedom in their country while Muslim girls are not free to choose the type of clothing they will wear to the university.

What has necessitated the writing of these lines is recent events in Turkey, which has to do with the volume and type of cooperation of the terrorist hypocrite organization with this nation's intelligence and security organizations. Due to the geographic features of the border between the two countries, this organization has built a base in Turkey which has been used from the very beginning by spy organizations and actually the Turkish leadership, so that this base became an intelligence exchange site. Since the extensive and growing bureaucracy of the terrorist hypocrite organization consumes dollars rapidly, to meet this need and to make use of other facilities, it has begun cooperating with MIT, the Turkish intelligence organization.

Turkish officials have authorized MIT's cooperation with the infamous hypocrite organization at a time when on the one hand its terrorist and sabotage operations are despised by the Muslim people of Turkey, and on the other hand when they have complained and protested often against some of the elements opposed to their government in neighboring countries.

Turkish officials have made a pretext of their international commitments concerning the matter of political asylum in order to give asylum to evil, destructive and disreputable elements. Unfortunately this is being done without foresight or concern for the political consequences. Of course it is possible that these events were created by the anti-religious faction of the Turkish government to weaken and pressure the more religious factions in the government who want sound and active relations with the Islamic Republic. Therefore, if these measures are taking place against the wishes of the religious factions in Turkey, it is necessary for them to thwart every plot that could have unwelcome consequences in order to expand relations based on principles acceptable to both sides.

In conclusion, it is necessary to note that evidently Turkish officials are seeking to have our nation's minister of the interior come to Ankara to solve border problems and the issue of Iranian counterrevolutionaries traveling into Turkey. The hope is that this trip will have positive results to drive terrorist elements out of the friendly soil of Turkey and protect the rights of Iranian residents. Finally it is hoped that Turkish officials clearly see that their nation will be in great need of an independent and powerful country that is now entering a period of post-war reconstruction.

#### **Paper Reports Several Hours of Daily Blackouts in Tehran**

46400050c London KEYHAN in Persian 1 Dec 88 p 4

[Text] Residents of Tehran are still suffering from repeated blackouts. Contrary to their expectation that after the end of the war at least the blackout problem

would end, this shortage has not only failed to abate, on the contrary lately the blackout time in Tehran has sometimes increased to 7 out of 24 hours.

Complaints from the people and the spread of the blackouts to areas surrounding Tehran and Karaj have caused the Islamic Republic's minister of power to appear before the press and explain the reason for the malfunctions to the people.

Engineer Zanganeh, minister of power, gave as the reason for Tehran's recent blackouts the failure to deliver fuel on time, and the loss of gas pressure at some gas electrical power-producing stations. He added that these malfunctions have caused the increase in the number and length of power interruptions in the last few days.

He said: Total production of electricity in the municipal network until early last week was 5,250 megawatts, and 5,900 megawatts in the entire network. At this level of production the municipal network is now faced with a shortage of 1,800 megawatts.

Early last week a Tehran publication wrote that it learned from a contact from the Ministry of Power that no measures have been taken to reduce the length of the blackouts, and that in view of the cold weather and the extraordinary consumption of electricity by families, recurring blackouts will continue.

#### **Commentary on Need for Vigilance, Reform**

46400026 Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian  
19 Oct 88 pp 1, 10

[Text] In the name of God, the compassionate and the merciful.

These days, the Iranian nation is experiencing sensitive and crucial circumstances. Even though the acceptance of Resolution 598 would seem to indicate that the war is on course towards a resolution, the disruption of the enemy in the implementation of the revolution requires more vigilance, so that both the people and the authorities unanimously and with cooperation leave behind the consequences one after another.

In the course of the revolution, and particularly during the eight years of the imposed war, the Iranian people have shown that they are ready, on the scene, courageous, brave and prepared to confront any conspiracy. However, the problem is to place the necessary information at the disposal of the people at this particular juncture in order for them to prepare the grounds on the basis of such information.



The nation is alert, and, naturally, no one expects the details to be told to the people in such a way that even the enemy would benefit from such a disclosure. However, the authorities must inform the people about the present situation and conditions at this juncture as much as possible, so that the people can confront the problems more vigilantly.

The nation knows that we are passing through a "transitional period" and, naturally, under such circumstances, certain problems and difficulties may exist which are natural side effects of passing through such a transitional period from a state of war to peace.

The Iranian people are alert, but they must be given the necessary warnings in order to know what their resistance and steadfastness at this particular juncture means and what fruitful results they will bring. It must be made clear that the enemy and some of its supporters are trying to hold the issue of the war in this state, so that there is neither war nor peace. But we must be able to crush this demonic conspiracy and change the situation. This requires more resistance and vigilance on the part of the people, and the authorities must speak more to the people and complete their information to assist them in making decisions and tolerating the present hardships.

The authorities must explain to the people the peculiarities and fine points of the present juncture and show that we are entering a transitional period, on a course which has its own problems and difficulties, and naturally we still must rely seriously on the preparedness and vigilance of the people to confront the conspiracies.

Naturally, at this temporary juncture, no one must expect the problems and difficulties of the country to be solved all at once, or that a serious and effective change in the present condition of services to the society will be created suddenly. We are at a transitional juncture, and although we are sincere in accepting the resolution and are on the road to peace, this is not sufficient to attain peace. We must stand bravely to gain our rights and resist problems in order to reach such a point. But before we reach it, it is inevitable that our shortages and shortcomings will remain, to one degree or another. The issue is quite clear and the reason for the shortcomings is also understandable, to a great extent. Today, the situation is such that we must not only think about peace, construction and reconstruction, but we must also not neglect war and the preservation of our combat readiness. Efforts to attain peace and tranquility at the present time necessitate the preservation of the defensive nature of the Islamic forces. Every individual in the nation understands well that such a phenomenon is undoubtedly not without its problems. Today, in every meeting, discussions center around reconstruction, policy making and necessary programs in this area. When we are on the road to peace, raising such issues seems quite natural, and no one can be blamed for discussing and giving opinions on such matters. But the issue is that at the same time, the authorities of the country should think

about the tricks of the enemy as well and place a large portion of the defensive resources and operational capabilities at the disposal of the war in order to preserve the reliability of the defensive nature of the forces, so that the enemy is not tempted to engage in new conspiracies. In other words, discussing reconstruction and raising welfare issues do not create problems in themselves, but if they cause us to neglect the war and the preservation of the defenses of the country at the present juncture, they will certainly be harmful and perhaps irreparable.

Today, reconstruction and welfare issues have become hot and compelling discussion topics, and there is the fear that a number of people, due to certain evil intentions or as the result of immaturity and lack of knowledge of the issues, will enter such discussions in a way that they become deviant, resulting in diverting public attention from the preservation of the combat readiness of the country to confront any possible incidents.

Before reconstruction, preparedness for reconstruction is important, and we must not forget that to maintain preparedness on the cease-fire lines and preserve the readiness of the defensive forces of the country, we must engage in policy making and planning. The meaning of "transitional state" is that in such a state, we cannot yet plan for the reconstruction of all the potential forces of the country.

Inviting the authorities to prepare the grounds for welfare programs at such a juncture can have harmful consequences, even if it is appropriate to the existing resources, if it does not pay attention to the present conditions of the society and the war. It can create more problems in the economic and distribution system of the country. A simple example in this regard can clarify the issue to a great extent. Everyone knows that the coupon distribution system and offering food items and the primary needs of the society through this method is one of the consequences of the imposed war. But at the same time, all fair experts also admit completely that it was an inevitable phenomenon which could not have been avoided by any means. Had the government not hurriedly come to the aid of the low-income people and classes of the society by creating such a system, certainly more uncontrollable problems and difficulties would have arisen.

The coupon distribution system is a side effect of the war, but such a system cannot be abolished merely with the declaration of a cease-fire. One reason is that these conditions are not stable and secure, on the basis of which one can engage in serious and effective decisions. Another reason is that the coupon distribution system harnesses prices and ensures the just distribution of primary goods and foods which are in short supply. The elimination of this system will harm precisely the most oppressed classes of the society, the low-income and destitute people, which is completely opposite to its intent.

The well-to-do stratum has never, at no juncture, felt a limitation in regards to the shortage of food and primary materials, and naturally, the existence or lack thereof of the coupon distribution system is not a factor in providing the needs of this stratum. But to eliminate the coupon distribution system without studying the coupon distribution system would mean the low-income strata would face the high prices of goods and shortages at even higher prices and would be harmed by it. But is there another way?

If the government and the executive officials have more resources and can decrease the intervals between the announcement of coupons or increase the rations in

order to ease the situation while carrying out fair distribution and gradually remove items that become more plentiful from the coupon system, in order not to shock the market prices, the low-income consumers would not be adversely affected.

This is an example, and there are many others in regards to proper planning in the "transitional state." The issue is quite clear, and the authorities should pay attention to the problem that the society, on the one hand, needs to understand the facts and fine points of the present juncture and, on the other hand, that the transitional state from war to peace requires special policies and planning. It is a state of neither war nor peace, one which might end up in war or peace. However, everyone hopes that the region will see tranquility and this requires resistance, vigilance and prudence.